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Editorial
Barry Solaiman* and Catherine Gascoigne**
1 Introduction
The second issue of the fifth volume of the Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (CJICL) brings together varied, thought-provoking and 
illuminating articles from our open Call for Papers and the Young Scholar’s Lecture. 
The first three articles analyse energy and climate issues covering the institutions 
of the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union (EU). These are 
followed by two comparative articles covering the integration of blind persons in 
the judiciaries of the United Kingdom, the United States and Israel, and an analysis 
of the way in which the federal-type polities of Canada and the EU have addressed 
the tension between State sovereignty and federalism. The next two articles that 
consider unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the civil liability 
imposed on credit rating agencies. The second issue concludes with a book review.
We are very grateful to all of our contributors for their articles. We also wish to 
thank our Managing Editors, Michael Dafel, Darren Harvey, Massimo Lando, Lan 
Nguyen, Niall O’Connor and Stefan Theil. The Managing Editors and their teams 
of editors have contributed a significant amount of time and effort in reviewing, 
copy-editing and liaising with authors to produce this issue. This issue would not 
have been possible without their hard work and dedication. We are also grateful for 
the generosity and support of the Cambridge Law Journal, the Lauterpacht Centre 
for International Law and the Centre for European Legal Studies at the University 
of Cambridge.
2 Overview of Issue 5(2)
The issue begins with an article by Danae Azaria. This year we were fortunate 
to continue the tradition of hosting the CJICL Young Scholar’s Lecture at the 
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law. This event was initiated by our 
DOI:10.7574/cjicl.05.02.165 
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predecessors, Naomi Hart and Ana Júlia Maurício, and has all the hallmarks of 
becoming a celebrated annual event for the Journal, as it provides a platform for 
an early-career academic to present and publish his or her research.  This year, the 
Journal was very honoured to welcome Dr Danae Azaria, a Lecturer at University 
College London, to present. We are delighted that Dr Azaria’s well-acclaimed 
and highly stimulating piece, ‘State Responsibility and Community Interest in 
International Energy Law: A European Perspective’ has been published in this issue 
in modified form. Dr Azaria’s piece surveys the landscape of obligations between 
EU Member States and third states in relation to the energy sector. 
We are also grateful to Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger for her article which 
considers the recent Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement was concluded in 
December 2016 with the aim of strengthening the global response to the threat of 
climate change. The author outlines the important measures of the Paris Agreement 
and discusses sustainable development principles. She outlines the international 
context for implementation and analyses emerging legal issues. Finally, ‘climate 
justice’ concerns are considered, and legal and governance obstacles for effective 
participation are highlighted. This includes a consideration of the opportunities for 
effective implementation of the new regime. The author argues that, ultimately, new 
legal research, education, awareness, capacity-building and technical assistance 
will be essential to ensuring the success of the Paris Agreement.
The third article, by Wei-Chung Lin, discusses the role of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel in upholding non-economic values in relation to the activities of 
the World Bank. The World Bank Inspection Panel is a review mechanism by which 
private individuals affected by the World Bank’s financed projects can challenge 
the legitimacy of the Bank’s lending decisions. To that end, the article examines 
the way in which the World Bank Inspection Panel has drawn on Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements in order to ensure that Bank-funded projects comply 
with environmental obligations. Wei-Chung Lin argues that the World Bank 
Inspection Panel not only enhances the accountability of the World Bank to the 
people it affects most, but that it also plays an important role in interpreting and 
enforcing social and environmental norms in the context of project finance.
Doron Dorfman then analyses the progress made by the Anglo-American 
judicial system in integrating blind persons into the judiciary. The integration of 
blind persons has received little academic attention and the author makes a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of this important issue through his comparative 
analysis. He achieves this by providing a historical account of the appointment 
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of blind persons in the United Kingdom and the United States to the judiciary. 
That analysis is supplemented by an examination of the symbolic importance of 
blindness in the legal system. These elements are drawn together by a consideration 
of the potential of integrating blind persons into the judiciary of Israel. 
Next, Thomas Verrellen examines how the federal-type polities of Canada 
and the EU have addressed the tension between the value of State sovereignty 
and the value of federalism. The author argues that in both polities, federalism 
is largely put ‘on hold’ with regard to foreign affairs. He notes that the authority 
to act internationally in Canada is mainly controlled by the order of government 
recognised as a sovereign state. This is in contrast to the EU, where the dominance 
of the sovereign state in the area of EU foreign affairs is liable to spill over into 
the EU’s domestic constitution. The author calls for a recalibration of the federal 
balance in Europe’s foreign affairs constitution via a critical appraisal of the use of 
the technique of mixity. 
The sixth article, by Reijer Passchier and Maarten Stremler, considers the issue 
of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. They analyse whether there are 
limitations of amendability that exist with regard to the EU Treaties and whether 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the competence to enforce 
such limits. The authors determine the extent to which arguments used to justify 
a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in national systems can 
justify the same doctrine in EU law. They argue that EU Treaty amendments may 
be deemed to be a violation of the Treaties in some cases. Further, they contend 
that the CJEU may review amendments to the EU Treaties where Member States 
put forward questionable revisions.
The issue of the effectiveness of credit rating agencies (CRAs) as gatekeepers 
has received much attention following the global financial crisis in 2008. Nicholas 
Hoggard analyses CRAs from a distinct angle by considering Regulation (EU) 
462/2013 in the seventh article of this issue. The Regulation imposes civil liability 
on credit rating agencies who intentionally or negligently infringe regulatory 
requirements, thus causing loss to investors. The author argues that the Regulation 
replicates the UK’s existing law on deceit—though it is more restrictive for 
claimants. He also analyses the potential harm caused by such duplication when 
considering harmonisation measures, and contends that the Regulation is another 
example of an ill-defined and inconsistent private liability.
This issue concludes with Valentin Jeutner’s review of the monograph, 
Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International Law 
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(Cambridge University Press 2014) by Surabhi Ranganathan. Jeutner’s review 
provides an overview of the main thesis of Ranganathan’s book and situates it in 
the surrounding literature.
3 Future Developments for the Journal
Finally, we conclude this Editorial by announcing exciting future developments 
for the Journal. The CJICL was established in 2011 by postgraduate students in the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Cambridge. Since then, the Journal has grown 
under the stewardship of previous Editors-in-Chief, supported by the hard work of 
postgraduate student editors and our esteemed Academic Review Board. Thanks 
to their hard work, the Journal has spurred a thriving community for collaboration 
between young and senior academics and practitioners, as evidenced by the 
publications in these issues and the Journal’s strongly attended annual conference. 
As such, the Journal is now ready to develop further, to grow its audience and 
become more specialised. To that end, Edward Elgar Publishing has agreed to 
publish the Journal from Volume 6 onwards on a long-term basis.1 
Edward Elgar is committed to publishing high quality, original scholarship 
in the field of International Law and their aim clearly mirrors the aims of the 
Journal. The Journal will narrow its focus to publishing pieces concerning 
International Law only, and the name of the Journal will change accordingly to 
the Cambridge International Law Journal (CILJ). Further consolidating our strong 
links with the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at Cambridge, Whewell 
Professor of International Law, Eyal Benvenisti, will become the Honorary Editor-
in-Chief of the Journal in future years. Importantly, the Journal will continue the 
traditions of the past by providing a forum for collaboration between young and 
senior academics and practitioners, and for providing the same opportunities 
for postgraduate students at the Faculty of Law to develop essential editing skills. 
Ultimately, we believe that the partnership between Edward Elgar and the Journal 
will provide more opportunities for the International Law community and support 
our aim of publishing high quality and original scholarship.
1  Barry Solaiman and Catherine Gascoigne, ‘Edward Elgar to publish the Cambridge 
International Law Journal’ (University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law, 7 September 2016) <http://
www.law.cam.ac.uk/press/news/2016/09/edward-elgar-publish-cambridge-international-law-
journal> accessed 21 September 2016.
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State Responsibility and Community Interest in 
International Energy Law: A European Perspective
Danae Azaria*
Abstract
Treaties dominate international energy law, meaning the rules of public international law that 
govern energy activities and their effects. This raises the question about the relationship of 
treaties, and particularly those on energy trade, with the law of international responsibility. 
This article uses a European angle to contextualise the importance of this question. EU 
Member States are major oil and gas importers from third states. The EU and Member States 
are party to treaties with third states that apply to energy trade, carriage and investment. 
Whether treaty obligations, undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-à-vis 
third states, are of bilateral, interdependent or community interest nature determines whether 
the EU and/or a Member State have standing to invoke the responsibility of a third state for 
a breach of an energy-related obligation as well as their remedial rights and the means by 
which they may implement responsibility. At the same time, because energy access is vital 
for states, suspending compliance with obligations in the energy sector is often preferred 
as a permissible response to wrongfulness carrying significant effects and persuasiveness. 
The nature of obligations of international energy law may determine whether suspending 
compliance with such obligations can be a lawful countermeasure either by the EU and/or 
Member States against a third state, or by a third state against the EU and/or Member States.
Keywords
State responsibility, international energy law, World Trade Organization, pipeline treaties, 
human rights
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) Member States are major oil and gas importers. The 
EU imports 90 per cent of the oil and 66 per cent of the gas that it consumes.1 
*  Lecturer in Law,  Faculty of Laws, University College London (UCL), email: d.azaria@ucl.ac.uk.
  An earlier draft of this article was presented at the CJICL Young Scholar’s Lecture at the Lauterpacht 
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge. This article is based on the author’s research 
for the monograph, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures (OUP 2015).
1  See generally ‘Energy Security Strategy’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/
energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-security-strategy> accessed 28 September 2016. 
DOI:10.7574/cjicl.05.02.169 
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The dependence of EU Member States on imports of different energy sources has, 
to varying degrees, existed for decades. The exporting and transit states of these 
sources of energy have also changed over time.2 Despite this dependence, it was 
not until the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), that a new 
Title on Energy was added.3 The Title comprises only one provision—Article 194—
which operates as a separate basis for energy-related EU legislation. However, even 
before the insertion of this provision, EU energy law had been expanding mainly 
with a view to creating an internal energy market and securing oil and gas supplies,4 
with further developments to be expected as the European Commission has made 
a new proposal for an ‘Energy Union’.5
Given the need for energy imports, the relationship of the EU and Member 
States with third states in the energy sector has been perceived as critical for the 
development of the internal energy market, as well as for securing supply.6 The 
modern significance of this relationship is illustrated by the effects of the 2009 gas 
crisis on the European gas market that occurred owing to a dispute concerning 
exports of gas from Russia to Ukraine and being transited through Ukraine.7 In 
terms of factual effects, industrial and household consumers were left without 
gas for days.8 In terms of legal impact, the conduct of third states triggered the 
2  Sanam Salem Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union 
with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries (Hart 2007) 38–64.
3  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ 
C115/47 (TFEU); For the reasons behind the reluctance of Member States to have a common 
energy policy, see Haghighi (n 2) 46–53, 56–62. 
4  Until the insertion of this provision, EU energy-related legislation was adopted mainly on the 
environmental and internal market bases and mainly through harmonisation. See generally 
Christopher Jones (ed), EU Energy Law, vol 1 (4th edn, Claeys & Casteels Publishing 2016) 
1–9; Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (OUP 2012) 4–6.
5  See Commission, ‘A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy’ COM (2015) 80 final.
6  Haghighi (n 2) 63.
7  Dan Bilefsky and Andrew E Kramer, ‘Deal to End Russia’s Cutoff of Gas Remains Uncertain’ 
The New York Times (New York, 9 January 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world/
europe/10gazprom.html> accessed 28 September 2016; For an analysis of the 2009 dispute 
between Ukraine and Russia, see Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and 
Countermeasures (OUP 2015) 4–5, 90–93.
8  For different effects on each Member State and third states in the Balkan region, see 
European Commission, ‘Member State General Situation According to Significance of 
Impact, Memo/09/3)’ (9 January 2009) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/09/3&type=HTML> accessed 28 September 2016.
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development of EU secondary legislation—the 2009 crisis led to the adoption of 
the 2010 Gas Security of Supply Regulation.9 
The relationship with third states is governed by international law. The EU 
and Member States are party to treaties with third states that apply to energy trade 
and investment, and Member States conclude treaties with third states so as to 
diversify sources and routes of supply. This treaty practice—partly driven by an 
effort to secure uninterrupted energy supply—raises a number of legal questions.10 
This study analyses the relationship between treaties concerning energy activities 
and the law of international responsibility. More specifically, the study focuses on 
the treaties that regulate the trade of energy. It explains that the nature of treaty 
obligations, which are undertaken and owed to the EU and/or Member States vis-
à-vis third states, determines whether the EU and/or a Member State has standing 
to implement the responsibility of a third state for a breach of an energy-related 
obligation. It also determines which remedial rights they have and by which means 
they can implement the responsibility of a third state. At the same time, because 
access to energy is vital for states—their economies and the survival of their 
populations depend on it11—suspending compliance with obligations in the energy 
sector rank highly among the permissible responses to wrongfulness carrying 
significant persuasiveness. The nature of obligations of international energy law, 
meaning the rules of public international law that govern energy activities and their 
effects,12 may determine whether suspending compliance with such obligations can 
be a lawful countermeasure. Such countermeasure may be taken either by the EU 
and/or Member States against a third responsible state, or by a third state against 
the EU and/or Member States. 
These issues are of exceptional practical importance to the EU, its 
Member States and its neighbourhood, as they lie at the heart of energy security 
considerations. Which Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
or Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, were entitled 
9  Council Directive (EU) 994/2010 of 12 November 2010 concerning measures to safeguard 
security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive (EC) 2004/67 [2010] OJ L295/1 recitals 
26–27. 
10  Questions that fall beyond the scope of this study include the allocation of external competence 
in relation to energy trade, the compatibility of EU law with treaties between Member States 
and third states, and the relationship between these treaties and customary international law.
11  Case 72/83 Campus Oil Limited and Others v Minister for Industry and Energy and Others 
[1984] ECR 2727, para 34.
12  Catherine Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in Martha Roggenkamp 
and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 16.
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to resort to dispute settlement under the ECT or the WTO Agreement against 
Ukraine or Russia in relation to the 2009 incident alleging breaches of transit or 
export obligations (respectively)?13 Would Ukraine have been able lawfully to 
suspend compliance with its transit obligations under the WTO or the ECT in 
response to Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea with consequences for the EU 
and its Member States? Can a Member State, which is party to a bespoke pipeline 
treaty with a third state, suspend energy flows via the pipeline in response to a 
breach of an obligation owed to it by that third state? 
The following analysis will first determine the nature of some primary 
obligations of international energy law that are of relevance to EU and/or 
Member States. Second, it will examine how secondary rules on energy-related 
countermeasures take into account the nature of primary obligations.14 The 
analysis will place international energy law and the energy security concerns of the 
EU and Member States within the broader field of public international law. The 
European angle is a context that assists in better understanding the application of 
international responsibility in the context of international energy law. 
2 From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International 
Energy Law: Treaties of European Concern
In early January 2009, the transit and export of gas to EU Member States were 
interrupted arguably contrary to Ukraine’s transit obligations (under the WTO 
Agreement and the ECT) and Russia’s export obligations (under the ECT). Yet, there 
13  Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1994, entered into force 16 April 1998) 2080 
UNTS 95 (ECT); Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 3. The EU and Member States 
were ECT Contracting Parties and WTO Members, as was Ukraine. Russia was provisionally 
bound by the ECT at the time of the dispute, but Russia was not a WTO Member. Russia 
acceded to the WTO Agreement on 22 August 2012. Russia’s provisional application of the 
ECT ceased to be in effect since 19 October 2009 (pursuant to ECT art 45(3)(a)). On 20 August 
2009, Russia expressed its intention not to become a party to the ECT. For Russia’s provisional 
application of ECT, see Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, PCA 
Case AA227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, para 394. 
14  Primary rules determine the conduct of a state, while secondary rules deal with the 
consequences of the breach of primary rules. For an explanation of the distinction between the 
two, see ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty-second 
Session’ (4 May–10 July 1970) UN Doc A/8010/Rev 1, 306, para 66.c.
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is no evidence that the EU or Member States formally invoked the responsibility 
of either of the two states by requesting cessation of the wrongful act or reparation, 
by resorting to dispute settlement or by resorting to countermeasures.15 Rather, 
on 10 January 2009, Russia, Ukraine and the European Commission signed the 
Agreement on Monitoring of Natural Gas through Ukraine, pursuant to which 
international monitoring staff (with strictly fact-finding competence) were 
dispatched to metering stations at the Russia-Ukraine border in Ukraine and 
Russia.16 However, the fact that responsibility was not invoked does not perforce 
mean that responsibility has not been engaged; nor does it necessarily mean that 
the EU and/or Member States lacked standing to invoke responsibility. Invoking 
international responsibility is discretionary.17
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR)18 and submitted 
them to the General Assembly that commended them to the governments.19 The 
ASR generally represents customary international law concerning the entitlement to 
invoke responsibility.20 Standing to invoke responsibility is premised on a tripartite 
classification of primary obligations. International obligations are classified on the 
basis of the question ‘to whom are these obligations owed?’
15  Invoking responsibility involves claims of ‘relative formality’, such as recourse to dispute 
settlement or countermeasures. ILC, ‘Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries Thereto’ (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 
August 2001) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 117. 
16  On 19 January 2009, Gazprom and Naftogaz signed 10-year supply and transit contracts. The 
EU and Member States were informed of the agreement, without participating in negotiations. 
On 20 January 2009, supplies to, and transit via, Ukraine began. See José Manuel Durão 
Barroso, ‘Statement of President Barroso on the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Dispute’ 
(European Commission, 20 January 2009) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=SPEECH/09/12&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> 
accessed 28 September 2016. On 22 January 2009, gas flows to all importing states returned to 
the levels before the interruption.
17  For possible reasons relating to the legal architecture of WTO and ECT dispute settlement 
mechanisms, see Azaria (n 7) 168–72, 177–84. 
18  ILC (n 15) 26–30. 
19  UNGA Res 56/83 (28 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/83. 
20  ILC (n 15) 117–19, 126–28; The ICJ has followed the ASR’s position concerning standing to 
invoke responsibility for breaches of erga omnes partes obligations in Questions relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 2012, paras 
67–70.
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First, some obligations are ‘bilateral’. These obligations are owed in pairs 
between the parties. When they are grounded in multilateral norms, such as 
a multilateral treaty, they may be called ‘bilateralisable’. In the latter case, the 
multilateral norm creates bundles of bilateral relationships.21 An example is that of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea.22 In case of a breach, the individually 
injured state may invoke responsibility, including by recourse to countermeasures.23 
Second, other obligations are ‘interdependent’, meaning obligations owed to a 
group of states collectively but premised on ‘global reciprocity’.24 Non-performance 
by one permits everyone else not to perform—a paradigmatic example is obligations 
of disarmament. Under the ASR, breaches of a certain character may change 
radically the position of all other states to whom this type of obligation is owed 
with respect to the further performance by those other states of the obligation.25 
Accordingly, the breach allows all other states to which the obligation is owed to 
invoke responsibility, as injured states, including by recourse to countermeasures.26
Third, community interest obligations, which are obligations owed indivisibly 
to all states for the protection of a collective interest (erga omnes obligations) or to 
a group of states established for the protection of a collective interest of the group 
(or even for a wider common interest) above the individual interests of the group 
(erga omnes partes obligations).27 These are genuinely multilateral obligations.28 In 
case of a breach, the specially affected state is the injured state and may invoke 
responsibility, including by recourse to countermeasures.29 States other than the 
injured state may claim cessation of the wrongful act and assurances and guarantees 
21  Bruno Simma, ‘Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State Responsibility’ in 
Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai 
Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) 822–23.
22  James Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law’ (2006) 319 Recueil 
des Cours 325. 
23  ILC (n 15) arts 42(a), 49.
24  Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension 
of the Relations of International Responsibility’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1127, 1134–36; ILC (n 15) 
117–18, note 669.
25  ILC (n 15) art 42(b)(ii). 
26  ibid art 49.
27  ILC (n 15) 126.
28  Simma (n 21) 822–23.
29  ILC (n 15) arts 42(b)(i), 49.
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of non-repetition.30 As a matter of progressive development, the ASR suggest that a 
state other than the injured state may claim reparation in the interest of the injured 
state, assuming that an injured state exists.31 It is questionable whether states other 
than the injured state may resort to countermeasures.32 
According to the ILC Commentary to the ASR, the determination of the 
nature of the obligation takes place by interpreting the primary rule.33 In the 
absence of a reasonable alternative, it is logical to argue that, at least in relation to 
treaty obligations, the customary rules on treaty interpretation set forth in Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) are to be used.34 
Furthermore, international case law has placed emphasis on the treaty’s object 
and purpose in order to identify the nature of treaty obligations,35 and scholars 
have suggested that inter se modifications are prohibited in cases of treaties that 
establish community interest obligations.36
Reciprocity dominates economic activities in the energy sector. Prior to the 
rise of multilateral treaties that either specifically deal with energy trade (eg ECT) 
or also apply to energy trade (eg GATT annexed to the WTO Agreement), energy 
trade had fallen within the scope of bilateral treaties on friendship, navigation and 
30  ibid art 48(2)(a). 
31  ibid art 48(2)(b). 
32  ibid art 54. See also ILC (n 15) 129, 137, 139; For an argument that countermeasures of states 
other than the injured state are permitted under lex lata, see Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, 
‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International 
Community’ in James Crawford and others (eds), The Law of International Responsibility 
(OUP 2010) 1146–48.
33  ILC (n 15) 118; Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice in his work on the law of treaties had similarly 
suggested that the nature of treaties is determined by the ‘correct interpretation of the treaty 
according to its terms’: ILC, ‘Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties’ (1959) UN Doc A/CN.4/120 
para 18.
34  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
35  S.S. Wimbledon (United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan v Germany) (Judgment) [1923] PCIJ 
Rep Series A No 1; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v 
Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] ICJ Rep 2012; In relation to the EU founding treaties, see Case 
26/62 NV Algemene Transport—en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, 12.
36  Individual Opinion by M. Anzilotti, Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Advisory 
Opinion) (1931) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 41, 64; Separate Opinion of Judge van Eysinga, The 
Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v Belgium) (Judgment) (1934) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 63, 
131.
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commerce. A case concerning the breach of such obligations that found its way 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the Oil Platforms case which was 
couched in terms of energy commerce.37 However, treaty obligations in this area 
of international law may protect the community interests of treaty parties. The 
following analysis classifies obligations relevant to energy activities in treaties 
to which either the EU and/or Member States are parties along with third states. 
These are examined in the following sequence: the WTO Agreement, the ECT, and 
bespoke pipeline treaties: the Nabucco Pipeline Agreement38 (Nabucco Agreement), 
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline Treaty39 (TAP Treaty) and the bilateral treaties for the 
South Stream pipeline.40 
37  Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary Objection, 
Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep 1996, 817, para 38; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United 
States of America) (Judgment) ICJ Rep 2003, 161 paras 23–84.
38  Agreement among the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Hungary, 
Romania and the Republic of Turkey Regarding the Nabucco Project (signed 13 July 2009) 
<https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_III_57/COO_2026_100_ 
2_605048.pdf> accessed 28 September 2016.
39  Agreement among the Republic of Albania, the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic 
relating to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (signed 13 February 2013, entered into force 
5 January 2014) <http://nomoi.info/ΦΕΚ-Α-267–2013-σελ-93.html> accessed 28 September 
2016.
40  Treaties for the South Stream pipeline between Russia and EU Member States (abbreviated): 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of Bulgaria (signed 18 January 2008); Intergovernmental 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the 
Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation of the Gas Pipeline 
in the Territory of Hungary (signed 28 February 2008); Agreement between Government of 
the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the 
Construction and Operation of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Hellenic Republic 
(signed 29 April 2008); Intergovernmental Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Slovenia (signed 14 November 2009); 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Austria (signed 24 April 2010); 
Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Construction and Operation 
of the Gas Pipeline in the Territory of the Republic of Croatia (signed 2 March 2010) (Croatia 
was not an EU Member State when it concluded this treaty with Russia).
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2.1 The WTO Agreement and Trade in Energy Goods
Under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 GATT)41 disputes 
concerning energy trade were not prominent.42 There is no agreement specifically 
dedicated to energy trade annexed to the WTO Agreement. In the first two decades 
since the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, disputes concerning energy 
trade did not give rise to proceedings under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).43 However, the scope of application of the WTO Agreement, including 
its annexes, such as the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),44 
encompasses some aspects of the energy sector. For example, freedom of transit 
(GATT Article V) and the prohibition of import and export restrictions (GATT 
Article XI) apply to oil and gas products.45 Furthermore, disputes relating to 
the energy (or mineral resources) sector are increasingly brought under the 
WTO DSU.46 Given the interconnection of energy markets, standing to invoke 
responsibility for breaches of trade obligations in the energy sector is important in 
relation to energy-related disputes. 
41  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30 October 1947, provisionally applicable 
1 January 1948) 55 UNTS 194. The provisional application of 1947 GATT was terminated one 
year after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, pursuant to the Decision of 8 December 
1994 adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO and the Contracting Parties to 
GATT 1947 on “Transitional Co-existence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement” 
(PC/12, L/7583).
42  The only 1947 GATT case that dealt with energy activities was Report of the Panel on US—
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (1987) GATT BISD 34S/136. 
43  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 401.
44  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex IA to the Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 3; 
annexes to the WTO Agreement expressly constitute an integral part of the WTO Agreement 
(Article II, paragraph 2 of the WTO Agreement); GATT is legally distinct from 1947 GATT, 
pursuant to Article II(4) of the WTO Agreement. 
45  Azaria (n 7) 30–35.
46  WTO, Canada: Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector—Report 
of the Appellate Body (6 May 2013) WT/DS412/AB/R; WTO, Appellate Body Report, China: 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials—Report of the Appellate Body 
(22 February 2012) WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R and WT/DS398/AB/R; WTO, China: 
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum—Report of 
the Appellate Body (26 March 2014) WT/DS431/R. Indicative pending cases: WTO, European 
Union and its Member States—Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector—Request for 
Consultation by the Russian Federation (8 May 2014) WT/DS476/1; WTO, European Union 
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The nature of WTO obligations has been considered by a Panel in 
EC—Bananas47 and by an Arbitrator in US—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales 
Corporations’.48 EC—Bananas dealt with standing to bring a claim under the WTO 
DSU for a breach of the GATT. In its reasoning, the Panel did not expressly make 
a finding that the GATT obligations are bilateralisable, erga omnes partes, or 
interdependent.49 Rather, its reasoning was based on the factual interconnectedness 
of international markets (‘interdependence of global economy’) and the risk 
of economic impact, including in the form of supplies and prices, faced by any 
other WTO member in cases where violations of GATT occur. In support of its 
findings, the Panel cited the Judgment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) in S.S. Wimbledon,50 as well as the provisionally adopted ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (1996),51 particularly Article 40(e) and (f), which 
encompass bilateral, interdependent, erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations 
respectively. By referring to community interest obligations without distinguishing 
among these bases, the Panel opened the debate about whether GATT obligations 
are erga omnes partes.52 However, the fact that the Panel cited the page of the S.S. 
Wimbledon Judgment where the PCIJ addressed the issue of jurisdiction (and, by 
implication, standing),53 rather than the judgment’s operative part, which touches 
implicitly on the nature of the primary obligations in question, offers support to 
the view that rules on standing in the WTO Agreement, including its Annexes, 
may be generous and unconnected to the nature of the primary obligations therein.
and Certain Member States—Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel 
and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry—Requests for Consultation by Argentina (23 
May 2013) WT/DS459/1.
47  WTO, European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—
Complaint by the United States (22 May 1997) WT/DS27/R/USA, as modified by the Report of 
the Appellate Body (25 September 1997). 
48  WTO, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’—Recourse to Arbitration 
by the US under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement—Decision of the 
Arbitrator (30 August 2002) WT/DS108/ARB.
49  WTO, European Communities (n 47) para 7.50.
50  S.S. Wimbledon (n 35).
51  ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session’ (6 May–26 
July 1996) UN Doc A/51/10, 58.
52  WTO, European Communities (n 47) para 7.50.
53  Jurisdiction and standing are two different issues, but they come up in international courts and 
tribunals as preliminary objections. On the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility, 
see Hochtief AG v the Argentine Republic ICSID Case ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 
October 2011, paras 90–96.
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In US—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, the Arbitrator did 
not deal with standing, but with the quantitative amount of the countermeasure 
agreed between the parties to the dispute. He explained that the prohibition of the 
subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) was an erga omnes obligation.54 Presumably, the Arbitrator meant 
erga omnes partes given that the obligations are binding only on WTO members. 
However, his reasoning does not support the suggestion that WTO obligations 
in general (or obligations arising from the SCM Agreement specifically) are erga 
omnes partes. He substantiated his finding by reference to the effects of the measure 
in question, rather than the obligation’s nature and the treaty’s object and purpose: 
‘once such a measure is in operation, its real world effects cannot be separated from 
the inherent uncertainty that is created by the very existence of such an export 
subsidy’.55 
Therefore, GATT obligations may be better classified as bilateralisable, while 
the rules on standing, as developed under the DSU, permit any WTO member 
to resort to the DSU in case of breach of a WTO obligation.56 This is fitting for 
international and regional energy markets given the factual interdependence of oil, 
gas, and electricity prices as well as of producers and consumers. Having examined 
WTO Agreement obligations that may apply to energy trade, the following section 
discusses the obligations under the ECT. 
2.2 The Energy Charter Treaty
The ECT is the first sector-specific multilateral treaty governing numerous aspects 
of the energy sector: eg trade in Articles 5 and 29; transit in Article 7; protection 
of foreign investment in Part III; protection of the environment in Article 19 and 
54  WTO, United States—Tax Treatment (n 48) para 6.10. 
55  ibid para 6.8.
56  Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their 
Violation’ (2006) 17 EJIL 723; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: 
Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907; Crawford (n 22) 
451; Azaria (n 7) 126–130; In opposition, see Chios Carmody, ‘WTO Obligations as Collective’ 
(2006) 17 2 EJIL 419. Although the causes of action provided in GATT Article XXIII(1) 
include ‘violations’, ‘non-violations’, and ‘other situations’, only standing for breaches of the 
GATT have been examined here.
180 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Danae Azaria
competition in Article 6.57 The ECT has 51 Contracting Parties, including the EU 
and Member States (with the exception of Italy, since 1 January 2016).58 
The nature of ECT obligations has yet to be addressed in the publicly available 
ECT case law. The following sections examine some ECT obligations separately. 
They demonstrate that ECT obligations vary in terms of their nature. This difference 
in nature has implications for standing to invoke responsibility either by recourse 
to ECT dispute settlement procedures, or by recourse to countermeasures, where 
the latter are not excluded by lex specialis in the ECT.59
2.2.1 Investment Protection Obligations
The ECT investment obligations in Part III and the dispute settlement provisions 
of Article 26 apply solely in relation to investors bearing the nationality of an ECT 
Contracting Party in relation to an investment in the Area of another (host) ECT 
Contracting Party. They do not apply (by virtue of the ECT) to foreign investors 
who do not bear the nationality of an ECT Contracting Party. They also do not 
apply to investors that are nationals of an ECT Contracting Party in relation to 
investment made in the Area of that ECT Contracting Party. It could be argued that 
the manner in which the protection of investors of another Contracting Party is 
widened because the definition of ‘investment’ (ECT Article 1(6)(b)) requires the 
host Contracting Party to treat locally incorporated companies in conformity with 
ECT investment obligations, thus leading to the multilateralisation of the investment 
obligations.60 However, the purpose of such a provision is not to treat foreign and 
domestic investors in the same manner, with a view to protecting corporate entities 
per se; but to protect the interests of as many investors of each Contracting Party 
as possible. It could also be argued that the manner in which the most-favoured 
nation (MFN) treatment works in practice means that the investors of numerous 
Contracting Parties may be affected by a breach of the investment obligations and 
that this could mean that investment obligations should be considered erga omnes 
partes.61 However, the MFN treatment obligation is characterised by an exchange of 
57  ibid. 
58  Italy submitted a notification of withdrawal from the ECT to the Depository on 31 December 
2014. Its withdrawal took effect on 1 January 2016, pursuant to ECT art 47(2). 
59  Azaria (n 7) 173–84.
60  See also Stephen W Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2010) 
202. 
61  See also Schill (n 60) 218–19.
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treatment, and reflects predominantly the individual interest of each Contracting 
Party to see its own nationals protected abroad, rather than a community interest 
that involves the protection of all commercial entities within a Contracting Party’s 
jurisdiction. 
Seen through these lenses, the ECT investment obligations rest on foreign 
nationality (that of another Contracting Party) and on a predominantly individual 
interest of each ECT Contracting Party to see their nationals protected abroad. 
They may be better classified as bilateralisable.62
2.2.2 Trade and Transit Obligations
There is no evidence that the ECT trade and transit obligations are not bilateralisable.63 
Given that trade and transit, as a general matter, are based on reciprocal exchanges 
between treaty parties (unless there is evidence to the contrary), it is arguable that 
they are owed in pairs between ECT Contracting Parties. 
Incidents have come up where violations of ECT obligations concerning 
transit (Article 7) and exports (Article 29) have either occurred or the lawfulness 
of the measures taken by the transit and exporter/importer ECT Contracting Party 
could at least have been challenged. However, since on none of these occasions did 
Contracting Parties make any claims of ‘relatively formal form’ for the cessation of 
an internationally wrongful act, no concrete conclusions can be drawn from their 
practice as to the nature of the trade and transit obligations.64 
Subsequent agreements between some ECT Contracting Parties provide 
evidence that priority is given to the ECT in the case of conflict between ECT 
provisions and the provisions of subsequent agreements. This practice of ECT 
Contracting Parties may support the view that the trade and transit provisions 
of the ECT are of integral nature. For instance, all Nabucco Agreement parties 
and TAP Treaty parties are ECT Contracting Parties. The Nabucco Agreement 
explicitly does not derogate from the ECT and the founding EU treaties65 and 
62  Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Concept of an Injured State’ in James Crawford and others (eds), The Law 
of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 944.
63  ECT (n 13) arts 5, 7, 29. 
64  Azaria (n 7) 89–94: the 2004 Belarus–Russia gas export/transit dispute; the 2006 and 2009 
Ukraine–Russia gas transit/export disputes; the 2007 Belarus–Russia oil transit/export dispute; 
the 2010 interruption of gas transit by Belarus.
65  Nabucco Agreement (n 38) art 3.1.
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the TAP Treaty is in furtherance of the ECT.66 All these provisions may indicate 
that parties do not intend to depart from their ECT obligations. However, it is 
unclear that they included such treaty provisions specifically owing to the erga 
omnes partes nature of the ECT trade and transit obligations. In light of the lack of 
evidence to the contrary, it is better to argue that ECT trade and transit obligations 
are bilateralisable.
2.2.3 Environmental Obligations
Article 19 on ‘Environmental Aspects’ sets out erga omnes partes obligations.67 
Article 19 of the ECT comprises three paragraphs.68 Paragraph 1 consists of a chapeau, 
containing framework obligations, and a (non-exhaustive) list of obligations 
specifying the obligations in the chapeau. The chapeau establishes an obligation 
on Contracting Parties to ‘strive to minimize in an economically efficient manner 
harmful Environmental Impacts occurring either within or outside its Area from 
all operations within the Energy Cycle in its Area’.69 Unlike the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), where the term ‘Area’ defines a space beyond national 
jurisdiction, the term ‘Area’ in the ECT expressly means spaces within national 
jurisdiction.70 Additionally, contrary to customary international law, which only 
requires that states prevent significant transboundary harm,71 Article 19 deals with 
66  TAP Treaty (n 39) Preamble.
67  ECT (n 13) art 19. 
68  For an overview of ECT (n 13) art 19, see Clare Shine, ‘Environmental Protection under the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Walde (ed), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East–West 
Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996) 520.
69  ECT (n 13) art 19(1). The wording ‘shall strive’ does not affect the normative character of the 
rule. The obligation is one of conduct, and the question is about the manner in which, and the 
time at which, such obligation is to be breached. 
70  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS). Compare UNCLOS art 1(1) and ECT (n 
13) art 1(10).
71  Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 
(3rd edn, OUP 2009) 137, 167; In opposition, see Phillippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel with 
Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, 
CUP 2012) 201; International case law has only found violations of the obligation not to cause 
(and subsequently to prevent) transboundary harm (or harm in the context of a shared resource), 
not of harm to the environment within one state’s jurisdiction. See Trail Smelter Case (United 
States v Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA, 1965; Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits, Judgment) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 4; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
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any environmental harm occurring outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party 
where the harmful energy activity takes place, as well as with environmental harm 
occurring within the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party, in whose jurisdiction 
the harmful energy activity takes place. In the absence of a requirement connecting 
jurisdiction and harm, there is no evidence that the obligation in Article 19(1) is 
based on a bilateral relationship between Contracting Parties, whose environment 
would be affected by a harmful energy activity in another Contracting Party. Rather, 
the obligation protects a community interest—the environment per se. It is better 
classified as an obligation erga omnes partes. 
2.2.4 Dispute Settlement Provisions and Standing
The ECT contains numerous dispute settlement mechanisms—a general inter-
Contracting Party arbitration mechanism in Article 27; an investor-Contracting 
Party arbitration provision in Article 26; a special transit conciliation procedure 
in Article 7(7); a special provision for the settlement of environmental disputes 
in Article 19(2) and a special procedure for settling trade disputes concerning 
Articles 5 and 29 in Annex D. Since none of these provisions contains detailed rules 
concerning standing, standing to resort to ECT dispute settlement depends on the 
nature of each obligation breached. 
Given that the transit obligations under Article 7 are bilateralisable, only 
individually injured Contracting Parties can resort to conciliation or to general 
inter-Contracting Party dispute resolution.72 Similarly, as the investment obligations 
in Part III are bilateralisable, only individually injured Contracting Parties 
may resort to general inter-Contracting Party dispute settlement.73 Since trade 
obligations under Articles 5 and 29 are bilateralisable, standing to resort to Annex 
ICJ Rep 226, 242 para 29; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 101; Cf Iron Rhine ‘IJZEREN RIJN’ Railway (Belgium v Netherlands) 
(2005) 27 RIAA para 59. However, the relevant passage in the latter award could be interpreted 
as recognising an obligation to prevent environmental harm generally only by taking the 
tribunal’s reasoning out of the dispute’s context: the harm at issue would be caused by activities 
of one state (Belgium) taking place in the territory of another state (the Netherlands).
72  ECT (n 13) art 27. 
73  Pursuant to ECT (n 13) art 27(2) the inter-Contracting Parties arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction over disputes concerning the application and interpretation of all provisions in 
Part III on Investment Promotion and Protection. However, art 27(2) expressly excludes from 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the last 
sentence of art 10(1) and only for Contracting Parties listed in Annex IA.
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D should be available only to individually injured Contracting Parties. However, 
although Annex D does not specifically provide for standing, it is arguable that, 
given the effort of the negotiating parties of the ECT to parallelise Annex D to 
the WTO DSU, Annex D may be interpreted as affording generous standing to all 
Contracting Parties.74 Finally, given that environmental obligations are erga omnes 
partes, any Contracting Party may resort to dispute resolution under Article 19(2).
2.3 Bespoke Pipeline Treaties between EU Member States and Third States
In the post-Cold War period, the trend to conclude bespoke pipeline treaties has 
been increasing. A number of reasons may have prompted this trend, but this 
question falls beyond the scope of this study.75 This treaty practice is by no means 
unique to Europe. Numerous such treaties have been concluded in relation to 
cross-border and transit pipelines in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.76 
However, the treaty practice involving EU Member States is of interest 
because of the context in which it is taking place. First, it can be seen as a reaction 
to the need to diversify routes and sources in the aftermath of the 2009 gas crisis 
that occurred in Europe owing to the gas transit and export dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine. Second, it will continue to be observed—if not to increase—as many 
of these projects are eligible for funding by the EU, when characterised as ‘projects 
of common interest’ under Decision No 1364/200677 or as ‘priority corridors’ under 
74  No subsequent practice of Contracting Parties supports this interpretation as yet.
75  Azaria (n 7) 7, 58.
76  For instance, see Treaty on the West African Gas Pipeline Project between Benin, Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Togo (31 January 2003) <http://www.wagpa.org/Treaty_on_WAGP_Project.pdf> 
accessed 28 September 2016; Agreement among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey Relating 
to the Transportation of Petroleum via the Territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey 
Through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline (signed 18 November 1999, entered 
into force 9 October 2000) <http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/BTC/Eng/agmt4/agmt4.pdf> 
accessed 28 September 2016; Agreement between Kazakhstan and China on cooperation in 
the construction and operation of gas pipeline Kazakhstan-China (signed 18 August 2007), 
Kazakhstan OJ No 218-IV; Agreement between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates Relating 
to the Transmission of Gas by Pipeline Between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (signed 
26 September 2004, entered into force 9 July 2005) <http://www.almeezan.qa/AgreementsPage.
aspx?id=1483&language=en> accessed 28 September 2016. 
77  Decision No 1364/2006/EC [2006] OJ L262/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing 
Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC.
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Regulation 347/2013,78 with a view to reinforcing the security of energy supplies 
by strengthening relations with third countries.79 Third, the compatibility with EU 
law, especially competition law and the internal energy market legislation, of the 
treaties and other arrangements for these projects has been a matter of concern for 
the European Commission.80 From the point of view of public international law, 
EU Member States may conclude treaties with third states, but they remain obliged 
to comply with their existing EU law obligations. If there is an incompatibility 
between treaty provisions with third parties and EU law provisions, the treaty with 
the third states will be the applicable legal standard between them and the third 
state, while the applicable legal standard in their relationship with EU Member 
States will be EU law.81 EU Member States will incur responsibility for the breach 
of EU law obligations.82 A possible solution may be to withdraw from the treaties 
with a third state, which can take place either in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of these treaties or in the absence of such provisions, by reference to 
extraneous grounds under custom or the VCLT, where applicable;83 or to pursue 
the amendment of these treaties with a view to ensuring compatibility with EU 
law.84 However, both choices are politically and procedurally cumbersome. For 
states that became EU Member States after the conclusion of treaties with third 
78  Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 [2013] OJ L115/39 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing 
Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 
and (EC) No 715/2009. This Regulation includes a list of ‘priority corridors’ that are eligible for 
EU financial aid (art 6(3)).
79  The Nabucco Pipeline was listed in Annex III of Decision No 1364/2006/EC (n 77) as a project 
of common interest, and was eligible for EU financial aid (art 6(3)); Regulation (EU) No 
347/2013 (n 78) included a list of priority corridors that include all EU Member States in 
whose territory the Nabucco pipeline would be constructed; the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline has 
been listed since 2006 in Annex III of Decision 1364/2006/EC (n 77) as a project of common 
interest and is eligible for EU financial aid (art 6(3) and s 9.25, Annex III).
80  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental 
agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU COM (2016) 53 final (Commission’s 
Proposal for Regulation repealing Decision No 994) para 4. 
81  VCLT (n 34) art 30(4)(b). 
82  ibid art 30(5). 
83  None of the grounds for termination under the VCLT and custom permit termination on the 
ground that one or more of the treaty parties are obliged to comply with other conflicting 
international obligations.
84  VCLT (n 34) art 40. 
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states that are incompatible with EU law (eg Croatia concluded a bilateral treaty 
with Russia concerning the South Stream pipeline prior to its accession to the EU), 
TFEU Article 351 provides that the TFEU does not affect such treaties.85 However, 
to the extent that they are incompatible with the TFEU, the Member States(s) are 
obliged to ‘take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established’.86 
EU Member States are thus obliged under EU law either to amend treaties with 
third states or to withdraw from them.
Fourth, in February 2016, the European Commission proposed amending 
Decision No 994/2012.87 Under the proposed amendment, EU Member States 
would be obliged to abstain from expressing consent to be bound by treaties with 
third states in the energy sector (including bespoke pipeline treaties) before the 
European Commission has made an assessment as to the compatibility of such 
treaties with EU law. Member States would also be obliged to ‘take (into) utmost 
account’ the European Commission’s assessment when concluding the negotiation 
of such treaties.88 Fifth, existing EU law and the proposal of the Commission to 
amend existing EU law favours multilateral treaties with third states. This express 
preference implies that the Commission may not favour bilateral energy-related 
treaties.89
Against this background, it is valuable to examine bespoke pipeline treaties 
between EU Member States and third states: two plurilateral treaties (the Nabucco 
Agreement and the TAP Treaty), and the bilateral treaties for the South Stream 
pipeline. The term ‘plurilateral bespoke pipeline treaties’ is to be contrasted with 
‘bilateral bespoke pipeline treaties’, and with ‘multilateral treaties’ (eg the WTO 
Agreement and the ECT),90 which are not tailor-made for a particular pipeline. The 
85  TFEU (n 3) art 351; Case 812/79 Attorney General v Juan C Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 8; 
Case C-84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I–5215, para 53; For an overview of TFEU 
art 351, see Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011) 396–436.
86  TFEU (n 3) art 351; where necessary, the Member States must assist each other with a view to 
eliminating the incompatibilities established and must adopt, where appropriate, a common 
attitude. ‘[T]he Commission (…) may facilitate mutual assistance between the Member States 
concerned and their adoption of a common attitude’. Case C-205/06 Commission v Republic of 
Austria [2009] ECR I–1301, para 44.
87  Decision No 994/2012/EU [2012] OJ L299/13 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of 
energy.
88  Commission’s Proposal for Regulation Repealing Decision No 994 (n 80) art 5(4).
89  ibid art 9(d); Decision No 994/2012/EU (n 87) art 7.
90  WTO Agreement (n 13); ECT (n 13). 
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use of the term ‘plurilateral’ here is only descriptive of the treaties’ form (which is 
multilateral) and does not entail legal consequences under the law of treaties in 
relation to the topic discussed here. Each treaty and each treaty obligation has to 
be interpreted separately. The following analysis focuses on obligations concerning 
uninterrupted energy flows via the pipelines.
2.3.1 Plurilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
The Nabucco Agreement requires treaty parties ‘not to permit or require the 
Interruption of gas transportation in the Nabucco (pipeline)’.91 The treaty’s object 
and purpose is to ensure the ‘security of supply (since) this is necessary for the 
welfare and security of each citizen and (…) States Parties are therefore determined 
to act in a spirit of solidarity to achieve collective energy security’.92 The TAP Treaty 
requires parties not to interrupt flows of gas through the pipeline.93 The Preamble 
of the Treaty states that the Treaty forms part of an effort to promote cooperation 
in ensuring the reliable supply of gas from states in Central Asia to the EU, none 
of which is party to the Treaty, and ‘to create uniform (…) conditions and standards 
for the (…) construction, and operation of (the Pipeline)’.94 Additionally, the Treaty 
categorically prohibits unilateral denunciations and inter se modifications.95 
The obligations not to interrupt transportation of energy via an integral 
pipeline system, which crosses the territory of numerous states, could be classified 
as ‘interdependent obligations’. What connects interdependent obligations is their 
negative nature: they require states, for instance, not to acquire arms or not to acquire 
nuclear weapons. As in relation to interdependent obligations, parties to bespoke 
pipeline treaties have a strong interest in cessation of the international wrongful 
act pertaining to the interruption of energy carriage, restitution and assurances 
of non-repetition rather than in compensation. Their interest is to guarantee the 
‘regime’ by re-establishing energy flows. Owing to these features, this could be seen 
as the natural classification of obligations concerning energy transportation via 
pipelines in the context of multilateral bespoke pipeline treaties unless there is 
evidence to the contrary, which is the case for the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP 
91  Nabucco Agreement (n 38) art 7. 
92  ibid art 1.2 (emphasis added). 
93  TAP Treaty (n 39) art 7. 
94  ibid Preamble (emphasis added).
95  ibid art 12. 
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Treaty. The features of the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty demonstrated 
above support the proposition that the obligations concerning uninterrupted 
energy flows therein are erga omnes partes. They are established primarily for a 
common interest (collective energy security), including a wider common interest 
of states beyond the treaty parties, and they are intended to set uniform standards 
for a regional project. 
This section has shown that two plurilateral bespoke pipeline treaties that 
EU Member States have concluded with third states establish obligations erga 
omnes partes and thus all treaty parties have standing to invoke responsibility 
(although it is questionable whether those other than the injured state may resort 
to countermeasures).96 The following section touches on the bilateral treaties that 
EU Member States and third states in the Balkan region have concluded with 
Russia concerning the South Stream pipeline.
2.3.2 Bilateral Bespoke Pipeline Treaties
In addition to multilateral treaties governing the construction and operation of 
one physically indivisible pipeline that crosses the territory of numerous states, the 
practice of states also reveals compounds of bilateral treaties concluded for such 
projects. A paradigmatic example of European interest is the bilateral treaties 
concluded between Russia, a gas exporting state, on the one hand, and each transit 
and importing state for the South Stream pipeline on the other hand, some of which 
are EU Member States.97 These include provisions concerning the construction and 
operation of the pipeline, including an obligation not to interrupt energy carriage.
Owing to the vehicle used to establish such obligations (bilateral treaties), 
the obligations under each treaty are bilateral and are owed between the parties to 
them. There is no evidence in the treaties that EU Member States have concluded 
with Russia or in the circumstances of their conclusion that there is an intention 
to establish rights (eg concerning uninterrupted transportation) for third states 
through whose territory the pipeline will be constructed or for a wider group of 
states.98
96  See (n 24–32).
97  See (n 40). For compatibility of the provisions in these treaties with EU law provisions, see 
analysis in section 2.3 above. 
98  VCLT (n 34) art 36.
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2.4 Interim Conclusions
Within the ambit of international energy law, community interest obligations 
appear in the treaty practice of Member States (eg obligations in bespoke pipeline 
treaties with third states, such as the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty) and 
in some multilateral treaties to which the EU is itself a party (eg ECT environmental 
obligations). However, the EU and Member States have also undertaken bilateral 
or bilateralisable obligations in the energy sector. WTO obligations apply to energy 
trade and are bilateralisable; but generous standing has been afforded to all WTO 
members to invoke responsibility for breaches of WTO obligations under the 
DSU. The ECT contains some bilateralisable obligations, such as those concerning 
trade, transit and investment. Furthermore, EU Member States conclude bilateral 
treaties with third states in the energy sector (eg with Russia for the South Stream 
pipeline). This section has explained that community interest obligations appear 
along with bilateral and bilateralisable obligations within the scope of international 
energy law that are of particular interest for the EU and Member States, and how 
this determines standing to implement the responsibility for a breach of these 
obligations. The following section examines whether lawful countermeasures, 
as a means of implementing international responsibility, can take the form of 
suspending compliance with energy-related obligations.
3 Suspending Compliance with Community Interest Obligations 
in International Energy Law
This section examines energy-related countermeasures. Countermeasures are a 
means of implementing international responsibility.99 They involve the suspension 
of compliance with an international obligation, but because they are taken in 
response to a previously internationally wrongful act, countermeasures are one of 
the circumstances that preclude wrongfulness.100 The following analysis assesses 
whether, and if so how, the community interest nature of obligations plays a role 
in determining the lawfulness of a countermeasure in the form of suspending 
compliance with treaty obligations relating to the energy sector. This analysis is 
important because resorting to energy-related countermeasures may be preferred 
99  ILC (n 15) Part III arts 49–53. 
100  ibid Part I art 22.
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among the available responses to wrongfulness in the UN era, given their significant 
effects on the responsible state and their corresponding persuasiveness. 
Section 3.1 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending 
compliance with treaty obligations in the energy sector are unavailable. Section 
3.2 examines whether countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance 
with obligations in the energy sector may not meet the conditions of lawfulness of 
countermeasures to the extent that the latter take into account community interest 
obligations.
3.1 Displacing Countermeasures as Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness
The argument that countermeasures as circumstances precluding wrongfulness may 
be displaced by lex specialis is founded on two separate bases—treaty language that 
displaces countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness; and the 
nature of the obligations whose performance is to be suspended implicitly displaces 
countermeasures. First, some treaties concerning energy trade and investment 
contain security exceptions—for instance, GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 
24. The relationship between security exceptions and circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness under the law of state responsibility has been the focus of a series 
of investor-state arbitrations against Argentina on the basis of bilateral investment 
treaties to which Argentina is party. While a number of arbitral tribunals have dealt 
with this issue differently,101 the more persuasive position is that when the language 
used in a security exception is (or resembles substantially) ‘nothing shall prevent 
the parties from’, as is the language used in GATT Article XXI and ECT Article 
24, such language suggests that the exception delineates the scope of primary 
treaty obligations. Conduct within the scope of the exceptions is not in breach 
of the treaty obligations. In contrast, circumstances precluding wrongfulness are 
part of secondary rules and preclude the wrongfulness of a conduct that would 
otherwise be wrongful: meaning conduct that would not fall within the scope of 
101  Treaty exceptions are lex specialis and supersede the customary circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness: LG&E v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) (ICSID Case No ARB/02/1) 
3 October 2006, paras 245–61; Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Decision 
on the Application for Annulment of the Award) (ICSID Case No ARB/99/7) 1 November 
2006, para 55; interpreting treaty exceptions through VCLT (n 33) art 31(3)(c) to incorporate 
conditions from secondary rules under custom: CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine 
Republic (Award of the Tribunal) (ICSID Case No ARB/01/8) 12 May 2005, paras 315–82.
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such security exceptions.102 This was also the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Railway 
Traffic Advisory Opinion (1931).103 
Most bespoke pipeline treaties do not contain security exception provisions, 
as is the case of those examined here. However, some contain other language that 
may displace countermeasures, as circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The TAP 
Treaty permits non-performance of treaty obligations only by prior consent of all 
parties. This rule is located in a provision that deals with the treaty’s operation that 
is separate from the provisions requiring states not to interrupt energy flows.104 The 
argument could be made that this treaty provision displaces countermeasures under 
the law of international responsibility taken in this particular form (meaning in the 
form of interrupting energy flows). The provision overlaps with countermeasures 
in that they both relate to suspension of performance of obligations, but it deviates 
from countermeasures, which are unilateral and are not premised on prior consent 
by the responsible state or any other state. Such interpretation would entail the 
displacement of any unilaterally operational circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
Second, as a separate argument, the community interest nature of some 
obligations of international energy law could be seen as entailing ipso facto non-
susceptibility to unilateral countermeasures. In his work on state responsibility, ILC 
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz suggested that, owing to their indivisible nature, 
erga omnes partes obligations may not be susceptible to countermeasures.105 However, 
his proposal was not taken up by the ILC—it was rather changed into a clause that 
severs the preclusion of wrongfulness towards the responsible state from the non-
preclusion of wrongfulness towards the non-responsible affected states.106 The 
approach of the ASR in relation to this issue may cast some doubt on the argument 
that countermeasures in the form of suspending performance of erga omnes partes 
obligations are displaced owing to the indivisible nature of such obligations. 
102  ILC (n 15) 7; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (Decision of the ad 
hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic) (ICSID Case 
No ARB/01/8) 25 September 2007, paras 129–35; Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic (Ad hoc Committee, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of 
the Award) (ICSID Case No ARB/02/16) 29 June 2010, paras 200–04.
103  Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Railway Sector Landwarów-Kaisiadorys) 
(Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series A/B, No 39, 107.
104  TAP Treaty (n 39) art 12. 
105  Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ (1992) II ILCYB; UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 1) paras 92–93.
106  ILC (n 15) 130 and art 49.
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The following section examines whether suspending performance of energy-
related obligations meets the conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures under 
custom, assuming that countermeasures are not displaced by lex specialis.
3.2 Conditions of Lawfulness of Countermeasures under Customary 
International Law
Countermeasures, in order to be lawful, have to meet a number of conditions under 
customary international law.107 One of these conditions is that a countermeasure 
has to be targeted against the responsible state.108 This condition—according to 
the ILC—is based on the ‘relative preclusion of wrongfulness’.109 The wrongfulness 
of the countermeasure is precluded vis-à-vis the responsible state, but not vis-à-
vis a third non-responsible state. For instance, if Ukraine suspends compliance 
with transit obligations that it owes to Russia as a countermeasure for the latter’s 
internationally wrongful act, while at the same time it owes a transit obligation 
to the EU and/or Member States (eg GATT Article V or ECT Article 7), the 
wrongfulness of interrupting transit vis-à-vis Russia may be precluded, but it will 
not be precluded vis-à-vis the EU and Member States simply owing to Russia’s 
wrongful conduct. In such situations, reacting states are faced with a dilemma. 
They may respond against the responsible state, but they will have to make 
reparations to third (not responsible) states; or they may abstain from resorting 
to countermeasures against the responsible state (at least in this particular form), 
owing to the burden of having to make reparations to third states. 
On the other hand, other conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures may be 
attuned to the community interest nature of international obligations. Some reflect 
the need to protect community interests per se; others may coincidentally allow 
the consideration of the community interest nature of a primary obligation when 
assessing the lawfulness of a countermeasure. Two conditions of the lawfulness of 
countermeasures are discussed in the following sequence—that countermeasures 
shall not affect fundamental human rights obligations and that they have to be 
proportionate to the injury suffered.110
107  ILC (n 15) arts 49–53.
108  ibid art 49(1).
109  ibid 130.
110  ibid arts 50–51. 
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3.2.1 Prohibition of an Effect on Fundamental Human Rights Obligations
If individuals are deprived of sufficient heating, water, sanitation and medical 
assistance or the use of medical equipment in hospitals or at home due to 
interruptions to the supply of electricity, oil and gas, there may be loss of life, or 
individuals may be subject to degrading treatment or their health may be put at 
risk. This is far from an academic discussion. During the 2009 gas crisis in Europe, 
deaths were reported in Poland and Bulgaria.111 
The rule that countermeasures shall not ‘affect obligations for the protection 
of fundamental human rights’112 covers two situations: where the state resorting to 
the countermeasure suspends compliance with its human rights obligations per 
se; and where the state resorting to the countermeasure suspends compliance with 
other international obligations and in so doing affects its human rights obligations. 
It is this second situation that relates to countermeasures in the form of energy-
trade restrictions. 
However, this prohibition faces numerous limitations. The following analysis 
touches on two of these limitations:113 the extraterritorial application of human 
rights obligations, and the effect on human rights.
3.2.1.1 Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights
Human rights obligations apply within the territory of the state resorting to 
countermeasures (‘reacting state’), and extraterritorially, where the reacting 
state exercises control. Unlike situations where state organs are present in areas 
outside the state’s territory and exercise control over a particular area114 or over a 
111  Bilefsky and Kramer (n 7).
112  ILC (n 15) art 50. 
113  Another limitation is that ASR art 50 (n 15) refers to ‘fundamental human rights’, which 
implies a smaller group of obligations within human rights generally. The term cannot mean 
only human rights that are found in jus cogens norms; such requirement would be superfluous, 
since the requirement that countermeasures do not affect obligations jus cogens is a separate 
condition for lawfulness (ASR art 50(1)(d)); the term ‘fundamental human rights’ was 
proposed by Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz based on the distinction adopted at the time between 
‘core’ or ‘basic’ human rights and ‘other’ human rights. Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz (n 
105) para 80; For further analysis: Azaria (n 7) 234–36.
114  Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) Series A no 310, para 62; In relation to 
full and exclusive control over a prison or a ship respectively, see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v 
United Kingdom App No 61498/08 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009) paras 86–89; Medvedyev and others 
v France App No 3394/03 (ECtHR, 20 March 2010) para 67.
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particular individual,115 interrupting energy exports or transit involves conduct in 
the territory of the reacting state that produces effects on individuals located in the 
territory of the responsible state (‘targeted state’). 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning 
territorial conduct, which has extraterritorial effects, is limited. However, the 
ECtHR has considered that individuals fall within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),116 
in circumstances where its organs are located within its own territory (or where 
the state exercises effective control) but are in close vicinity to the victims that are 
located in another state and there is a direct and immediate causal link between 
their conduct and the effect on the individual concerned.117 
Interruptions of energy exports or transit may in certain circumstances fulfill 
the vicinity and the causation link criteria, for instance, where the importing state 
is wholly dependent on established energy flows from the exporter or the transit 
route. Such instances include Belarus’ dependence on Russia’s exports of gas, and 
the dependence of Moldova on gas transiting through Ukraine and gas exports 
from Russia.118 However, the case law where such a threshold has been established 
is confined to obligations to abstain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights.119 
States are obliged not to kill, not to subject individuals to degrading treatment, 
and not to put at risk the health of individuals that are located in the territory of 
another state. By contrast, it is doubtful that obligations to take positive measures 
115  Öcalan v Turkey App No 46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 May 2005) para 91. 
116  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8 and 
11) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR). 
117  Andreou v Turkey App no 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008), section A.3(c); Additional 
support for the Court’s reasoning in this respect can be drawn from Nada v Switzerland 
App no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012). The claimant resided in an Italian enclave 
surrounded by Switzerland. The ECtHR presumed that the individual fell within Switzerland’s 
‘jurisdiction’ without giving reasons (para 122). It found that, by prohibiting the claimant 
from entering or transiting through its territory, Switzerland violated his right to private life. 
Neither Switzerland nor any intervening state objected on the grounds that Nada was outside 
Switzerland’s ‘jurisdiction’. The exceptional situation, which involved an enclave of 1.6 square 
kilometres of Italian territory, where the claimant resided, may have prompted the Court’s 
reasoning, but Switzerland’s conduct was conduct that took place within its own territory 
albeit that it produced extraterritorial effects.
118  See n 8. 
119  Andreou v Turkey App no 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008); Nada v Switzerland App no 
10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012).
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to protect the right to life, freedom from degrading treatment or the right to health 
by providing energy apply in such an extraterritorial manner. No case law or state 
practice as yet supports (albeit it does not preclude) the view that obligations to 
take positive measures to protect human rights apply in such manner.120
3.2.1.2 ‘Effect’ on Human Rights Obligations
Even assuming arguendo that the ‘jurisdiction’ threshold was to be fulfilled,121 it 
would have to be proven that the effect on the human rights of individuals in the 
targeted state is the result of the countermeasure. Such a link depends on the facts, 
and may not be easily identified. Furthermore, the reacting state may argue against 
the existence of such a link because the targeted state has not taken the necessary 
measures to protect the human rights of individuals within its own territory. For 
example, the reacting state could have mitigated the effects of an energy crisis 
by taking pre-emptive or other measures such as storage or entering into energy 
sharing mechanisms like the International Energy Agency mechanism of oil 
stockpiling and demand restraints or the EU Gas Security mechanism.122 Hence, in 
the current state of international law, the rule that countermeasures cannot affect 
human rights obligations is unlikely to result in countermeasures in the form of 
interrupting energy flows being unlawful. 
3.2.2 Proportionality
Under customary international law, countermeasures have to be proportionate 
to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question.123 The following 
sections explain how the condition of proportionality of countermeasures 
accommodates community interest obligations. First, the effects on human rights 
120  For counterarguments that may support the extraterritorial application of obligations and the 
conduct discussed here, see Azaria (n 7) 243–44.
121  As a separate matter, there is no evidence that a stricter jurisdictional link is required for the 
customary right to life and freedom from inhuman treatment, or the right to health (assuming 
that it attains customary status) other than the one applicable to human rights treaties.
122  Agreement on an International Energy Program (concluded 18 November 1974, entered into 
force 19 January 1976) 1040 UNTS 271, arts 2–3; Council and Parliament Regulation (EU) 
994/2010 (n 9). 
123  ILC (n 15) art 51; Gabčνkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85.
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obligations of the targeted state will be discussed, and second, how the condition 
of proportionality takes into account the community interest nature of obligations 
whose performance is suspended as a countermeasure. In relation to the former 
issue, the question as to the existence of a human right to energy will be touched on. 
The analysis is put in the context of treaties to which all EU Member States are party 
(as at 28 September 2016): the ECHR and the European Social Charter (ESC).124
3.2.2.1 Effects on Human Rights Obligations of the Targeted State: A Human Right 
to Energy?
Countermeasures in the form of suspending compliance with exports or transit of 
energy can affect the ability of the targeted state to perform its own human rights 
obligations vis-à-vis individuals within its own territory. These include obligations 
to respect human rights by abstention and obligations to protect human rights 
by positive action. A countermeasure that has such an effect is likely to be 
disproportionate to the injury suffered, taking into account the rights in question. 
Since this criterion covers the rights of the injured and responsible states,125 the 
argument can be made that it also covers the ability of the targeted state to comply 
with its human rights obligations.
It is in this context that the question arises as to whether there is a ‘human 
right to energy’. There is no human rights treaty specifically establishing the right 
to energy, or referring to energy in connection with the rights established in the 
treaty.126 However, the interpretation of existing treaties may establish obligations 
not to arbitrarily deprive access to energy in relation to vulnerable individuals 
(especially those dependent on the state) and especially in cases where such 
deprivation has no connection to the conduct of the individuals in question (eg 
non-payment of utility bills). Such an argument can also be made in relation to 
customary human rights law, where available. 
124  European Social Charter (adopted 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965) 529 
UNTS 89.
125  ILC (n 15) 135.
126  The only exception is Article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (adopted 19 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 
13. The Article obliges parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas and, in particular, to ensure their right to enjoy adequate 
living conditions, particularly in relation to electricity. This provision is limited in scope of 
beneficiaries (‘women in rural areas’) and purpose (‘elimination of discrimination’).
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Access to energy (oil, gas or electricity) is central for heating, cooking, use 
of medical equipment at home and hospitals, and for ensuring access to water, 
including for the purposes of sanitation. In light of this, it may be argued that 
when states arbitrarily deprive individuals of access to energy they may violate 
their obligation not to employ degrading treatment, their obligation to protect the 
right to life, their obligation to respect individuals’ right to health, and the right 
to housing under human rights treaties (and customary international law, where 
available), such as the ECHR and the ESC.
The question has far-reaching implications for states—would such a right 
include only access to electricity or also gas and oil; or does it require states to 
provide uninterrupted energy or ensure the uninterrupted provision of energy 
by private entities (in cases other than non-payment of utility bills), and under 
which conditions (for free, on payment and if so, what would be the charges)? 
These issues fall beyond the scope of this study which examines a different issue—
access to energy in situations where individuals already have access to energy, and 
where provision of energy is interrupted for reasons that do not have to do with 
the human right-holder.
In relation to degrading treatment, in 1991, the European Commission on 
Human Rights rejected the admissibility of a complaint which argued that Belgium 
violated ECHR Article 3 because ‘in the case at issue, the cutting off or the threat of 
cutting off electricity did not reach the level of humiliation or debasement needed 
for there to be inhuman or degrading treatment’.127 This decision does not rule out 
the possibility that interfering with access to electricity may meet the threshold 
of treatment that would be inhuman or degrading. However, the decision did 
not provide detailed reasoning. Subsequent case law of the ECtHR has taken 
into account a number of the conditions present in the case of the applicant in 
this case, when it has accepted that a breach of ECHR Article 3 has taken place. 
The conditions that the European Commission on Human Rights could have 
considered include the applicant’s economic conditions, her mental and physical 
state (she suffered from depression and respiratory problems), the duration of the 
lack of electricity and the weather conditions during which it took place, and the 
fact that the facilities in her residence allowed for no alternative energy sources.128 
127  Francine van Volsem v Belgium App No 14641/89 (Commission Decision, 9 May 1990) 3 
(emphasis added).
128  Antonio Cassese, ‘Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Be Applied to Socio-
Economic Conditions?’ (1991) 2 EJIL 141, 141–45.
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Additionally, subsequent ECtHR case law has clarified that the ‘absence of 
(…) a purpose (to humiliate) cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation 
of Article 3’.129 Moreover, a breach of Article 3 may occur ‘in circumstances (where 
the individual is) wholly dependent on State support, (and is) faced with official 
indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or incompatible with 
human dignity’.130 Interruption of access to energy for heating, sanitation, light, 
cooking or the use of essential medical equipment to individuals dependent on the 
state may amount to a violation of their right to be free from degrading treatment 
under ECHR Article 3. They may also amount to a breach of the right to health, as 
part of the right to private life.131 Moreover, in relation to the ESC, the European 
Committee of Social Rights has recognised in its long-standing case law that the 
right to adequate housing under ESC Article 31(1) includes a dwelling with ‘all 
basic amenities such as water, heating (...) and electricity (...)’.132 In relation to 
vulnerable individuals dependent on the state, interruption of energy for heating, 
sanitation, and cooking and medical support may constitute degrading treatment, 
a breach of the right to health, or a breach of the right to adequate housing. 
To some extent, EU secondary legislation (incidentally) is compatible with 
the obligations of EU Member States under the ECHR: Article 3(3) of Directive 
2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
requires EU Member States to: 
take appropriate measures to protect final customers, [and] in particular, [to] ensure 
that there are adequate safeguards to protect vulnerable customers. [E]ach Member 
State shall define the concept of vulnerable customers which may refer to energy 
poverty and, inter alia, to the prohibition of disconnection of gas to such customers 
in critical times.133 
129  Valašinas v Lithuania App No 44558/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2001) para 101.
130  MSS v Belgium and Greece App No 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) para 253. 
131  ECHR (n 116) art 8; Nada v Switzerland (n 117) para 151; Glor v Switzerland App No 13444/04 
(ECtHR, 30 April 2009) para 54.
132  Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, Complaint No 58/2009 (ECSR, 25 
June 2010) para 54.
133  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] 
OJ L211/94; In relation to electricity, see similar provisions in Article 3, Directive 2009/72/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55.
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However, the ECHR (and other international obligations of EU Member States) 
may require further measures vis-à-vis vulnerable individuals, and the protection 
of a wider group of individuals than those protected by Directive 2009/73.134 
In extreme situations, where the targeted state is placed in a position where 
it cannot comply with its negative and positive obligations concerning the right 
to life, the right to be free from degrading treatment, and the right to health,135 
owing to an interruption of energy exports or transit by a reacting state, such 
countermeasure would be disproportionate.
3.2.2.2 In Relation to Targeting Community Interest Obligations
As a separate matter, targeting community interest obligations may not meet the 
condition of proportionality. The reasoning of the ICJ in Gabčνkovo-Nagymaros 
supports this interpretation. Hungary had violated a bilateral treaty with Slovakia, 
which required both States to construct works for energy development on a part 
of the River Danube crossing the two States. Slovakia unilaterally responded by 
diverting a part of the river and by constructing alternative works along the course 
of the diversion. Slovakia claimed that its conduct was a lawful countermeasure 
against Hungary’s prior breach. The ICJ found that ‘[t]he effects of a countermeasure 
must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in 
question’.136 
The Court did not explain the criteria by which it assessed proportionality. It 
could be argued that the Court’s criterion was the aim pursued by Slovakia when 
resorting to the alleged countermeasure. Factually, Slovakia’s measures meant that 
the adverse effects of Hungary’s conduct were wiped out and Slovakia managed to 
134  First, the term ‘vulnerable customers’ within Directive 2009/73 (and Directive 2009/72 
concerning electricity) is to be determined by each EU Member State and, in any event, it does 
not necessarily coincide with the definition of vulnerable individuals as referred to in the case 
law of the ECtHR. Second, Directives 2009/73 and 2009/72 seem to require that disconnection 
from gas or electricity respectively cannot take place, but there is no equivalent obligation 
under EU law concerning oil.
135  The right to life and the right to be free from degrading treatment would qualify as ‘fundamental 
human rights’ within the meaning of the ASR. See ILC (n 15) art 50(1)(b); Special Rapporteur 
Arangio-Ruiz (n 105) paras 80–83; Given the close connection between the right to health 
and the right to life and freedom from degrading treatment, it may be argued that the right to 
health is also covered by the term ‘fundamental human rights’; See also Azaria (n 7) 236.
136  Gabčνkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85. 
200 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Danae Azaria
enjoy unilaterally the benefits it would have enjoyed had Hungary performed its 
treaty obligations.137 Thus, the measure’s aim was not to induce Hungary to comply 
with its obligations but rather an attempt to benefit from non-compliance. 
Although this interpretation is defensible, especially in light of the facts, 
the Court’s reasoning in paragraph 85 of the Judgment allows for a different 
interpretation. The ICJ alluded to the findings of the PCIJ in River Oder concerning 
the creation of a ‘community of interest on a navigable river [which] becomes the 
basis for a common legal right’ (of navigation) of riparian states on international 
rivers.138 Although it did not specifically link the community interest nature 
of those obligations to the assessment of the lawfulness of the countermeasure 
in question, it made an analogy between the common legal right of navigation 
and the modern developments of international law concerning non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses. This reasoning allows for the argument that 
the community interest and hence indivisible nature of the obligation whose 
performance is being suspended as a countermeasure may be a qualitative criterion 
for measuring proportionality.139 For instance, given that the obligations concerning 
the protection of the environment in ECT Article 19 and the obligations concerning 
uninterrupted energy flows under the Nabucco Agreement and the TAP Treaty are 
erga omnes partes, suspending their performance would not constitute a lawful 
countermeasure because it would not meet the condition of proportionality. 
4 Conclusion
Reciprocity and the making of bilateral or bilateralisable obligations dominate 
international rules concerning the energy sector. While multilateral treaties that 
apply to energy trade (eg WTO Agreement) or specific to the energy sector (eg 
ECT) have been concluded since the end of the Cold War, the rise of multilateralism 
has not necessarily brought about community interest obligations in this field. For 
instance, GATT obligations and ECT obligations concerning trade and investment 
are bilateralisable. 
137  Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 889, 898–99. 
138  Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder 
(Judgment) PCIJ Rep Series A No 23, 5.
139  According to the ILC, the criteria for proportionality in the framework of the ASR are 
quantitative and qualitative. ILC (n 15) 134–35.
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However, to suggest that this is the whole picture would be misleading. The EU 
founding treaties and, by implication, the secondary sectoral legislation on energy 
do not establish reciprocal undertakings between EU Member States according 
to Van Gend Loos.140 But, even outside EU law, as a species of international law, 
contemporary treaty practice is growing in the form of ‘plurilateral’ bespoke pipeline 
treaties, and EU Member States have participated in this development. Some of 
these treaties contain obligations erga omnes partes concerning uninterrupted 
energy flows.
At the same time, the community interest nature of international obligations 
may be relevant in determining whether suspending compliance with them can 
be a lawful countermeasure. Some conditions of lawfulness of countermeasures 
protect community interests per se; others incidentally allow the consideration of 
the community interest nature of a primary obligation when assessing whether the 
conditions of lawfulness of a countermeasure have been met. The condition that 
countermeasures cannot affect fundamental human rights obligations is unlikely 
to render unlawful countermeasures in the form of interrupting energy supplies to 
the responsible state, because the human rights obligations of the state taking such 
countermeasures are unlikely to apply in such extraterritorial situations. However, 
the condition that countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury suffered 
may not be met in two cases. First, if the energy-related obligation, performance of 
which is suspended, is of a community interest nature, this nature is a criterion for 
measuring proportionality. Second, countermeasures in the form of interrupting 
energy flows may curtail the ability of the targeted state to comply with its own 
human rights obligations.
140  NV Algemene Transport (n 35).
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Abstract
This article introduces and analyses the sustainable development dimensions of the Paris 
Agreement on climate change. After nearly seventeen years of deadlock, 197 Parties to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded a new international 
agreement at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 
December 2015. The Treaty aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate 
change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. This article 
reviews the provisions and principles of the accord, focusing on its potential contributions to 
sustainable development, and on the opportunities for domestic legal and institutional reform.
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1 Introduction
After nearly seventeen years of deadlock, 197 Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded a new international 
agreement on climate change at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
(COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015. The Treaty aims to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development 
and efforts to eradicate poverty. Parties seek to hold increases in global temperatures 
to well below 2°C, pursuing efforts toward a 1.5°C limit; to increase adaptation 
to climate impacts and foster resilience; and to harness finance flows for low 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development. The Paris 
Agreement sets a ‘high ambition’ framework for climate mitigation, adaptation and 
finance commitments by countries, backed by measures for inter-governmental 
cooperation on loss and damage, forests and land management, technology 
development and transfer, education and capacity-building, with a fit-to-purpose 
framework of transparency, peer review, stocktaking and compliance support. 
Adopting a ‘bottom up’ approach, it builds on submissions of climate action plans 
to the UNFCCC by 188 countries up to December 2016, as Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. 
The climate Agreement is desperately needed, and only a first step. Climate 
change poses crucial challenges for sustainable development. The impacts of climate 
change threaten to undermine decades of social and economic development, to 
severely constrain efforts to protect the environment, and to affect a wide range of 
human rights, such as the rights to life, health, water, food, shelter, and an adequate 
standard of living.1 As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has noted, from 1880 to 2012, average global temperatures increased by 0.85°C.2 
Global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) have increased by almost 50 per cent 
since 1990, and emissions grew more quickly between 2000 and 2010 than in 
each of the three previous decades.3 Given current concentrations and on-going 
GHG emissions, it is likely that by the end of this century, the increase in global 
temperature will exceed 1.5°C compared to the 1850–1900 period.4
1  UNCHR Res 7/23 (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/7/23; UNGA Res 63/32 (26 November 
2008) UN Doc A/RES/63/32; UNCHR Res 10/4 (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/10/4; UNGA 
Res 63/281 (3 June 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/281; Report of the Secretary-General ‘Climate 
Change and its Possible Security Implications’ (2009) UN Doc A/64/350; UNSC Presidential 
Statement (2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/15; UNCHR Res 18/22 (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/
RES/18/22. 
2  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report’ 
(Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) Geneva 2015) <www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/
syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016, Section SPM 1.1, 2 (IPCC 2014 
Report).
3  ibid.
4  It should be noted that a 1.5°C increase only constitutes the most certain scenario, with other 
outcomes carrying considerable percentages of likelihood as well. See IPCC 2014 Report (n 
2) Section E1, 20 which shows that global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st 
century is likely to exceed 1.5°C relative to 1850–1900 for all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. 
It is likely to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5, and more likely than not to exceed 2°C for 
RCP4.5.
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Such changes have already led to serious repercussions and give rise to 
significant further risks worldwide. For example, food security is increasingly 
threatened. For each degree of temperature increase, grain yields decline by about 5 
per cent. Oceans have warmed, with snow and ice diminishing and sea levels rising. 
The extent of Arctic sea ice has decreased since 1979, with 1.07 million km² of ice 
loss every decade.5 From 1901–2010, the global average sea level rose by 19cm as ice 
melted and oceans expanded, with a further rise predicted of 24–30cm by 2065 and 
40–63cm by 2100.6 At the same time, studies comparing 88 recent forest ‘die-offs’ 
show that increases in drought and heat stress are fundamentally altering forests in 
many regions, with a rise in tree mortality associated with climate-induced stress, 
insect outbreaks and wildfire.7 Recent reports suggest that the costs of climate 
change adaptation will reach between USD 70 and USD 100 billion a year by 2050.8 
Most effects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions 
were halted immediately. Perhaps most troubling, current regulatory and financial 
regimes guiding development continue to privilege carbon-intensive, unsustainable 
options, rather than promoting sustainable development, and making finance flows 
consistent with a pathway towards low GHG and climate-resilient alternatives, 
as sought by the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, as this article argues, it is still 
possible, using a wide array of legal and institutional measures, to limit the increase 
in global mean temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Major 
regulatory, institutional, economic and technological transformations, if carried 
out promptly, offer the world a chance to limit dangerous consequences to below 
this threshold. 
The UNFCCC was concluded in 1992 and is the central framework for global 
efforts to avoid the dangers of climate change.9 While the Treaty itself does not 
contain binding GHG emission limits or enforcement mechanisms, it does provide 
a framework for the negotiation of further protocols and instruments. The Kyoto 
5  IPCC 2014 Report (n 2).
6  ibid.
7  Craig D Allen and others, ‘A Global Overview of Drought and Heat-induced Tree Mortality 
Reveals Emerging Climate Change Risks for Forests’ (2010) 259 Forest Ecology and 
Management 660.
8  Muyeye Chambwera and others, ‘Economics of Adaptation’ in Christopher B Field and 
others (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global 
and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2014) 945, 959. 
9  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered 
into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC). 
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Protocol10 includes binding emissions reduction targets for Parties, and is based 
on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC).11 The first commitment period under the Protocol ended 
in 2012, and a second commitment period, known as the Doha Amendment, runs 
to 2020.12 However, these efforts have fallen short of what is needed to mitigate and 
adapt to dangerous climate change. Indeed, only 74 countries had accepted binding 
targets under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol by December 
2016, and current projections for average global temperature rise by the end of the 
century place warming well above the 1.5°–2°C limit necessary to avoid dangerous 
climate change.
Failure to achieve the action plan agreed in Bali at the 13th Conference of 
the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 2007 made it impossible to reach a new 
agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, and negotiations through a new 
process known as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) for a post-
2020 agreement were initiated at COP17 in Durban in 2011. From 25 February 
2015, when the first draft text was made available, to the eighth part of the second 
session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the ADP in Geneva on 8–15 February 
2015, to the Bonn inter-sessional meeting (ADP 2–9), held from 1–11 June 2015, 
aspects were streamlined and consolidated. Further streamlined negotiating texts 
were released on 24 July 2015, 5 October 2015, and 6 November 2015, and intense 
negotiations continued throughout COP21 in Paris from 1–12 December 2015, for 
a Paris Agreement that was finally adopted by the COP21 on 12 December 2015.13 
The Agreement entered rapidly into force upon ratification by 55 countries or more, 
representing 55 per cent of the world’s emissions on 4 November 2016. In order 
to develop the initial ‘rulebook’ for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, 
an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) was established at the 
44th UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies meeting in Bonn, Germany in May 2016. With 
over 114 ratifications by December 2016, the work of this APA proceeds alongside 
10  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 
December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 148 (Kyoto Protocol). 
11  Sandrine Maljean-Dubois and Pilar Moraga Sariego, ‘Le Principe des Responsabilités 
Communes Mais Differenciées dans le Régime International du Climat’ (2014) 55 Cahiers de 
Droit 83.
12  In accordance with arts 20 and 21 of the Kyoto Protocol, ratification by 75% of the Parties 
present and voting at the meeting is necessary for the Doha Amendment to come into force 
(144 Parties), which has not yet materialised.
13  Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
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the First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement, known as the CMA, working to develop the ‘Paris Rulebook’ 
to implement the Agreement. The Treaty14 and its Adoption Decision15 aim to 
achieve climate mitigation, adaptation and finance through a series of cooperative 
frameworks and mechanisms, each of which establishes different legal rights and 
obligations for Parties, and explicitly makes provision for the needs of developing 
country Parties, especially the most vulnerable. 
A focus on sustainable development is relevant for the leading high ambition 
countries, for emerging economies and for the most vulnerable countries of the 
world that are otherwise often excluded from international law-making. Indeed, 
in September 2016, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law 
(CISDL) legal research revealed that, out of 187 countries with intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (iNDCs) published online by the UNFCCC registry, 
156 countries explicitly prioritise an intention to undertake legal and institutional 
reforms.16 Further, 120 countries are calling on support from the international 
community in their iNDCs, with 51 stressing specifically the need for legal and 
institutional capacity-building.17 Building on the work of the Climate Law and 
Governance Initiative,18 this article, to be followed by a series of legal working 
papers and a new edited volume for Cambridge University Press as part of its 
Implementing Treaties on Sustainable Development Series, provides an overview of 
the Paris Agreement, discusses how the provisions of the Treaty reflect the principles 
14  While a certain ambiguity may exist on this point, the Paris Agreement can be seen as a Treaty 
in the sense of art 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted May 1969, 
entered into force January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. One indication is the need for ratification 
for its entry into force. It is a Treaty under the UNFCCC, however.
15  Conference on the Adoption of the Paris Agreement (12 December 2015, opened for signature 
21 April 2016) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
16  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Mirjam Reiner and Alexandra Scott, ‘Countries Stress 
Importance of Legal and Institutional Reforms in their iNDCs’ (Climate Law and Governance 
Initiative September 2016) 4 <http://www.climatelawgovernance.org/knowledge-centre.html> 
accessed 7 September 2016. 
17  ibid 5. 
18  Climate Law and Governance Initiative partners include CISDL and McGill University Faculty 
of Law, C-EENRG and LCIL at University of Cambridge, IREDIES of La Sorbonne/Pantheon 
Faculty of Law in Paris, GEM at Yale University and University of Toronto, CR2 at University 
of Chile Faculty of Law, Ateneo School of Governance, University of Zambia Faculty of Law, 
and CASELAP at the University of Nairobi Faculty of Law, among others, in collaboration with 
IDLO, UNDP, UNEP, CIFOR, ILA, and the IUCN World Commission for Environmental Law. 
For details, see <http://www.climatelawgovernance.org/> accessed 10 November 2016.
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of international law on sustainable development, and considers the challenges and 
opportunities that it presents for domestic legal reform for sustainable development.
2 Overview of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
The Paris Agreement aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate 
change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, 
by holding the increase in the global average temperature to ‘well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels’ and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C; by increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change 
as well as foster climate resilience and low GHG emissions development; and by 
making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions 
and climate resilient development.19 The international regime developed in an 
interactional manner over decades,20 as countries sought to address climate 
challenges domestically while also struggling to find an appropriate international 
cooperative framework. 
In essence, the Paris Agreement presents a core triangle of obligations:
(i)  countries must take nationally determined, quantifiable and progressive 
action for climate mitigation and adaptation;
(ii)  these actions are incentivised by changes in financial flows and related 
technology transfer, capacity-building, education and other cooperative 
measures; and
(iii)  enforcement is achieved through transparency and reporting, peer 
review, periodic stocktaking, public participation and compliance 
mechanisms. 
The Paris Agreement seeks to enhance implementation of the UNFCCC, which 
sets out its ultimate objective at Article 2 as being the ‘stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system (…) within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
19  Paris Agreement (n 13) art 2.
20  Jutta Brunee and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (CUP 2010).
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in a sustainable manner’.21 Specifically, the Paris Agreement aims to implement the 
commitments in Article 4 UNFCCC in accordance with the principles reflected in 
Article 3 UNFCCC.22 
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement further specifies that the agreement will 
be implemented to ‘reflect equity and the principle of [CBDRRC], in the light of 
different national circumstances’.23 The legal obligations of developing countries 
under the Paris Agreement are thus variable in order to equitably reflect their 
historical, economic, and social circumstances in comparison with that of other 
states. Article 3 of the Paris Agreement underscores that all Parties will undertake 
and communicate ambitious efforts (as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13) 
to achieve the aim of the agreement through NDCs to the global response to 
climate change. In doing so, it recognises, the efforts of all Parties will progress 
over time, and there is a need to support developing country Parties for effective 
implementation.
The Paris Agreement aims to achieve climate mitigation, adaptation and 
finance through a series of cooperative frameworks and mechanisms, each of 
which establishes different legal rights and obligations for Parties, and explicitly 
makes provision for the needs of developing country Parties, especially the most 
vulnerable. These are intended to: (1) achieve NDCs to mitigation and adaptation, 
through (2) mobilisation of resources, (3) transparency, global stocktaking, 
review and facilitative dialogue, (4) a sustainable development mechanism and 
non-market approaches, (5) technology transfer, and (6) further implementation 
measures, such as capacity-building, education, and a compliance mechanism. 
21  UNFCCC (n 9) (emphasis added); While there is an unequivocal link between the Paris 
Agreement and the UNFCCC, the Agreement remains silent on the actual nature of the 
relationship between the two documents. The Paris Agreement could be said to constitute 
a de facto Protocol under the UNFCCC but may also be characterised as a subsequent 
agreement. The latter option would give more room for an interpretation of the terms of the 
Paris Agreement independent of the meaning contained in the UNFCCC. See in that regard, 
Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A Rejoinder’ (EJIL: Talk! 16 February 2016) <www.
ejiltalk.org/the-paris-agreement-a-rejoinder/> accessed 12 June 2016.
22  The principles in art 3 UNFCCC (n 9) include intergenerational and intra-generational equity, 
common but differentiated responsibility, precaution, right to sustainable development, and 
non-discrimination. 
23  Note the broadening of differentiation from the simple CBDR adopted by the UNFCCC (n 9). 
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2.1 Nationally Determined Contributions to Climate Mitigation and 
Adaptation
One of the central aspects of the Paris Agreement is its ‘bottom-up’ approach. 
Paragraph 2(b) of Decision 1/CP.19 invited all Parties to communicate to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat NDCs for GHG emissions reductions. By COP22, 188 
countries had submitted NDCs or iNDCs. Under Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, 
Parties commit that they ‘shall prepare, communicate and maintain’ successive 
NDCs and pursue domestic mitigation measures to achieve their commitments. 
Rather than setting out specific mitigation or adaptation targets for each country, 
the Paris Agreement commits Parties to nationally determine and transparently 
communicate their own objectives, to inform the international community of the 
progress in implementing and achieving them, and to participate in periodic global 
stocktaking to inform progressively higher ambition. Paragraph 13 of the Paris 
Agreement Adoption Decision recalls this invitation for Parties who have not done 
so already, for the pre-2020 period. 
2.2 GHG Emission Mitigation, Low Carbon GHG Emission Development 
Strategies and GHG Sinks and Reservoirs
In Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, the Parties aim to reach global peaking of GHG 
emissions as soon as possible (recognising that this will take longer for developing 
country Parties) and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with 
the best available science, so as to balance emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks in the second half of this century (Article 4.1). The notion of balancing 
emissions and removals can be understood as an objective of ‘net zero’ emissions, 
whereby any residual anthropogenic GHG emissions would be annulled by activities 
removing GHG from the atmosphere. Such a sequestration of GHG could occur 
through expansion of the activities of natural carbon sinks and reservoirs, such as 
forests or oceans, or through the deployment of carbon capture technologies.24 
24  The utilisation of both carbon sinks (including afforestation) and carbon dioxide capture and 
storage (CCS) as well as bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) feature 
prominently in several of the mitigation scenarios developed by the UNFCCC. This applies 
not only to overshoot scenarios (where the declared targets are exceeded for certain periods) 
but also to compensate for industries in which mitigation is more costly. However, there are 
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The NDCs are communicated every five years (ie 2020, 2025, 2030, etc.). A 
Party may at any time adjust its existing NDC to enhance its level of ambition 
(Article 4.3, Article 4.11). These NDCs, once submitted by the government of 
a country, shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. The information that must be included in the communication of 
NDCs, so as to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding, is explained 
in paragraph 27 of the Adoption Decision (see also Decision 1/CP.20 paragraph 
14). Furthermore, Parties shall account for their NDCs and, in accounting for 
GHG emissions and removals corresponding to the NDCs, Parties shall promote 
environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and 
consistency, and avoid double-counting in accordance with guidance from Parties 
in the CMA (Article 4.13). 
Among other sustainable development provisions, Article 4 of the 
Paris Agreement recognises that developed countries should take the lead by 
undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, while developing 
countries should continue enhancing mitigation efforts, moving over time towards 
economy-wide targets (Article 4.4, see also Preamble paragraph 16). Support 
shall also be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of 
mitigation efforts, recognising that enhanced support for developing country 
Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions (Article 4.5, see also Articles 
9, 10 and 11). The least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing 
States (SIDS) may prepare strategies that reflect their special circumstances (Article 
4.6). Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of the Agreement 
the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response 
measures, particularly developing country Parties (Article 4.15). Further, over and 
above their NDCs, all Parties should strive to formulate and communicate Long-
term Low-GHG Emission Development Strategies (LEDS), taking into account 
CBDRRC, in light of different national circumstances (Article 4.19).
In the Paris Agreement, Parties also agree that they should take action to 
conserve and enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs as described in UNFCCC Article 
4.1(d), including forests.25 They are encouraged to take action to implement and 
support the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already 
also concerns associated with the deployment of CCS and BECCS. See IPCC 2014 Report (n 2) 
SPM 3.4, as well as Full IPCC Report, Box 3.3 ‘Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Radiation 
Management Geoengineering Technologies—Possible Roles, Options, Risks and Status’ 89. 
25  See Bruno Locatelli and others, ‘Forests and Climate Change in Latin America: Linking 
Adaptation and Mitigation’ (2011) 2 Forests 431.
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agreed under the UNFCCC, in order to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD+ framework), including through results-based 
payments.26 The role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, but also alternative 
policy approaches such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for integral 
and sustainable management of forests, is emphasised, while the importance of 
incentivising non-carbon co-benefits is also reaffirmed (Article 5.2). These simple 
provisions arguably highlight and integrate many existing decisions and guidance 
for collaboration, including those established or strengthened in recent years.
2.3 Adaptation Goal and Communications, and Efforts to Address Loss 
and Damage
By virtue of Article 7, a global goal on adaptation is established, to enhance 
adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, 
with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate 
adaptation response (Article 7.1). Each Party should submit and periodically 
update an Adaptation Communication, which may include a national adaptation 
plan, priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without 
creating additional burdens for developing country Parties (Article 7.10, Article 
7.11). The Adaptation Communications shall be recorded in a public registry 
maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat (Article 7.12). 
Among sustainable development aspects of Article 7, the Treaty provides 
that adaptation is recognised as a global challenge faced by all with multiple 
dimensions, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change (Article 7.1). The adaptation efforts of developing country Parties 
shall be recognised, in accordance with the modalities adopted by the first CMA 
meeting of the Paris Agreement Parties (Article 7.3), and Adaptation Committee 
26  Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers and others, ‘Trade-offs, Co-benefits and Safeguards: Current 
Debates on the Breadth of REDD+’ (2012)  4 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 
646; Peter J Kanowski, Constance L McDermott and Benjamin W Cashore, ‘Implementing 
REDD+: Lessons from Analysis of Forest Governance’ (2011) 14 Environmental Science and 
Policy 111; Antonio G M La Viña and Alaya de Leon, ‘Two Global Challenges, One Solution: 
International Cooperation to Combat Climate Change and Tropical Deforestation’ (2014) 
CGD Climate and Forest Paper Series no 14 Working Paper 388.
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and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) should be involved in this 
process (Adoption Decision paragraph 42). The Green Climate Fund is to expedite 
support for the least developed countries and other developing country Parties for 
the formulation of National Adaptation Plans (Adoption Decision paragraph 47). 
Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, 
taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework (Article 7.7), and the global 
stocktake shall recognise and enhance these efforts, reviewing the adequacy and 
effectiveness of adaptation and support for it, and overall progress (Article 7.14, 
also Article 14). Continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided 
to developing country Parties for the implementation of commitments to enhance 
action on adaptation, to engage in adaptation planning, and to prepare, submit and 
periodically update their Adaptation Communications (Article 7.13, also Articles 
7.7, 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11). The Paris Agreement recognises the importance of averting, 
minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects 
of climate change, including extreme weather events as well as slow onset events, 
specifically highlighting the importance of sustainable development in reducing 
risks of loss and damage (Article 8.1). The Paris Agreement also addresses the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts, noting that this shall be subject to the authority and the guidance 
of the CMA, and that Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, 
on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change (Article 8.3, also Article 8.2).
Certain key priorities for cooperation and facilitation are identified in 
the Paris Agreement, such as early warning systems, emergency preparedness, 
slow onset events, events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and 
damage, comprehensive risk assessment and management, risk insurance facilities, 
climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions, non-economic losses, as well 
as resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems (Article 8.4). In the 
Treaty, Parties agree to ensure that the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) 
collaborates with existing bodies and expert groups, as well as relevant actors outside 
the Agreement (Article 8.5). They do not go further to define, deny or designate 
liability or compensation. In the Adoption Decision, while a new clearinghouse for 
risk transfer is established to serve as a repository for information on insurance and 
risk transfer to facilitate Parties’ efforts to develop and implement comprehensive 
risk management strategies (Adoption Decision paragraph 49), it is simply stated 
that Article 8 of the Treaty does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or 
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compensation (Adoption Decision paragraph 52). In essence, the Treaty neither 
confirms nor denies whether liability exists, or compensation should be provided, 
a stalemate in legal terms.
2.4 Mobilisation and Direction of Climate Finance
Under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, developed country Parties shall provide 
financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both 
mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing UNFCCC obligations 
(Article 9.1), while other Parties are encouraged to provide financial support 
voluntarily (Article 9.2). At the same time, all Parties should increase their efforts 
in mobilising climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and 
channels, noting the significant role of public funds, and taking into account the 
priorities and needs of developing country Parties, with the greater onus being on 
developed country Parties which shall take the lead (Article 9.3). 
Prior to 2025, the COP shall set a new collective quantified goal from a 
floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities 
of developing countries (Adoption Decision paragraph 54). Developed country 
Parties are strongly urged to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete 
roadmap to achieve this goal by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation (significantly 
increasing adaptation finance) and to provide appropriate technology and capacity-
building support (Adoption Decision paragraph 115). Developed country Parties 
shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information 
related to scaling up and mobilising financial resources, including as to the balance 
between adaptation and mitigation (as per Articles 9.1 and 9.3), as applicable. 
The financial mechanism of the UNFCCC serves as the mechanism for the Paris 
Agreement. 
The provision of scaled-up financial resources should attempt to balance the 
provision of mitigation and adaptation resources and take into account country-
driven strategies and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, 
especially those particularly vulnerable to climate change with significant capacity 
constraints, such as LDCs and SIDS, and considering the need for public and grant-
based resources for adaptation (Article 9.4).  The balance between mitigation and 
adaptation, and careful attention to opportunities for sustainable development, are 
key for global implementation of the Paris Agreement.
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2.5 Transparency, Global Stocktaking and Peer Review
By virtue of Article 13, in addition to reporting on mitigation and adaptation, 
Parties should also regularly provide Communications on a national inventory 
report of GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks, prepared using good 
practice methodologies accepted by the IPCC (Article 13.7(a)), and the information 
necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving NDCs (Article 
13.7(b)). They should also provide information regarding climate change impacts 
and adaptation (Article 13.8). 
Of particular interest for sustainable development, Article 13 mandates further 
transparency. For developing country Parties, information may be presented on 
financial, technological and capacity-building support needed and received under 
Article 9 on climate finance, Article 10 on technology transfer and Article 11 on 
capacity-building (Article 13.10). For developing country Parties, information may 
be presented on progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, 
actions or measures to implement the Paris Agreement (Article 11.4). The LDCs 
and SIDS may submit the information required at their discretion (Adoption 
Decision paragraph 91).
As elements of pledge and review, the national inventory reports on GHG 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks, and the information for tracking 
progress, as well as the level of support, will be the object of a technical expert 
review and also of a multilateral consideration of progress (Article 13.11, 
Article 13.12, Article 13.13). The review process shall pay particular attention 
to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of developing country 
Parties. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation 
of their transparency frameworks (Article 13.14), and for building capacity to 
participate in the process, on a continuous basis (Article 13.15). The ‘enhanced 
transparency framework’ shall build on the transparency arrangements under the 
UNFCCC (including monitoring, reporting and verification measures) and be 
implemented with common modalities, guidelines and procedures in a manner 
that is facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive, respectful of national sovereignty, 
and avoids placing undue burdens on Parties (Article 13.3). It shall supersede 
existing guidance (Adoption Decision paragraph 88).
As a further ambition/transparency measure, the Paris Agreement stipulates 
that its Meetings of the Parties shall periodically take stock of the Treaty’s 
implementation, to assess collective progress towards achieving the Treaty’s 
purpose and long-term goals—referred to as the ‘global stocktake’. Stocktaking 
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will be comprehensive and facilitative, considering mitigation, adaptation and the 
means of implementation and support, in the light of equity and the best available 
science (Article 14.1). The first global stocktake is planned for 2023 and every 
five years thereafter (Article 14.2), and the outcome of the global stocktake shall 
inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support, as well as in 
enhancing international cooperation for climate action (Article 14.3). The reviews, 
in essence, take place on many levels, engaging all aspects.
2.6 Sustainable Development Market Mechanism and Non-Market 
Approaches
Under Article 6, Parties may engage in ‘international transfers of mitigation 
outcomes’ towards their NDCs, through voluntary cooperation, to allow for 
‘higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions’ (Article 6.1). When 
using internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, Parties shall promote 
sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, 
applying robust accounting and governance to avoid double-counting, consistent 
with guidance to be adopted by the CMA (Article 6.2).27 
Further, a ‘sustainable development mechanism’ is established to promote 
mitigation of GHG emissions while fostering sustainable development; to 
incentivise and facilitate GHG mitigation by authorised public and private entities; 
to contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will 
benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be 
used by another Party to fulfil its NDC; and to deliver overall mitigation of global 
emissions (Article 6.4). It is established under the authority of the CMA, for use 
by the Parties on a voluntary basis, and is to be supervised by a body designated by 
the CMA (Article 6.4). Rules, modalities and procedures for its operation should 
be forthcoming (Article 6.7). The new mechanism might draw upon certain 
experience accumulated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
under the Kyoto Protocol. However, a key question is how this mechanism will 
27  See Kishan Khoday, ‘Mobilizing Market Forces to Combat Global Environmental Change: 
Lessons from UN-Private Sector Partnerships in China’ (2007) 16 Rev Euro Comm & Int’l 
Envt 173; Steven Bernstein and others, ‘A Tale of Two Copenhagens: Carbon Markets and 
Climate Governance’ (2010) 39 Millenn J Int Stud 161; Christina Voigt ‘WTO Law and 
International Emissions Trading: Is there Potential for Conflict?’ (2008) 2 CCLR 54.
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work in a world of NDCs, where developing countries (as potential hosts) also have 
agreed baselines and/or reference levels.
Provisions of interest to vulnerable developing countries include a 
commitment that a share of proceeds from the mechanism shall be dedicated to 
cover administrative expenses and to assist developing country Parties particularly 
vulnerable to climate change to meet adaptation costs (Article 6.7). There is also 
recognition of the importance of non-market approaches, and the definition of a 
framework to promote them, including public and private sector participation and 
coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements (Article 
6.8 and 6.9). It is not enough, perhaps many would argue, but provides a platform 
to build on.
2.7 Technology Mechanism
The Technology Mechanism established under the UNFCCC shall also serve the 
Paris Agreement (Article 10.3). Parties recognise the importance of technology for 
the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under the Paris Agreement, 
and commit to strengthening cooperative action on technology development and 
transfer (Article 10.2). They also establish a framework to guide the operation of 
the Technology Mechanism (Article 10.4). Of interest for sustainable development, 
Parties agree to focus on collaborative approaches to research and development, 
and on facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the 
technology cycle, for developing country Parties (Article 10.5). Support, including 
financial support, shall be provided to developing country Parties, including for 
strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at 
different stages of the technology cycle.
2.8 Further Measures for Implementation of the Agreement
2.8.1 Cooperation for Capacity-Building
Capacity-building under the Paris Agreement, according to Article 11, should 
enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties to take effective 
climate action, particularly ‘countries with the least capacity, such as the least 
developed countries, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
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effects of climate change’ (Article 11.1). All countries should cooperate to achieve 
this, and there is a specific provision that developed country Parties should enhance 
support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties (Article 11.3). 
Capacity-building should be country-driven, responsive to national needs, and 
foster country ownership of Parties, including at the national, subnational and local 
levels, in particular for developing country Parties (Article 11.2). In essence, an 
effective, iterative process is called for—one that is participatory, cross-cutting and 
gender-responsive (Article 11.2). Capacity-building should be guided by lessons 
learned, including those from previous activities under the UNFCCC. There will 
be regular communication by all Parties that support capacity-building about 
their actions and measures (including the capacity-building done under regional, 
bilateral and multilateral approaches). Capacity-building will not just assist 
with technical capacity for implementing adaptation and mitigation actions, the 
facilitation of technology development, dissemination and deployment, and access 
to climate finance, but it will also support education, training and public awareness, 
and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information (Article 
11.1, Article 11.4, see also Article 13.15).
The Paris Agreement calls for capacity-building activities to be enhanced 
through appropriate institutional arrangements, to be created in the APA, and 
followed up in the CMA (Article 11.5). The Paris Committee on Capacity-Building 
is also created, with the aim of addressing gaps and needs in implementing 
capacity-building in developing country Parties and further enhancing capacity-
building efforts, including with regard to coherence and coordination in 
capacity-building activities under the Convention (Adoption Decision paragraph 
72). Further, a Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency is created by the 
Adoption Decision, in order to build institutional and technical capacity, both 
pre and post-2020. This initiative will support developing country Parties, upon 
request, in meeting enhanced transparency requirements as defined in Article 13 
of the Agreement in a timely manner (Adoption Decision paragraph 85).
2.8.2 Education and Public Awareness
The Paris Agreement affirms that Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as 
appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, 
public participation and public access to information, recognising the importance 
of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under the Agreement (Article 12). 
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2.8.3 Implementation and Compliance Mechanism
A mechanism to facilitate implementation of the agreement and to promote 
compliance is established (Article 15.1). This mechanism is structured as an 
expert-based and facilitative committee, and operates on a transparent, non-
adversarial, and non-punitive way, according to procedures to be defined by 
the first CMA. The Compliance Committee shall pay particular attention to the 
respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties. The Committee shall 
consist of 12 members with recognised competence in relevant scientific, technical, 
socio-economic or legal fields, to be elected by the COP on the basis of equitable 
geographical representation, with two members each from the five regional groups 
of the United Nations and one member each from the SIDS and the LDCs, taking 
gender balance into account (Adoption Decision paragraph 103).
2.8.4 Governance and Dispute Settlement
The Paris Agreement adopts the UNFCCC Rules of Procedure and Secretariat 
(Article 16 and Article 17); its governance structure, including the subsidiary body 
for scientific and technological advice (UNFCCC Article 9) and the subsidiary 
body for implementation (UNFCCC Article 10), the arrangements for voting 
and observer participation (Article 18 and Article 19), and its dispute settlement 
mechanism (Article 24, see also UNFCCC Article 14). The Agreement opened for 
signature from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017, and thereafter for accession (Article 
20.1). It entered into force 30 days after 55 Parties to the UNFCCC—accounting 
for at least 55 per cent of global GHG emissions—joined (Article 21.1), which was 
4 November 2016, a significant achievement demonstrating very high political 
momentum.
3 Sustainable Development Dimensions of the Paris Agreement
3.1 Sustainable Development as a Purpose of the Paris Agreement 
In 2015, through ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’, the UN and its member States agreed on 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) for the world, identifying time-bound targets and implementation 
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methods.28 Legal reviews reveal that these SDGs can be found in the object and 
purpose of many important international treaties.29 Achieving SDG 13 to take 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts will be implemented in 
part through the Paris Agreement. Indeed, SDG 13 itself acknowledges that the 
UNFCCC is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating 
the global response to climate change. Other SDGs, for instance, on energy, water, 
hunger, poverty, biodiversity and innovation, are also highly relevant to the Treaty’s 
objectives.
While all Parties, including those with the least historical contributions to 
global emissions, begin to play a role in emissions reduction, they also benefit 
from new investment and collaboration for low GHG pathways for sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. As an important instrument in the climate 
regime, the Paris Agreement holds all the hallmarks of a sustainable development 
accord.30
The Paris Agreement is predicated upon an expectation that, if NDCs can 
be shaped and supported by peer review and public awareness, new scientific data 
on risks, actual impacts, and greater political attention will lead to ever-higher 
ambition from all levels of governments, along with non-State actors in the private 
sector and civil society. Some hope that countries, perhaps in groups with higher 
ambition, can move towards setting and achieving absolute emissions reduction 
targets, diversified enhanced mitigation actions, or arrangements among donors 
and beneficiaries to address key sectors. The former would seek to bind Parties to 
attain net zero emissions levels over the long-term through a quantifiable standard. 
The latter would set higher ambition, whether or not remaining recalcitrant 
countries also accept such actions as obligatory.
28  UNGA Res 70/1 (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1.
29  See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Elizabeth Mrema (eds), ‘The Contribution of 
International Law, Policy and Governance to the Sustainable Development Goals’ (Issue Briefs, 
CISDL-UNEP 2016) <http://cisdl.org/research-publications-events/legal-briefs-reports-
working-papers.html>.
30  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, 
Practices, and Prospects (OUP 2004); Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of 
International Law: Resolving Conflicts between Climate Measures and WTO Law (BRILL 2009).
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3.2 Commitments to Sustainable Development in the Adoption Decision
A commitment to sustainable development permeates the Paris Agreement and its 
Adoption Decision. Indeed, the Decision begins by welcoming UNGA Res 70/1 on 
the global SDGs, particularly Goal 13,31 and acknowledging that climate change 
is a common concern of humankind. The Adoption Decision also recognises 
that, when taking action on climate change, States must respect, promote and 
consider their human rights obligations; the right to development; the rights of 
indigenous peoples, children and others in vulnerable situations; gender equality 
and empowerment; and inter-generational equity. It acknowledges the need to 
promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing countries, alongside 
the deployment of renewables, especially in Africa. Important sustainable 
development principles such as transparency and public participation, integration 
of environmental concerns and human rights into economic decision-making, 
good governance, precaution, inter-generational equity, CBDRRC, and sustainable 
use of natural resources such as energy, are reflected in the Preamble to the 
Adoption Decision.32
Operationally, the Adoption Decision also clarifies that the Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technological Advice will undertake a work programme under 
the framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development referred to 
in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (paragraph 40); invites all UN agencies and 
financial institutions to provide information on how their development assistance 
and climate finance programmes incorporate climate-proofing and climate 
resilience measures (paragraph 44); recognises the link between adequate and 
predictable financial resources and sustainable management of forests (paragraph 
55); recognises the co-benefits of voluntary mitigation actions for adaptation, 
health and sustainable development (paragraph 109); recognises the importance 
of taking national sustainable development priorities into account in the existing 
technical examination process on mitigation (paragraph 110(a)) and encourages 
Parties to make effective use of the Climate Technology Centre and Network to 
obtain assistance to develop economically, environmentally and socially viable 
31  SDG 13 requires ‘urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, acknowledging 
that the UNFCCC is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the 
global response to climate change’. See UNGA Res 70/1 (n 27) 14.
32  See John H Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations’ (2009) 
33 Harv Envtl L Rev 477; John H Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 50 
Va J Int’l L 163.
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project proposals in the high mitigation potential areas identified in the process 
(paragraph 110(d)), among other measures of note.
3.3 Principles of Sustainable Development in the Paris Agreement and its 
Adoption Decision
States and legal scholars have long sought to identify principles of international law 
on sustainable development.33 In 2002, the International Law Association’s (ILA) 
Committee on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development, after ten years of 
study, drew the outcomes of these global policy discussions together in its New 
Delhi ILA Declaration on Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable 
Development as a Resolution of its 70th Conference.34 The New Delhi Declaration 
notes that:
sustainable development is now widely accepted as a global objective and [...] the 
concept has been amply recognised in various international and national legal 
instruments, including treaty law and jurisprudence at international and national 
levels.
In the New Delhi Declaration, seven principles of international law are highlighted 
which characterise treaties related to sustainable development35 and are reflected in 
decisions of international courts and tribunals.36 The Declaration suggests that States 
33  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘Significant Developments in Sustainable Development Law 
and Governance: A Proposal’ (2004) 28 Natural Resources Forum 61; Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger and others, ‘Prospects for Principles of International Sustainable Development Law 
after the WSSD: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, Precaution and Participation’ 
(2003) 12 RECIEL 54. 
34  International Law Association, ‘New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International 
Law Related to Sustainable Development’ Resolution 3/2002; Nico Schrijver and Friedl Weiss 
(eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2004) 1–152, 699–706; Cordonier Segger and Khalfan (n 30) 95–191; Duncan French, 
International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development (MUP 2005); See also 7 CISDL Legal 
Working Papers detailing the meaning, scope and existing status in international law of each 
proposed ILA New Delhi Declaration Principle, online: <http://cisdl.org/public/docs/new_
delhi_declaration.pdf> accessed 12 June 2016.
35  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and C J Weeramantry (eds), Sustainable Justice: Reconciling 
Economic, Social and Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 561–92; Cordonier Segger 
and Khalfan (n 30).
36  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger with C J Weeramantry, Sustainable Development in 
International Courts and Tribunals (Routledge 2017) (forthcoming).
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respect the following principles: 1) sustainable use of natural resources whereby 
States have sovereign rights over their natural resources, and a corresponding duty 
not to cause, or allow, undue damage to the environment of other States in the use 
of these resources; 2) inter and intra-generational equity and the eradication of 
poverty; 3) common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; 
4) the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems, 
transferring the burden of proving lack of significant harm from an undertaking to 
the proponent, in cases of scientific uncertainty; 5) public participation, backed by 
access to information and justice; 6) good governance, with measures to support 
rule of law, coherence and anti-corruption; and perhaps most telling, 7) integration 
and interrelationship of human rights and social, economic and environmental 
objectives. 
As has been noted elsewhere, this last principle may sometimes be called—
in short-hand—a ‘principle of sustainable development’, holding that States must 
take into account the environmental and social (including human rights) aspects 
of economic plans or projects, integrating related measures and costs, to promote 
more sustainable development.37 
These non-exhaustive ‘sustainable development principles’ are gaining 
certain recognition by States and other actors in international law. Some are not yet 
recognised as binding rules of customary international law, and in some cases, they 
might never be. However, they are increasingly reflected and made operational in 
binding international treaties, forming part of international law and policy in the 
field of sustainable development.38 Indeed, each is reflected in the Paris Agreement 
in different ways:
3.3.1 The duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources
In the Paris Agreement, atmospheric and carbon resources are framed as key 
resources to be managed in a sustainable manner, one which avoids dangerous 
climate change, as noted in the Treaty preamble and in the substantive sections 
on mitigation. For example, in Article 2, Parties recognise that limiting the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Parties are encouraged to take 
37  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in David 
Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook on International Law (Routledge 2009) 355.
38  ibid.
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action on sustainable management of forests as a key natural resource and carbon 
sink (Article 5, Adoption Decision paragraph 55), including through REDD+ 
and alternative policy frameworks such as joint mitigation and adaptation 
approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests. The protection 
of ecosystems, biodiversity, and oceans is also prioritised in the Paris Agreement 
(Preamble paragraph 13), alongside the need to build the resilience of socio-
economic and ecological systems, including through sustainable management of 
natural resources (Article 7.9(e) on adaptation).
3.3.2 The principle of equity and the eradication of poverty 
The notion of equity arises frequently in the Paris Agreement, as was posited prior 
to the conclusion of the Treaty by leading legal scholars.39 In the Preamble of the 
Treaty, there are two references to equity and intergenerational equity, which also 
appear in the Preamble of the Adoption Decision. In the operational provisions 
of the Paris Agreement, it is noted that Parties should protect the climate on the 
basis of equity and the principle of CBDRRC (Articles 2 and 4). The importance of 
efforts to eradicate poverty are also highlighted (Preamble paragraphs 8 and 9), in 
the statement of the general objective of the Agreement (Article 2), and in relation 
to cooperation to implement NDCs (Article 6).
3.3.3 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capacities
The Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect the principle of CBDRRC, in 
light of different national circumstances (Article 2). Each Party’s successive NDC will 
represent a progression beyond their earlier one, with its highest possible ambition, 
reflecting its CBDRR (Article 4.3). Each Party will also strive to formulate and 
communicate long-term low GHG development strategies, mindful of CBDRRC 
(Article 4.19, Preamble paragraph 3). The Paris Agreement, to reflect CBDRRC, 
also commits to the provision and the mobilisation of financial assistance (Articles 
9.1–3), assistance in adaptation efforts (Article 7.7(d)), facilitation of technology 
transfer (Article 10.6), and capacity-building (Article 11.1–3).
39  Christina Voigt, ‘Equity in the 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 4 Climate Law 50.
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3.3.4 The principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural 
resources and ecosystems 
The Treaty recognises an urgent ‘threat’ of climate change (Preamble paragraph 
4) and the need to strengthen global response to the threat of climate change and 
to significantly reduce the risks of climate change (Article 2.1). In essence, while 
references could be more explicit, the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC are 
founded on the precautionary principle. In order to stabilise GHG concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system and in order to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, so as to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner, mitigation 
and adaptation actions must be taken even in the event of scientific uncertainty 
as to the exact contours of the challenge. As asserted in several places in the Paris 
Agreement, action on climate change should also be guided by the best available 
scientific knowledge (Preamble paragraph 4). While not detracting from the 
precautionary nature of the Agreement, the emphasis on continuing to advance 
scientific knowledge is recognised in the long-term goal (Article 4.1), in provisions 
on adaptation (Articles 7.5 and 7.7(c)), and in plans for the global stocktake 
(Article 14.1), with specific reference to the work of IPCC. Such ‘best available 
scientific knowledge’, however, evolves over time, and precaution is still required 
when the science is uncertain, under the Convention itself (Article 3.3, UNFCCC).
3.3.5 The principle of public participation and access to information and justice 
As noted in the Adoption Decision (Paragraphs 83, 84 and 110), and in the Paris 
Agreement (Preamble para 14), public participation and access to information are 
crucial for global responses to climate change, and for the success of the framework 
established by the Paris Agreement itself. The importance of public participation 
is emphasised throughout the Paris Agreement, including in provisions on 
mitigation (Article 4), adaptation (Article 7) and on the Sustainable Development 
Mechanism and non-market approaches (Article 6), which aim to enhance public 
and private sector participation in the implementation of NDCs. Further, Parties 
shall enhance education, training, public awareness, public participation and 
public access to information, recognising their importance in enhancing actions 
under the Agreement (Article 12). In essence, the Treaty depends on public 
engagement, informed by the information that is made available through the 
(2016) Vol 5 Issue 2       Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 225
 Advancing the Paris Agreement
national communications that are submitted to international registries, the global 
stocktake, the peer review, and other measures, to assist Parties progressively to 
intensify their contributions to mitigation, adaptation, finance and other aspects 
of the global response to climate change. There is an unprecedented recognition 
of the importance (for some) of ‘climate justice’ in taking action to address climate 
change, in the Preamble at paragraph 13. As explained in Sustainable Justice, climate 
change is the justice challenge of this century, both in terms of its causes, and who 
is disproportionately affected by its impacts.40 As explained during negotiations by 
the Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, the UN Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and the Environment Professor John Knox, and also by the International 
Bar Association, there is a need to ‘ensure communities, individuals and 
governments have substantive legal and procedural rights relating to the enjoyment 
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment and the means to take or 
cause measures to be taken within their national legislative and judicial systems 
and, where necessary, at regional and international levels, to mitigate sources of 
climate change and provide for adaptation to its effects in a manner that respects 
human rights’.41 Although ‘access to justice’ may not be expressly mentioned in the 
Agreement, Parties intended to access the same dispute settlement measures as the 
UNFCCC (Article 24).
3.3.6 The principle of good governance
Good governance is essential in the context of the Paris Agreement, particularly 
for the cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes towards NDCs. Indeed, transparency and robust accounting 
are required in the measurement of such outcomes (Article 6). In the establishment 
of the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (Adoption Decision paragraph 
74(a), (b) and (h)), Parties seek to build institutional and technical capacity 
with regard to the transparency requirements defined in Article 13 of the Paris 
Agreement (Articles 85–99). Further, they are committed to ensuring transparency 
of action and also support, including the provision of climate finance (Adoption 
Decision paragraph 93(c)) among other measures.
40  Cordonier Segger and Weeramantry, Sustainable Justice (n 35).
41  International Bar Association, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force 
‘Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption’ (IBA 2014).
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3.3.7 The principle of integration and interrelationship, in relation to human rights 
and social, economic and environmental objectives 
By recognising the far-reaching nature of climate change across environmental, social 
and economic domains, as well as the need to act in a timely and effective manner in 
order to prevent detrimental impacts, the principle of integration of environmental 
and social/human rights considerations into economic decision-making permeates 
the Paris Agreement. The integration of economic and environmental concerns 
is found in the reference to ‘climate-resilient development’ (Article 2.1(c)), and 
in the linking of economic growth and sustainable development in the context of 
technology transfers (Article 10.5). Integration is also apparent in the references to 
economic diversification and sustainable resource management in the context of 
adaptation (Article 7.9(e)), which also highlights the resilience of socio-economic 
and ecological systems, underlining the need for adaptation measures to integrate 
all three objectives. The Paris Agreement supports the integration of environmental 
considerations into economic and social development, while ensuring that climate 
change actions are economically viable and respect human rights, as noted in the 
Adoption Decision (Preamble paragraph 7) and in the Paris Agreement Preamble 
(paragraph 11). This principle is also reflected in references to safeguarding food 
security, as noted in the Paris Agreement (Preamble paragraph 9), and to respect 
for human rights, gender equality, indigenous rights, and the integrity of Mother 
Earth (Preamble paragraph 13). 
4 National Legal Priorities for Implementation of the Paris 
Agreement 
Key aspects of the Paris Agreement respond to international legal obligations and 
are very likely to require domestic legislation for effective implementation. 
4.1 Nationally Determined Contributions and Mitigation Mechanisms
(i)  Nationally Determined Contributions: Parties’ NDCs represent the 
emissions reductions and other actions that each country will contribute 
to global efforts to respond to climate change. In order to make their 
contribution, participate in peer review, and engage in the global stocktake 
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process, Parties can implement changes across various sectors of public 
policy to reduce GHG emissions, to support the development of sinks 
and reservoirs (including forests), and to institute processes for collection, 
compilation and verification of information. In many cases, this requires 
domestic legislation in sectors such as energy, forests, water, land and 
other natural resources; also transportation, agriculture, finance, industry, 
trade, construction; in addition to environment, health and waste 
management; as well as adaptation, disaster risk reduction, resilience and 
natural disaster response. 
(ii)  Mitigation Mechanisms: The Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) 
and REDD+ are examples of mitigation mechanisms included in the Paris 
Agreement. Such mechanisms may also require legislation to implement—
for example, in bringing various sectors into harmony or clarifying land 
tenure in order to support the establishment of REDD+, or in guiding the 
mandates and operations of the designated national authorities for the 
SDM.
(iii)  Incentives for Mitigation Technologies: Best practices may be leveraged 
to incentivise mitigation technologies, including in the areas of cap 
and trade, carbon taxes and hybrid systems, both within subnational 
jurisdictions, among subnational jurisdictions, and among countries. The 
removal of perverse subsidies and the implementation of incentives for 
the development of clean technologies may also be key. 
4.2 Adaptation, Resilience, Loss and Damage
(i)  Disaster Risk Reduction: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) planning at the 
national level can be integrated with climate adaptation planning, in line 
with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and related 
regulations.
(ii)  Disaster Response/Internal Climate Migration and Displacement: In 
addition to DRR planning, a legal framework for disaster response may 
be needed to assist those who are impacted by both slow and rapid onset 
climate disasters, including those internally displaced by climate change. 
(iii)  Incentives for Adaptation Technologies: As with mitigation technologies, 
the development and implementation of adaptation technologies—for 
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example, to prevent coastal erosion and flooding—can be incentivised 
domestically and internationally. 
(iv)  Legal Rules of Adaptation Funds: Adaptation funds such as the Adaptation 
Fund, the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, the Green Climate 
Fund and others, may require clear legal rules governing transparency, 
accountability, and effectiveness, and incorporating safeguards for human 
rights, the environment and other priorities. 
(v)  Loss and Damage: Legal approaches to address loss and damage, including 
investment in early warning systems, pooling of risk and insurance 
mechanisms among other measures, can be explored and piloted, 
informing global efforts to implement the Warsaw Mechanism.
4.3 Climate Finance
(i)  Laws Governing Finance: Climate finance benefits from predictability 
and sustainability. In addition, full transparency in the way that financial 
resources are used for mitigation and adaptation activities can be key. To 
this end, effective rules, institutions and systems are important for the 
transparency, accountability and effectiveness of climate finance. 
(ii)  Laws Governing Incentives, Including Subsidies: Certain agricultural 
and industrial subsidies—for example, in the areas of fossil fuels, GHG 
emissions-intensive energy, mining and transportation—may need to be 
eliminated, while new subsidies may be created, including for renewable 
energy and clean technology, at the national level in order to stimulate a 
shift towards sustainable practices and in accordance with international 
trade rules.42 
42  Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and 
the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum (CUP 2009); Thomas Cottier, Olga 
Nartova and Anirudh Shingal, ‘The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate Change Mitigation: 
Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2014) 48 JWT 1007; Kateryna Holzer and Thomas Cottier, 
‘Addressing Climate Change under Preferential Trade Agreements: Towards Alignment 
of Carbon Standards under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ (2015) 35 
Global Environmental Change 514; Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More 
Policy Space or Enhanced Disciplines?’ (2014) 5 RELP 40.
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4.4 Transparency, Communication, Peer Review and Global Stocktake
(i)  Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV): Necessary elements of 
transparency, including collection of national communications and 
related data, and ensuring its public availability, are key for the successful 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, and may require new laws, 
institutions and guidelines or standards to be adopted at national levels 
and internationally. 
(ii)  Social and Environmental Impact Assessments: Laws relating to the 
requirements for social and environmental impact assessments may be 
required for actions relating to new projects and policies on agriculture, 
infrastructure, transportation, industry, energy and natural resources, 
vis-à-vis their potential climate-related impacts. Such rules may also 
be strengthened to apply to climate change mitigation and adaptation 
projects, for example, CDM or REDD+, in order to minimise any negative 
human rights, social and environmental effects. 
4.5 Human Rights and Equity
(i)  Respect for Human Rights: Following the Cancun Agreements, which 
recognised the importance of respecting human rights in all climate related 
actions, the Paris Agreement also contains several references to respect 
for human rights. Human rights considerations—arising from the effects 
of climate change itself, as well as from Parties’ climate change response 
measures—shall be taken into account at the national level. At its latest 
session, the Human Rights Council reaffirmed the importance of respect for 
human rights in the efforts to address climate change, building on previous 
statements to the same effect.43 In addition, as observed by the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, respect for 
the right to public participation and access to information are guaranteed 
43  UNCHR Draft Res (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/L.21; UNCHR Res 7/23 (2008) UN Doc A/
HRC/7/78; UNCHR Res 10/4 (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/L.11. 
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under international human rights law and, along with other fundamental 
rights, are critical to the success of efforts to address climate change.44
(ii)  Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Including Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC): Climate response measures can recognise the 
specific rights of Indigenous peoples, as affirmed in the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples45 and other binding international 
human rights treaties. Indigenous peoples can be included in participatory 
processes relating to climate change. The principle of FPIC may also be 
applicable in climate-related projects that affect the lands of indigenous 
peoples, and the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local 
communities can be key for climate actions at the domestic level.
(iii)  Climate Justice: As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights has noted, the ‘effects of climate change will be felt most 
acutely by those segments of the population who are already in vulnerable 
situations due to factors such as poverty, gender, age, minority status, and 
disability’.46 Parties can adopt new measures to mainstream consideration 
for the right to non-discrimination of historically vulnerable groups 
across their climate policies and climate-related legislation, and take the 
necessary affirmative actions to ensure that climate change harms and 
climate response measures do not impact on substantive equality. 
(iv)  Climate Disputes, Arbitration and Litigation Strategies: Alongside the new 
Agreement, and building on the Urgenda decision in the Dutch Courts 
and other current cases,47 as well as recent legal scholarship and advocacy 
for a Draft Climate Compensation Act at national and local levels in key 
44  OHCHR (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 paras 78–79; See also OHCHR (2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/19/34; See also Sumudu Atapattu, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced 
Migration: Implications for International Law’ (2009) 27 Wis Int’l LJ 607; Sumudu Atapattu, 
‘Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive this Onslaught?’ 
(2008) 20 Colo J Int Environ Law Policy 35.
45  UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007) UN Doc A/61/PV.107.
46  OHCHR (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 para 42.
47  Kai Purnhagen, ‘Climate Law: Dutch Decision Raises Bar’ (2015) 523 Nature 410; For discussion, 
see David Estrin, ‘Limiting Dangerous Climate Change: The Critical Role of Citizen Suits and 
Domestic Courts—Despite the Paris Agreement’ CIGI Paper Series 101 (CIGI 2016) <https://
www.cigionline.org/publications/limiting-dangerous-climate-change-critical-role-citizen-
suits-and-domestic-courts> accessed 26 September 2016; See also Climate Justice Programme 
(2016) <http://climatejustice.org.au> accessed 10 November 2016. 
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jurisdictions,48 it is likely that climate-related litigation strategies will 
continue to be advanced. Legislation relating to liability, response action 
and compensation for loss and damage due to climate change—including 
with regards to health, property, infrastructure, and industry—may be 
needed at the domestic level, in addition to provisions for related issues 
such as climate-induced displacement and migration. The facilitation of 
access to justice to existing judicial mechanisms or the establishment of 
new claims processes or tribunals may be important, along with good 
governance assurances in compensation mechanisms.49
5 The Paris Agreement in its International Legal Context 
The Parties have sought, in drafting the Agreement, to make it compatible with other 
relevant treaty obligations across international law on human rights, environment, 
trade, investment and finance, demonstrating synergies, and co-benefits for all 
three pillars of sustainable development.
5.1 Human Rights Instruments 
Of relevance to the new Agreement are the obligations contained in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention to Eliminate 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), amongst other international and regional human rights 
instruments. Among regional instruments, recognition of the rights to private and 
family life, for instance under the European Convention on Human Rights, and to 
the right to culture and right to property for indigenous people under the Inter-
American system of human rights, are particularly significant.
48  Andrew Gage and Margaretha Wewerinke, ‘Taking Climate Justice into our own Hands: A 
Model Climate Compensation Act’ (WCEL/VELA 2015). 
49  See Sumudu Atapattu, ‘Climate Change, Differentiated Responsibilities and State 
Responsibility: Devising Novel Legal Strategies for Damage Caused by Climate Change’ in 
Benjamin J Richardson and others (eds), Climate Law and Developing Countries: Legal and 
Policy Challenges for The World Economy (EEP 2009) 37; Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility 
for Climate Change Damages’ (2008) 77 Nordic J Int’l L 1.
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The Paris Agreement, in its Preamble, calls for Parties to implement their 
obligations in a manner that ensures the full respect for human rights. In particular, 
after intensive discussions in Paris, Parties agreed in the Preamble to acknowledge 
that climate change is a common concern of humankind and to respect, promote 
and consider their respective obligations on human rights when taking action to 
address climate change. As such, Parties may need to implement new domestic 
legal and institutional reforms to ensure mitigation action sufficient to safeguard 
the substantive human rights enshrined in fundamental accords such as the 
ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the CRC. These include the right to life, adequate food, 
the highest attainable standard of health, adequate housing, and access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation. Procedural rights of key importance to climate 
change which are recognised in the Aarhus Convention also include access to 
information, public participation, and access to justice.50 Special attention can also 
be directed to gender equality and the full and effective participation of women; 
the recognition and respect for indigenous peoples’ rights in all climate actions 
and decision-making and the recognition and protection of the rights of those 
displaced by climate change (climate migrants). 
5.2 Environmental Agreements
A number of multilateral environmental agreements are relevant to the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. Examples include treaties on water, such as 
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Helsinki Water Convention and the New 
York Watercourses Convention; treaties on biodiversity such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) with its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS), which also touch on sustainable 
development matters, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES), and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS); treaties on 
chemicals, such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs), the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides (PICs), the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; 
50  International Law Association Committee on the Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, 
‘Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change’ (ILA 2014) 35; See also Expert Group on Global 
Climate Obligations, ‘Oslo Principles on Global Obligations to Reduce Climate Change’ 
(adopted 1 March 2015). 
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and also treaties on air and atmosphere, such as the Vienna Convention and its 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP).
To achieve synergies and co-benefits, the Paris Agreement may need to 
establish climate change mitigation ambition that is sufficient to ensure that 
Member States fulfil their undertakings under other instruments to protect natural 
environments and ecosystems.51 For example, mitigation ambition and procedures 
for the monitoring, reporting and verification of States’ emissions reductions 
commitments can help to minimise environmental impacts, such as the loss of 
wetlands due to sea level rise, coral die-off due to warming sea temperature and 
ocean acidification, increases in drought and desertification, and biodiversity loss to 
the greatest extent possible, taking account of the precautionary principle. Further, 
the information gathered and best practices developed under different multilateral 
environmental agreements may assist in refining the rules and implementing the 
Paris Agreement. 
5.3 Economic Instruments
Trade, investment and financial instruments can support action on climate 
change, including action on mitigation, adaptation, and clean technology. Parties 
are seeking ways to harness international economic law to foster more efficient 
responses to climate change, and sustainable low carbon development pathways 
through negotiations in the World Trade Organization under its international 
treaties (the WTO Agreements); particular provisions on the environment, 
human rights or climate change, including renewable energy, forests, and 
environmental goods and services in regional trade agreements (RTAs); initial 
awareness in international investment agreements (IIAs); cooperation in 
specialised instruments, such as the agreements establishing the International 
Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and 
the Energy Charter Treaty; changes in the interpretation of the mandates of 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and other means.52 
51  The objective of promoting ‘synergies and coherence’ between environmental treaties was 
explicitly affirmed in UNGA Res 66/288 (27 July 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/288 para 79.  
52  See also Antonio G M La Viña, Joanne C  Dulce and Naderev Saño, ‘National and Global 
Energy Governance: Issues, Linkages and Challenges in the Philippines’ (2011) 2 Global 
Policy 80; Pilar Moraga (ed), Energía, Cambio Climático y Sustentabilidad: Una Mirada desde 
el Derecho (Thomson Reuters 2013).
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As one example, the WTO has undertaken efforts to reduce perverse subsidies 
and to promote trade in environmental goods and services, such as the launch 
of plurilateral ‘green goods’ negotiations.53 Other efforts by trading nations have 
resulted in new models of investment agreements and regional trade agreements 
that may seek to be mindful of green procurement schemes, emissions trading 
systems, carbon taxes and other GHG reduction mechanisms. Further, there 
are opportunities to promote renewable energy cooperation and other climate-
compatible economic development objectives, among other climate and sustainable 
development measures, in a new generation of RTAs. Initial examples include the 
EU-Peru-Colombia, EU-South Korea, Canada-EU and Japan-Switzerland accords, 
though arguably a great deal more can be done to ensure that trade, investment 
and financial instruments foster rather than frustrate achievement of the world’s 
SDGs.54
The various international treaties described above, but especially accords 
such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its Regional 
Seas Conventions, also integrated agreements on sustainable development, such as 
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), will be 
very important in international efforts to support implementation of the Paris 
Agreement. In essence, while three dimensions of sustainable development are 
reflected in the new climate agreement, many other global, regional and bilateral 
instruments exist to address related challenges. For Parties’ commitments to be 
effectively implemented to avoid dangerous climate change, intersections of these 
inter-actional regimes are practically inevitable. 
53  See WTO, ‘Azevêdo welcomes launch of plurilateral environmental goods negotiations’ <www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/envir_08jul14_e.htm> accessed 6 June 2016. Fourteen 
WTO members launched plurilateral negotiations for an Environmental Goods Agreement 
on 8 July 2014 at the WTO. These members said the talks will promote green growth and 
sustainable development while providing impetus for the conclusion of the Doha Round.
54  Markus W Gehring and others, ‘Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Measures in Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs)’ ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable 
Energy Issue Paper No 3 August 2013 <www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/08/climate-change-
and-sustainable-energy-measures-in-regional-trade-agreements-rtas.pdf> accessed 12 June 
2016; See also Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus Gehring and Andrew Newcombe (eds), 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law International 2011); and 
Markus Gehring and Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Development in World 
Trade Law (Kluwer Law International 2005).
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6 Conclusion
Given available scientific findings, there can be no sustainable development if the 
worst-case scenarios for climate change are not averted. Compliance with the Paris 
Agreement, with due consideration of the applicable principles of international law, 
is crucial to achieve all global SDGs.55 In this article, key international and domestic 
law and governance issues raised in the Paris Agreement have been identified and 
discussed to assist Parties and key institutions in their preparations to implement 
new climate change commitments. The negotiation of the Paris Agreement 
occurred in an environment characterised by the emergence of new forms of 
international governance, and its eventual implementation will be influenced by 
this reality. The fragmentation of international law into increasingly specialised 
regimes; polycentricism and multi-level action in rule-making and implementation; 
experimentalism and revisability of legal obligations; increased participation 
of non-State actors; increased recourse to non-binding standards; among other 
influences, are reshaping the context for compliance, and indeed the evolution of 
international law itself.56 These developments have transformed and informed the 
roles and engagement of all the actors involved in the UNFCCC process, including 
State delegations, non-State observers from civil society, academia and the private 
sector among others, and intergovernmental organisations. Jurists, legal institutes 
and associations, law schools, judges’ networks, decision-makers, advocates and 
other members of the law and governance community worldwide have long 
sought legal and institutional reforms on multiple levels, including international, 
regional, national and sub-national level, to facilitate, incentivise and mandate 
effective action on climate change.57 Indeed, the International Bar Association has 
55  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Elizabeth Mrema (eds), ‘Contributions of International 
Law to Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals’ (CISDL/UNEP 2016); See also 
Usha Natarajan and Kishan Khoday, ‘Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International 
Law’ (2014) 27 LJIL 573.
56  See, eg, Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) Vand 
J Transnat’l L 501; Matthew Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting 
with a Global Response after Kyoto (OUP 2011); Harriet Bulkeley and others, Transnational 
Climate Change Governance (CUP 2014). Christopher Campbell-Durufle is recognised and 
thanked for excellent insights on these points.
57  Kelly Levin and others, ‘Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining 
our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change’ (2012) 45 Policy Sciences 123.
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highlighted ‘[t]he need for climate change justice is (…) apparent in the unequal 
geographic distribution of its environmental effects’.58 
As the ILA Climate Change Principles affirm, States have an obligation ‘to 
employ due diligence efforts to mitigate climate change impacts’ in the design 
of any social and economic development plan which may result in significant 
emissions of GHGs (paragraph 5).59 The ILA’s Committee on International Law 
on Sustainable Development, and its follow-up Committee on International Law 
relating to Sustainable Natural Resources Management, are further working to 
illuminate the principles and good practices of international law which guide 
efforts in this field.60
After a series of international symposia and conferences, backed by 
independent research and analysis, a consortium of law faculties from leading 
universities, together with key research institutes, inter-governmental agencies, 
law associations, judges’ networks, experts commissions and others, launched 
the inaugural Climate Law and Governance Day on 4 December 2015 at the Paris 
COP21, opening a special forum for informed dialogue between experts, practising 
jurists, and decision-makers.61
For effective responses to climate change under international law, inter-
actional forms of international law-making under framework treaties are proving 
essential.62 Many countries plan to reform their laws and institutions across diverse 
economic, environmental and social sectors in order to respond to the challenges 
of climate mitigation, resilience, technology, finance and accountability.63 Indeed, 
58  IBA Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force (n 41) 45.
59  ILA, ‘Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change’ (n 50); See also Expert Group on Global 
Climate Obligations, ‘Oslo Principles on Global Obligations to Reduce Climate Change’ (n 50).
60  ILA, ‘New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development’ (n 34). See also Committee on the Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, 
‘International Law on Sustainable Development’ (ILA 2012). 
61  Report from Climate Law and Governance Day, La Sorbonne Faculty of Law, Pantheon-
Sorbonne University, Paris, 4 December 2015 (CISDL/LCIL/IREDIES/IDLO/CIFOR/UNEP/
UNDP Paris 2015); Report from Climate Law and Governance Official Side Event to the 
UNFCCC COP21 in Paris, 11 December 2014 (CISDL/NCCSD/ASOG, Paris 2015) <www.
climatelawgovernance.org> accessed 1 October 2016. 
62  Toope and Brunnee (n 29).
63  See, eg, Robert Kibugi, ‘Mainstreaming Climate Change into Public Policy Functions: Legal 
Options to Reinforce Sustainable Development of Kenya’ (2012) 8 Fla A & M UL Rev 205; 
Robert Kibugi, ‘Legal Options for Mainstreaming Climate Change Disaster Risk Reduction in 
Governance for Kenya’, in K O H Kheng-Lian (ed), Adaptation to Climate Change, ASEAN and 
Comparative Experiences (WSPC 2015) 409; Jose Ramon T Villarin, Ma Antonia Y Loyzaga 
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as noted above, 156 countries explicitly state their intention to undertake legal and 
institutional reforms, out of 187 countries with ‘intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions’ (iNDC) published online by the UNFCCC registry, and 51 stress 
specifically the need for legal and institutional capacity-building in order to achieve 
their iNDCs.64 There is a pressing need for innovative legal knowledge, expertise 
and capacity-building to address the climate law and governance issues signalled 
in this article, in order to ensure a strengthened agenda for the implementation of 
the Paris Agreement and the broader global SDGs. 
As countries seek to implement the Paris Agreement, including through the 
presentation of new and more ambitious NDCs and the adoption of domestic laws 
designing their transition to a low carbon economy, a profound comprehension 
of sustainable development, its principles, and parameters will be essential. As 
recognised in the Agreement itself, new legal research, education, awareness, 
capacity-building and technical assistance, especially in LDCs and SIDS, but 
also in high per capita emission countries, will also be necessary to ensure the 
success of the commitments undertaken in Paris, the avoidance of climate change’s 
most dangerous consequences, and the transformation of the world’s economies, 
societies and ecosystems towards sustainability.
and Antonio G M La Viña, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: What the Philippines Should Do 
About Climate Change’ (SCJ Professorial Lecture Working Paper July 2008) <http://ohm.ecce.
admu.edu.ph/wiki/pub/Main/EandEMaterials/SCJ_doc.pdf> accessed 14 June 2016.
64  Cordonier Segger, Reiner and Scott, ‘Countries stress importance of legal and institutional 
reforms in their iNDCs’ (n 16). 
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Abstract
The establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel is a crucial development in handling 
the negative social and environmental impacts of Bank-financed projects. It allows affected 
people to seek redress for the harms resulting from projects, by questioning the legitimacy 
of the Bank’s lending decisions. The Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank has 
complied with its own safeguard policies in specific projects. Even though the substantive 
rules applicable in the Panel’s investigation process (ie, the World Bank’s Operational 
Policies and Bank Procedures) refer to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); 
the Panel has considered the borrowers’ environmental treaty commitments extensively in 
its investigations on a few occasions. This paper examines the extent to which the World 
Bank Inspection Panel—as an accountability mechanism—has employed different MEAs 
to address environmental issues resulting from Bank-funded projects, thereby ensuring 
compliance with environmental treaty obligations in project finance activities.
Keywords
World Bank Inspection Panel, Project Finance Activities, Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements
1 Introduction
In recent years, the World Bank Group has increasingly opened its doors to 
civil society in order to be more responsive to those who may be affected by its 
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operations.1 The World Bank Inspection Panel (herein, Panel or Inspection Panel) is 
a classic example of addressing public concerns about the social and environmental 
impacts of Bank-financed projects. This citizen-driven accountability mechanism 
allows those who are affected by projects supported by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the International Development 
Association (IDA) to file claims before it. The Inspection Panel has the mandate 
to examine whether the Bank’s lending decisions have complied with its own 
safeguard policies.
Legal scholarship has focused on the role of this kind of complaint and 
grievance mechanism in enhancing the public accountability of multilateral 
development banks (MDBs). However, a particular strength of the Panel that 
promotes the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
in project finance has not been explored. This strength relates to the proactive role 
played by the Inspection Panel in examining the project’s compliance with MEA 
obligations through its investigatory mandate. In the substantive rules applicable 
in the Inspection Panel’s investigation process, MEAs are referred to only on a few 
occasions. In practice, however, the borrowing governments’ MEA obligations 
have been examined in a manner that is far more extensive than those explicitly 
stipulated in the Bank’s safeguard policies by the Panel. This paper seeks to explore 
the extent to which the Panel, as a non-judicial mechanism, has employed MEAs to 
address environmental issues arising from Bank-funded projects, thereby ensuring 
compliance with environmental treaty obligations in the course of project finance 
activities.
After this introduction, the second section discusses the institutional aspect 
of the Inspection Panel. This section initially identifies the Inspection Panel’s 
composition and the rules to safeguard its independence. It then evaluates the 
accessibility of civil society organisations to the Panel. This involves examining the 
requirements which an eligible requester and request have to satisfy when making 
complaints. It also discusses the Panel’s investigation process and the procedural 
reform in recent years. The third section examines the substantive rules applicable 
in determining environmental issues before the Inspection Panel. It illustrates the 
World Bank’s environment-related safeguard policies, and explores the relationship 
between, and the cross-fertilisation of, these rules and MEAs. This section also 
1  See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, ‘The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank’ 
(2000) 7 ILSA J Intl & Comparative L 399.
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considers the influences that these rules may have on different stakeholders. The 
fourth section analyses how the Panel has treated MEAs in addressing private 
complaints about environmental impacts arising from Bank-financed projects. 
Drawing upon the recent practice of the Inspection Panel, this section examines 
the implications of the Panel’s findings for the implementation of MEA obligations 
in the context of project finance.
2 The Institutional Aspect of the World Bank Inspection Panel
2.1 The Composition of the Inspection Panel
The Inspection Panel comprises three inspectors of different nationalities. They are 
nominated by the World Bank’s President after consultation with the Bank’s Board 
of Executive Directors2 and are appointed by the Board.3 Panel members must meet 
certain criteria, including being able to address the requests thoroughly and fairly, 
having integrity and independence from Bank Management4 and understanding 
the development issues in, and the living conditions of, developing countries.5
To ensure that the Inspection Panel can exercise its investigatory power 
towards the conduct of the management department in the same institution 
impartially, safeguarding the Panel’s independence is of pressing importance. Five 
requirements, especially post-employment restrictions, have thus been set out. 
First, Panel members serve a non-renewable five-year term of office and cannot be 
re-elected.6 Only the Board of Executive Directors can remove them from office.7 
2  The World Bank’s Board of the Executive Directors consists of the Bank’s President and 25 
Executive Directors. It is responsible for general operations of the Bank and exercises the 
powers delegated to it by the Boards of Governors under the Articles of Agreement.
3  The Inspection Panel for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
International Development Association: Annex I, Resolution No. 93–10, Resolution IDA 
No. 93–6 (adopted 22 September 1993) (1995) 34 ILM 520, para 2 [hereinafter ‘Resolution 
Establishing the Inspection Panel’].
4  The term ‘Bank Management’ refers to the ‘World Bank as an institution involved in the design, 
appraisal and/or implementation of Bank-financed projects, as distinct from the Board of 
Executive Directors’. See Operating Procedures of the World Bank Inspection Panel (revised April 
2014) 9 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/2014 Updated 
Operating Procedures.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016 [hereinafter ‘Operating Procedures’].
5  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 4.
6  ibid para 3.
7  ibid para 8.
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Second, ex-Bank staff cannot serve as Panel members within two years following 
the end of their service in the World Bank Group.8 Third, Panel members cannot 
participate in the hearing and investigation of any request in which they have a 
personal interest or a significant involvement in any capacity.9 Fourth, they cannot 
serve in any other position in the World Bank Group after their service for the 
Panel.10 Fifth, Panel members are considered to be the World Bank’s officials when 
performing their duties, so they enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to 
Bank officials.11
2.2 The Eligibility Requirements
According to the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel adopted by the IBRD 
and IDA12 and the Clarifications adopted in the first review of the Panel in 1996,13 
any two or more persons who share some common interests or concerns in the 
borrower’s territory can make a request.14 This includes a community of persons, 
such as an organisation, association, society or other grouping of individuals, or 
the local representatives of such an affected party.15 
However, a single individual cannot file a request. The limitation to two or 
more affected persons to submit a request is due to the concern that if a single 
individual is allowed to make the request, the Inspection Panel would be flooded 
8  ibid para 5.
9  ibid para 6.
10  ibid para 10.
11  ibid; For these privileges and immunities, see Articles of Agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (entered into force 27 December 1945) art VIII, 
sec 8 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027–1215526322295/
IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_English.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; See also, Articles of Agreement 
of the International Development Association (IDA) (entered into force 24 September 1960) art 
VIII, sec 8 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027–1215526322295/
IDAArticlesofAgreementEnglish.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016. 
12  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
13  The first review of the Inspection Panel, which resulted in the issuance of the 1996 
Clarifications, was required by the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel after two years 
of its establishment. See Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 27.
14  Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel: Clarification of Certain Aspects 
of the Resolution (17 October 1996) in David Freestone, The World Bank and Sustainable 
Development (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 293–307 [hereinafter ‘1996 Clarifications’].
15  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
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with complaints and it would overburden its capacity to investigate. It is also to 
be expected that the negative impacts of project activities would not only affect a 
single individual.16 When appropriate local representation of such affected parties 
is not available, the Board of Executive Directors may allow requests from non-
local representatives.17 
In contrast, a proposal from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
during the 1996 Review of the Inspection Panel, to the effect that foreign and 
local NGOs whose rights or interests were not affected by projects should also be 
allowed to file requests, was rejected.18 This reflects the continuing concern that 
foreign NGOs may use the Inspection Panel to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of borrowing countries.19 The same rationale is also reflected by the fact that there 
should be a direct link between affected parties and the rights or interests for which 
they claim to be affected by project activities. In cases where representatives bring 
requests on behalf of affected parties they should provide evidence that they have 
been duly entrusted to do so.20 Finally, the complaint may also be submitted by 
entities other than the affected parties. According to the Resolution Establishing 
the Inspection Panel, in special cases of serious alleged violations of Bank policies 
and procedures,21 any Executive Director may ask the Inspection Panel for an 
investigation. Also, the Executive Directors acting as a Board may instruct the 
Panel to conduct an investigation.22 However, to date this provision has never been 
utilised.
Several requirements must be met to initiate the investigation. First, the 
requester has to demonstrate that its rights or interests have been, or will potentially 
be, affected by acts or omissions of the Bank.23 Second, the alleged damage should 
result from the Bank’s failure to follow its policies and procedures in respect of 
the project’s design, appraisal and/or implementation. Such a failure should also 
16  Ibrahim F I Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2000) 59–61.
17  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
18  Shihata (n 16) 166–69.
19  ibid 64–66.
20  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
21  A serious violation of the Bank’s policies and procedures means that such violation has, or 
is likely to have, a material adverse effect. See Conclusions of the Board’s Second Review of 
the Inspection Panel (6 November 1997) para 9(b) [hereinafter ‘1999 Clarifications’] <https://
policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b08231aada.pdf> accessed 28 July 
2016.
22  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
23  ibid.
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have had, or threaten to have, a material adverse effect on the requester.24 Third, 
the requester must demonstrate that the subject matter of the request has been 
submitted to Bank Management before making the request to the Inspection Panel, 
and that Bank Management has failed to establish that it has followed, or is taking 
adequate steps to follow, the Bank’s safeguard policies.25 
2.3 The Investigation Process
The Inspection Panel’s investigation process has two phases—the eligibility 
phase and the investigation phase. During the eligibility phase, the Inspection 
Panel ascertains whether the request is admissible. According to the Operating 
Procedures, revised April 2014, the Panel will not register a request if: (i) the 
request is frivolous, absurd or anonymous; (ii) the request does not involve the 
project which is supported or is being considered for support by the Bank; (iii) the 
subject matter of the request cannot be plausibly linked to the alleged harm; (iv) 
the disbursement of the loan is closed or is more than 95% by the date of receipt of 
the request;26 (v) the matter is related to procurement; or (vi) the subject matter of 
the request has been dealt with in a prior request, unless there is new evidence or 
circumstances not known at the time of the prior request.27
Regarding the eligibility phase, the Inspection Panel has piloted a new 
approach with a view to reaching early solutions for issues of alleged harm without 
recourse to a full investigation. According to the revised Operating Procedures, 
the Inspection Panel will postpone its decision on registration of the request, 
which would otherwise be an eligible request, to offer additional opportunities for 
Bank Management and the requester to address the issues raised in the request.28 
This optional approach is adopted on a case-by-case basis and depends on the 
willingness of Bank Management and the consent of the requester.29 
24  ibid.
25  ibid para 13.
26  For the appropriateness of the cut-off point for filing claims, see Suresh Nanwani, ‘Holding 
Multilateral Development Banks to Account: Gateways and Barriers’ (2008) 10 Intl Community 
L Rev 199, 213–14.
27  Operating Procedures (n 4) para 25.
28  ibid Annex 1, para 2.
29  ibid para 3.
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After the 1999 Review of the Inspection Panel, as will be illustrated below, the 
Board of Executive Directors’ discretionary authority on whether an investigation 
should be undertaken has to a large extent been shifted to the Inspection Panel. The 
new pilot approach for early problem-solving through dialogue between different 
stakeholders further strengthens the Panel’s independence from the Board. The 
adoption of this pilot approach does not affect the Inspection Panel’s discretion to 
recommend a full investigation in light of Management’s and the borrower’s efforts 
to address the requester’s concerns. 
After the registration, Bank Management should submit its response to the 
request to the Inspection Panel.30 Once it has received Management’s response, 
the Panel conducts a preliminary review to determine whether to recommend an 
investigation to the Board of Executive Directors. In this phase, the Panel assesses 
whether: (i) there is a plausible causal link between the alleged harm and the 
project; (ii) the alleged harm and possible non-compliance with Bank policies 
and procedures are of a serious character; (iii) Bank Management has dealt 
appropriately with the issues raised in the request, and has clearly shown that it 
has followed the required safeguard policies, or Management has acknowledged 
that it did not adhere to relevant policies and procedures; and (iv) remedial actions 
proposed by Management are adequate.31 The Board then makes a final decision.32
In addition to the abovementioned requirements, which constitute the basis 
for the Panel not to recommend the request to the Board for authorising the 
investigation, in recent years the Panel has also deferred its decision on whether 
to recommend an investigation in order to provide additional time for Bank 
Management and the requester to seek solutions. In several cases this has resulted 
in the Panel not recommending full investigations to the Board.33
The Board of Executive Directors used to have considerable discretion in 
deciding whether to authorise an investigation. In the first five years of the Inspection 
Panel’s operation (ie, from its establishment to the second review of the Inspection 
Panel in 1999) the Board often turned down the Panel’s recommendations. During 
this period, the Board rejected four out of the six requests recommended by the 
30  ibid paras 33–35.
31  ibid para 43.
32  ibid paras 49–50.
33  World Bank Inspection Panel, Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel at 15 
Years (The World Bank 2009) 51–55 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/IPPublications/
InspectionPanelAt15yearsEnglish.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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Inspection Panel for investigation.34 This happened because, after the Panel’s 
recommendation, but before the Board’s decision, Bank Management often agreed 
on an action plan to address the alleged failure with the borrower and submitted it 
to the Board. However, such action plans were designed without the involvement 
of the complainant, other people affected by the project and the Inspection Panel. 
This practice was also not envisaged by the Resolution Establishing the Inspection 
Panel or the Inspection Panel’s Operating Procedures. This often resulted in the 
Board’s disapproval of the Panel’s investigation.35
The Board’s discretion in authorising the Panel’s investigation was restricted 
following the second review.36 According to the 1999 Clarifications, the Board will 
authorise an investigation without examining the merits of the request. It can only 
reject the Panel’s recommendations for certain technical eligibility reasons.37 These 
requirements are exactly the criteria that the Panel has to satisfy itself in deciding 
whether to recommend an investigation. This reform not only strengthens the 
Panel’s independence in exercising its investigatory mandate, but also increases 
the possibility for project-affected people to seek redress through the Panel’s 
investigation. The Board has approved every recommendation since the 1999 
Clarifications.
If an investigation is authorised, the Inspection Panel has extensive 
investigatory powers. Panel members can receive information from various sources. 
They can interview Bank staff involved with the project concerned and access 
Bank documents for their investigations. They can also visit the country where the 
project is conducted after having obtained that country’s prior consent.38 The Panel 
can also hold public hearings with the requester during its visits, requesting or 
34  These cases are Brazil: Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project, Report on Progress 
Review of Implementation of Brazil: Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project (25 
March 1997); Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, Review of Problems and 
Assessment of Action Plans (16 September 1997); Brazil: Itaparica Resettlement and Irrigation 
Project, Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection (26 June 1997); India: 
Ecodevelopment Project, Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection (21 October 
1998); For an overview of these cases, see Andria Naudé Fourie, The World Bank Inspection 
Panel Casebook (Eleven International Publishing 2014) 29–38; 45–52; 61–66; 79–84.
35  Daniel D Bradlow, ‘Private Complainants and International Organizations: A Comparative 
Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial Institutions’ 
(2005) 36 Georgetown J Intl L 403, 418–19.
36  For the discussion in the second review of the Inspection Panel, see Shihata (n 16) 173–203.
37  1999 Clarifications (n 21) para 9.
38  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 21; Operating Procedures (n 4) para 54.
246 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Wei-Chung Lin
receiving information from them, or otherwise from project-affected people and 
others likely to have relevant information.39
Upon completion of its investigation, the Inspection Panel submits its findings 
and conclusions to the Board and the Bank’s President, indicating whether Bank 
policies have been violated.40 Bank Management should then submit its report and 
recommendations (MRR) to the Board,41 which includes an action plan devised 
through consultation with the complainant and agreed between the Bank and the 
borrower.42 The Board then discusses the Panel’s findings and Bank Management’s 
MRR, and makes a final decision on the remedial measures to be taken.43 It may 
approve Bank Management’s action plan as proposed, or it may require changes or 
additional measures to address harms.44 
Finally, regarding the implementation of the action plan that the Board may 
have approved in response to the findings, the Inspection Panel is not tasked with 
monitoring how remedial measures are implemented. This has resulted in the filing 
of new complaints by project-affected people regarding the same project before the 
Panel.45 Now the Board often asks Bank Management to submit progress reports to 
the Panel and requires the latter to follow up on the implementation of the action 
plan.46
3 The Applicable Environmental Rules
The World Bank’s operational policies and procedures describe the steps that the 
Bank’s staff should follow during Bank activities to minimise negative social and 
environmental impacts from Bank-financed projects. These mandatory rules 
govern the internal activities of the Bank. They become legally binding externally 
when incorporated into loan agreements between the borrower and the lending 
institutions. They are also the substantive rules for reviewing the complaints 
brought by those affected by project finance activities before the Inspection Panel.
39  Operating Procedures (n 4) para 54.
40  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 22.
41  Operating Procedures (n 4) para 67.
42  World Bank Inspection Panel (n 33) paras 41–42.
43  Operating Procedures (n 4) para 71.
44  World Bank Inspection Panel (n 33) paras 42–43.
45  Nanwani (n 26) 217–20.
46  World Bank Inspection Panel (n 33) paras 44–45.
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The Bank’s safeguard policies are the instruments issued by Bank Management 
and agreed upon by the Board. The rules were initially adopted as Operational 
Manual Statements (OMSs) and Operational Policy Notes (OPNs) in the 1970s 
and 1980s, then converted into Operational Directives (ODs) in 1987. However, 
since ODs included both binding and non-binding rules, their application caused 
confusion for Bank staff. To streamline and simplify the practice, Bank Management 
gradually converted ODs into Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank Procedures 
(BPs), both of which are mandatory for all Bank staff, and Good Practices, which 
are non-mandatory.47
According to the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel, the Bank’s 
safeguard policies include OPs, BPs, ODs and similar documents.48 OPs are policy 
statements that set out the requirements for the Bank’s conduct in its operations.49 
BPs are procedural instructions covering Bank staff requirements for carrying out 
the policies stipulated in OPs.50 ODs have been replaced by OPs and BPs. In the 
early phases of the Inspection Panel’s operation, project-affected people accused 
the Bank of failure to apply ODs.51 These ODs were essentially the current OPs and 
47  For a description of the evolution of the Bank’s operational policies and procedures, see 
Shihata (n 16) 41–46.
48  Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12.
49  The World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank: Third Edition (The World Bank 2011) 61 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2342/638430PUB0Exto00B 
ox0361527B0PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 17 August 2016.
50  ibid.
51  See, eg, Nepal: Arun III Hydroelectric Power Project, Request for Inspection (24 October 1994) 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/1-Request for Inspection (English).
pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; India: NTPC Power Generation Project, Request for Inspection 
(1 May 1997) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/10-Request for Inspection 
(English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; China: Western Poverty Reduction Project, Request for 
Inspection (18 June 1999) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/16-Request 
for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; Chad: Petroleum Development and Pipeline 
Project, Management of the Petroleum Economy Project, and Petroleum Sector Management 
Capacity Building Project, Request for Inspection (22 March 2001) <http://ewebapps.
worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/22-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 
2016; India: Coal Sector Mitigation Project and Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project, Request for 
Inspection (21 June 2001) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/23-Request 
for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; Cameroon: Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project (Loan No. 7020-CM) and Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement 
(CAPECE) Project (Credit No. 3372-CM), Request for Inspection (25 September 2002) <http://
ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/27-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2016; Colombia: Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Project 
(Loan No. 4507-CO), Request for Inspection (20 April 2004) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.
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BPs, even though their substantive contents may have been revised. The Panel’s 
jurisdiction is limited to investigating the Bank’s compliance with these OPs and 
BPs.
The Bank’s safeguard policies address various environment-related issues that 
may arise during project activities.52 These issues include environmental impact 
assessment (OP/BP 4.01,53 the term ‘environmental assessment’ is used in Bank 
policies and procedures), ‘Environmental Action Plans’ (OP/BP 4.02),54 ‘Natural 
Habitats’ (OP/BP 4.04),55 ‘Pest Management’ (OP 4.09)56 and ‘Forests’ (OP/BP 
4.36).57 The Bank should incorporate these requirements into its loan agreements 
org/apps/ip/PanelCases/31-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; 
Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project (Credit No. 2999–PAK), Request for Inspection 
(10 September 2004) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/34-Request for 
Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
52  It has been contended that the Bank’s safeguard policies have in many ways reflected 
international environmental law as stipulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (adopted 14 June 1992) (1992) 31 ILM 874. Charles E Di Leva, ‘International 
Environmental Law, the World Bank, and International Financial Institutions’ in Daniel D 
Bradlow, David B Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2010) 352–63.
53  See The World Bank, Environmental Assessment (January 1999) OP 4.01 <https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1565&ver=current> 
accessed 28 July 2016; The World Bank, Environmental Assessment (January 1999) BP 
4.01 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?doc 
id=1578&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016.
54  See The World Bank, Environmental Action Plans (July 2015) OP 4.02 <https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=3528&ver=current> 
accessed 28 July 2016; The World Bank, Environmental Action Plans (July 2015) BP 4.02 <https://
policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=3529 
&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016.
55  See The World Bank, Natural Habitats (April 2013) OP 4.04 <https://policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1567&ver=current> accessed 28 July 
2016; The World Bank, Natural Habitats (April 2013) BP 4.04 <https://policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1581&ver=current> accessed 28 July 
2016.
56  See The World Bank, Pest Management (August 2004) OP 4.09 <https://policies.worldbank.
org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1637&ver=current> accessed 28 
July 2016.
57  See The World Bank, Forests (April 2013) OP 4.36 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/
PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1574&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016; 
The World Bank, Forests (April 2013) BP 4.36 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/
PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1585&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016.
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with the borrower in binding terms and supervise the borrower’s implementation 
of its contractual obligations.58
There are several aspects to the relationship between the Bank’s environment-
related safeguard policies and international environmental law. First, the 
interpretation of these Bank rules may have to take into account principles and 
rules of international law, which could extend to environmental norms.59 This is 
especially so when Bank rules explicitly refer to a specific MEA,60 ‘international 
environmental treaties and agreements’61 or ‘applicable international environmental 
agreements’.62 These Bank rules (such as OP 4.11, OP/BP 4.01 and OP 4.36) may 
contribute to the fulfilment of relevant MEA obligations during project activities.63
Second, certain Bank policies require the borrower’s national legislation to be 
adhered to in Bank-financed projects.64 Consequently, international commitments 
that the borrower has undertaken and incorporated into the host country’s 
national legislation would constitute the borrower’s obligations throughout 
all project activities. Bank staff should be aware of the borrower’s international 
undertakings and take them into account during the project’s design, appraisal 
and implementation.65 This is important because borrowing states’ environmental 
commitments in other international fora may become their substantive obligations 
via the Bank’s safeguard policies.
58  See Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 12; Operating Procedures (n 4) 
paras 1 and 12(c).
59  Daniel D Bradlow, ‘International Organizations and Private Complainants: The Case of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel’ (1994) 34 Virginia J Intl L 553, 608–09.
60  See The World Bank, Physical Cultural Resources (June 2006) OP 4.11, para 3 <https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1571&ver=current> 
accessed 28 July 2016.
61  See The World Bank, Environmental Assessment (January 1999) OP 4.01, para 3 <https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1565&ver=current> 
accessed 28 July 2016; The World Bank, Environmental Assessment (January 1999) BP 4.01, 
paras 10 and 19 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.
aspx?docid=1578&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016.
62  See The World Bank, Forests (April 2013) OP 4.36, para 6 <https://policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1574&ver=current> accessed 28 July 
2016.
63  Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank 
Operational Standards’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System (OUP 2000) 297.
64  See OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment (n 53) para 3; OP 4.11, Physical Cultural Resources 
(n 60) para 3.
65  See Operating Procedures (n 4) paras 1 and 12(c).
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Although the Bank’s safeguard policies are its internal regulations aiming at 
binding Bank staff in handling project activities, their application can have far-
reaching implications for the Bank, the borrowing government and civil society.66 In 
terms of the Bank, since its staff must comply with these standards, their decisions 
on relevant social and environmental issues constitute the Bank’s important 
practice on project finance operations. Also, by requiring the borrower to meet 
the requirements of the loan agreement, especially to refrain from contravening 
its environmental treaty obligations, the Bank plays a crucial role in promoting 
compliance with MEAs.67
In terms of the borrower, while the Bank’s safeguard policies are not intended 
to impose obligations directly on the borrowing government when receiving Bank 
finance, the borrower has to carry out substantive obligations throughout the 
project cycle when these rules are incorporated into the loan agreement. If the 
borrower fails to meet its contractual obligations, the Bank can impose sanctions 
(such as suspension or cancellation of the loan) on the borrower.68 This shows the 
profound impact that the Bank’s safeguard policies can have on the manner in 
which the borrower conducts its project finance activities.
The external effects of the Bank’s safeguard policies are also evident with civil 
society. As these standards aim to ensure the quality of the Bank’s project finance 
operations, they are not formulated in terms of individuals’ rights.69 Nevertheless, 
when these rules are duly implemented, they can protect the rights or interests of 
local populations in borrowing countries. Project-affected people can use these 
rules to question the legitimacy of the Bank’s lending operations. The Bank’s 
safeguard policies thus constitute an avenue for civil society to oversee the lending 
institution’s activities. Through the Panel’s investigation and the Board’s remedial 
measures when non-compliance is found, civil society may seek to protect its 
welfare through these instruments. Meanwhile, by airing grievances and making 
arguments through the Panel, civil society may influence the interpretation of 
Bank policies and the Bank’s future operations on project finance.
66  Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (n 63) 191–92.
67  Ibrahim F I Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, vol 3 (Brill 2000) 514–16.
68  Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements—Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank’s Experience’ 
(1996) 9 Georgetown Intl Environmental L Rev 37, 49–51.
69  See Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (CUP 
2011) 808.
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As far as Bank policies are concerned, there may be cross-fertilisation between 
these social and environmental standards and international law.70 First, while 
these rules are not legally binding under international law, it has been argued that 
through their incorporation into the loan agreement and their constant practice 
by borrowing countries in their domestic legislation as well as by MDBs in their 
lending decisions, the substantive contents of these rules may acquire customary 
status under international law.71 Second, the Panel may refer to principles and 
rules of international law when interpreting these social and environmental rules.72 
More importantly, by promoting the integration of international practice into Bank 
policies, via private complaints submitted to the Inspection Panel, civil society may 
contribute to the development of the substantive contents of these rules and their 
implementation in project finance activities.
4 The Practice of the World Bank Inspection Panel
The Inspection Panel’s first ever investigation was Nepal: Arun III Hydroelectric 
Power Project in 1994. Since then, until 2014, the Board of Executive Directors 
has authorised 31 investigations and the Inspection Panel has completed all of 
these.73 Almost all of these investigations involve multiple claims in the same case 
70  Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (n 63) 297–301; For the discussion of the influences of the 
Bank’s operational standards, see David Freestone, ‘The Environmental and Social Safeguard 
Policies of the World Bank and the Evolving Role of the Inspection Panel’ in Alexandre Kiss, 
Dinah Shelton and Kanami Ishibashi (eds), Economic Globalization and Compliance with 
International Environmental Agreements (Kluwer Law International 2003) 144–45; Benedict 
Kingsbury, ‘Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-Making 
Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples’ in Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon 
(eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (OUP 1999) 338–42.
71  David Freestone (n 70) 191–92.
72  See Daniel D Bradlow and Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, ‘The World Bank’s New Inspection 
Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order’ (1994) 54 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 392, 404–05.
73  This excludes Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project (1996), where the Board, 
while refusing to approve a full investigation, authorised the Inspection Panel to conduct a 
review of the existing problems of the project and assessed the adequacy of the action plan as 
agreed between Management and the two borrowing countries to address the problems. The 
Inspection Panel, Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, Review of Problems and 
Assessment of Action Plans (16 September 1997) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
PanelCases/7-Review and Assessment (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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and alleged violations of the Bank policy on EIA.74 Other important environmental 
issues the Panel has addressed include natural habitats and forests. Using several 
disputes as case studies, this section examines the extent to which the Inspection 
Panel has effectively promoted the fulfilment of environmental treaty obligations 
in project finance activities when addressing environmental issues brought by 
project-affected people.
4.1 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
To ensure that Bank-financed projects are environmentally sound and sustainable, 
Bank policies require an EIA to be conducted in the project.75 An EIA identifies 
a project’s potential environmental impacts, examines alternatives and offers 
options for improving project implementation.76 The issues that an EIA should 
consider include natural environment, human health and safety, social aspects,77 
74  There are certain exceptions in this regard. See, eg, The Inspection Panel, Albania: Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management and Clean-Up Project (IDA Credit No. 4083–ALB), Investigation 
Report (24 November 2008) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/47-
Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; The Inspection Panel, Panama: 
Land Administration Project (Loan No. 7045–PAN), Investigation Report (16 September 2010) 
<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/53-Investigation Report (English).pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2016; The Inspection Panel, Cambodia: Land Management and Administration 
Project (Credit No. 3650–KH), Investigation Report (23 November 2010) <http://ewebapps.
worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/60-Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 
2016; The Inspection Panel, Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project, Investigation 
Report (22 May 2014) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/84 - Investigation 
Report (English).pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.
75  OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment (n 53) para 1.
76  ibid para 2.
77  Social aspects include involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples and physical cultural 
resources. There are other Bank policies addressing these issues: see The World Bank, Indigenous 
Peoples (July 2005) OP 4.10 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/
Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1570&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016; The World 
Bank, Indigenous Peoples (July 2005) BP 4.10 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/
PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1582&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016; 
Physical Cultural Resources, OP/BP 4.11 (n 60); The World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement 
(December 2001) OP 4.12 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/
Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1572&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016; The World Bank, 
Involuntary Resettlement (December 2001) BP 4.12 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/
PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1584&ver=current> accessed 28 July 2016.
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and transboundary and global environmental aspects.78 The country’s institutional 
capacities in dealing with EIA-related issues,79 its domestic policy framework and 
legislation, and its obligations regarding project activities under international 
environmental agreements must also be considered.80
The borrower has an obligation to conduct an EIA,81 though the Bank advises 
on its EIA requirements and reviews the findings and recommendations of the 
EIA to determine if it provides an adequate basis for processing the project for 
Bank financing. When the borrower has completed or partially completed EIA 
work prior to the Bank’s involvement in a project, the Bank also reviews the EIA to 
ensure that it is consistent with this policy. It may require additional EIA work to 
be done by the borrower.82
When undertaking an EIA in a proposed project, the first step is 
environmental screening, ie to decide the appropriate extent and type of analysis 
to adopt. According to OP 4.01 as revised in 2013, a project should be classified 
as Category A when it is likely to have ‘significant adverse environmental impacts 
that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented’.83 The impact is considered sensitive 
when it involves issues covered by other Bank policies, such as natural habitats, 
indigenous peoples, physical cultural resources or involuntary resettlement. 
An EIA for a Category A project should examine the project’s potential 
environmental impacts and compare them with those of feasible alternatives. 
It should also recommend any measures to prevent, minimise, mitigate or 
compensate for such impacts and improve environmental performance.84 
Moreover, the borrower should retain independent experts not affiliated with the 
project to undertake the EIA.85 An advisory panel, which comprises independent 
and internationally recognised environmental specialists, should be appointed 
to advise on all aspects of the project relevant to the EIA if the project is ‘highly 
risky or contentious or (…) involves serious and multidimensional environmental 
concerns’.86
78  OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment (n 53) para 3.
79  ibid para 13.
80  ibid para 3.
81  ibid para 4.
82  ibid para 5.
83  ibid para 8(a).
84  ibid.
85  ibid para 4.
86  ibid.
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An EIA report for a Category A project has to include an executive summary; 
a policy, legal and administrative framework; a project description; the baseline 
data; environmental impacts; an analysis of alternatives; and an environmental 
management plan.87 There are other issues that also have to be addressed, including 
a potential regional/sectoral EIA88 and the institutional capacity of the borrower.89 
Among other things, an EIA has to examine a project’s environmental impacts. 
The aspects of environmental impacts that should be evaluated for a Category A 
project include: (i) the project’s likely positive and negative impacts; (ii) mitigation 
measures and any residual impacts that cannot be mitigated; (iii) opportunities for 
environmental enhancement; and (iv) the extent and quality of available data, key 
data gaps, and uncertainties associated with those predictions.90
4.1.1  DR Congo: Forest-related Operations Project
An inadequate analysis of impacts from the project on the borrower’s environmental 
treaty obligations became a contentious issue in Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Grant (TESRO) and Emergency 
Economic and Social Reunification Support Project (EESRSP) (the ‘DR Congo: 
Forest-related Operations Project’).
The dispute involved two inter-related activities. EESRSP included five 
components to assist the borrowing government’s economic reforms. The complaint 
mainly focused on its institutional element, which included the preparation of a 
forest zoning plan and the implementation of the new forest concession system.91 
87  OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment, Annex B (Content of an Environmental Assessment 
Report for a Category A Project) para 2; Each of these items has more detailed stipulations in 
respective Bank policies. See, eg, Annex B, para 2(c) (Project Description); para 2(d) (Baseline 
Data); para 2(e) (Environmental Impacts); para 2(f) (Analysis of Alternatives) <https://policies.
worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=3902&ver=current> 
accessed 17 August 2016.
88  ibid para 7, Annex A, paras 7, 9 <https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/
Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=3901&ver=current> accessed 17 August 2016. 
89  ibid para 13.
90  ibid Annex B, para 2(e).
91  The Inspection Panel, Democratic Republic of Congo: Transitional Support for Economic 
Recovery Grant (TSERO) (IDA Grant No. H 1920–DRC) and Emergency Economic and Social 
Reunification Support Project (EESRSP) (Credit No. 3824–DRC and Grant No. H 064–DRC), 
Investigation Report (31 August 2007) paras 15–22 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
PanelCases/37-Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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Moreover, TESRO was a budget support operation that supported, inter alia, an 
improvement of governance in the natural resources sector. The forest-related prior 
actions that had to be met before the Board approved its operation were a legal 
review of forest concessions and an extension of the moratorium on new logging 
concessions.92 
The complaint was brought by indigenous Pygmy organisations and Pygmy 
support organisations in the DR Congo on their own behalf and on behalf of 
affected communities. The complainants argued that the forest sector reform 
activities that the project supported had harmed, and would continue to harm, the 
forests where these indigenous peoples lived and on which they relied for their 
livelihood. They contended that the significant adverse social and environmental 
impacts that may result from the reform programme were one reason why the 
project should have been assigned a Category A status and an extensive EIA should 
have been conducted.93
In this case, the Panel not only held that the project had failed to undertake 
an EIA on the pilot forest zoning94 and the logging concession review process,95 
it also considered the borrower’s MEA obligations concerning project activities, 
although the complainants did not raise this. The Panel held that the DR Congo 
had obligations under the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC)96 and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES);97 both to which 
the DR Congo was a party.98 
As for the WHC, the Panel found that one of the borrower’s natural sites 
(Salonga National Park), which was included in the List of World Heritage in Danger, 
appeared to be adjacent to two areas held by concessions.99 As for the CITES, the 
Panel noted that there were high-value species of timber in the borrower’s territory. 
In particular, one of the species, ie the African Teak (Pericopsis elata), was listed 
92  ibid paras 31–36.
93  ibid, Request for Inspection (30 October 2005) 7–8.
94  DR Congo Forest-Related Operations, Investigation Report (n 91) paras 343–46.
95  ibid paras 349–50.
96  Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 
16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151 [hereinafter 
‘WHC’]. 
97  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted 
3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243 [hereinafter ‘CITES’]. 
98  DR Congo Forest-Related Operations, Investigation Report (n 91) para 387.
99  ibid paras 388–90.
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under CITES Appendix II and had been subject to export control.100 The Panel 
stated that if the project’s EIA had been conducted in accordance with Bank policy, 
it should have identified these international obligations and evaluated the project’s 
implications for the pertinent World Heritage Sites and CITES-listed species.101
This was the first time that the Inspection Panel addressed the issue of 
environmental impact analysis in terms of the borrower’s MEA obligations. As for 
the WHC, for a natural site to be included in the World Heritage List (WHL), it 
should be of outstanding universal value.102 According to the WHC, States Parties 
have to take effective and active measures for the protection, conservation and 
presentation of cultural and natural properties in their territories.103 Also, for the 
properties included in the List of World Heritage in Danger, major operations 
are necessary for their conservation, and assistance has been requested under the 
WHC to protect such sites.104 As of 2015, the List of World Heritage in Danger has 
48 properties, five of which—all natural sites—are in the DR Congo.105 Although 
the concession areas in this case were not on the WHL, they were in close proximity 
to a World Heritage Site. The Inspection Panel thus held that implications for the 
Site should have been evaluated.
Regarding the CITES, the purpose of the Convention is to protect wildlife 
listed in its three Appendices through international trade controls.106 Among other 
things, Appendix II species are not necessarily threatened with extinction, but they 
may become so unless trade is controlled.107 The export of Appendix II species 
is prohibited unless an export permit is granted under the authorisation of the 
state of export.108 The species concerned in this case, ie the African Teak, had been 
subject to export control at that time.109 Considering the high economic value of 
100  ibid paras 391–93.
101  ibid para 394.
102  WHC (n 96) art 2; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 
‘Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention’ (revised 
July 2013) WHC 13/01, paras 77–95 <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2016; For an analysis of the criteria, see Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and 
Catherine Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edn, CUP 2011) 464–70.
103  WHC (n 96) art 5.
104  ibid art 11(4). 
105  The information is available at UNESCO, ‘List of World Heritage in Danger’ <http://whc.
unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=86> accessed 28 July 2016.
106  CITES (n 97) Preamble.
107  ibid art II(2).
108  ibid art IV(2).
109  DR Congo Forest-Related Operations, Investigation Report (n 91) para 393.
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the African Teak as timber assets, the Inspection Panel also held that the impacts 
of concessions should have been evaluated.
The Inspection Panel’s explicit references to the WHC and CITES without the 
complainants raising them shows how it played an even more active role than the 
complainants in asserting the borrower’s MEA obligations when undertaking the 
EIA. What is more important is that the Panel has indirectly imposed additional 
treaty requirements on the Bank, which was not a signatory to either of these MEAs 
and was not bound by them in a strict sense, in being required to consider the 
borrower’s environmental treaty commitments when deciding to finance projects.
4.1.2  Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project
The involvement of project-affected populations and local NGOs in the EIA process 
is important for the public to better understand the implications of proposed project 
finance activities. Public consultation with those affected can help to identify, not 
only potential impacts of projects, but also solutions for such impacts.110 
Disclosure of information by the borrower is the prerequisite for public 
consultation in the EIA. Without knowing about projects and acquiring adequate 
information about them, affected people cannot meaningfully participate in the 
EIA process. Therefore, the Bank policy on EIA calls for the borrower to provide 
relevant project documentation in a timely manner prior to consultation. The 
information should be in a form and language that is understandable and accessible 
for those consulted.111 For Category A projects, in particular, a summary of the 
project’s objectives, descriptions and its potential impacts should be provided 
for the initial consultation. A summary of the EIA’s conclusions should also be 
provided once the draft EIA has been prepared. Finally, the borrower should make 
the draft EIA report available in an accessible place for project-affected people.112
In addition to information disclosure, the borrower has to consult project-
affected people and local NGOs about the environmental aspects of the project 
and incorporate their opinions. Public consultation should be held as early as 
110  The Inspection Panel, Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project 
(Credit No. 3365–KH and Trust Fund. 26419–JPN), Investigation Report (30 March 2006) para 
255 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/36-Investigation Report (English).
pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
111  OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment (n 53) para 15.
112  ibid para 16.
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possible.113 For Category A projects, in particular, consultations must be conducted 
at least twice: (i) shortly after environmental screening and before the terms of 
reference for the EIA have been finalised; and (ii) once a draft EIA report has been 
prepared. Consultations should be held throughout the project’s implementation 
as is necessary to tackle EIA-related issues affecting such groups.114
The delay in holding public consultations during project preparation and 
implementation has become a contentious issue in several cases.115 Albania: Power 
Sector Generation and Restructuring Project is the one that deserves discussion 
because, in finding the borrower’s non-compliance, the Inspection Panel considered 
the former’s treaty obligations which had also been referred to in the complaint. 
The project involved the construction of a thermal power station (Vlora Thermal 
Plant) in the Vlora area. The Civic Alliance for the Protection of the Bay of Vlora 
submitted the complaint on behalf of local residents.116 
The complainants maintained, amongst others, that there were no adequate 
public consultations during project preparation. They argued that most public 
meetings were not properly announced, and that the information provided before 
the meetings was incomplete. Moreover, the meetings were held only after the 
location of the power plant had been decided.117 The complainants further stated 
that a communication regarding the borrowing government’s non-compliance 
with its obligations on public participation and access to information had been 
113  ibid para 14.
114  ibid.
115  See, eg, The Inspection Panel, Colombia: Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and 
Environmental Project (Loan No. 4507–CO), Investigation Report (4 June 2005) paras 
236–42 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/31-Investigation Report 
(English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; The Inspection Panel, Ecuador: Mining Development 
and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (Loan No. 6355–EC), Investigation 
Report (23 February 2001) paras 101–08 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
PanelCases/20-Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016; Cambodia: Forest 
Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, Investigation Report (n 110) paras 251–
54; The Inspection Panel, Peru: Lima Urban Transport Project (Loan 7209–PE), Investigation 
Report (18 January 2011) paras 100–15 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/
ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=79> accessed 28 July 2016.
116  The Inspection Panel, Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project (IDA Credit 
No.3872–ALB), Request for Inspection (30 April 2007) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/
ip/PanelCases/46-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
117  ibid; Investigation Report (7 August 2009) paras 310–11 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/
apps/ip/PanelCases/46-Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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brought to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, and the latter had 
found breaches of the relevant obligations.118
In reaching its conclusions, the Inspection Panel extensively considered the 
findings of the Aarhus Compliance Committee. It firstly held that, despite the Aarhus 
Committee focusing on the actions of the Albanian Government rather than those 
of the Bank, the Committee’s conclusions were relevant to the Inspection Panel. 
This was because Bank policy imposed an obligation on the borrower to hold public 
consultations and required the Bank to ensure the borrower’s implementation of 
this obligation. Also, the requirements of the Aarhus Convention were similar to 
those under Bank policy.119
The Panel then summarised the Aarhus Committee’s investigation and 
findings.120 It then stated that Bank policy required a project’s EIA to consider the 
borrower’s international environmental obligations relevant to project activities. 
It added that the Bank did not finance project activities that would contravene 
the borrower’s international obligations. As Bank Management did not ensure the 
borrower’s fulfilment of its Aarhus obligations, the Panel concluded that the project 
did not adhere to Bank policy.121 
In addition to its findings on the borrower’s violation of its Aarhus obligations, 
the Inspection Panel found other breaches in this case. It noted that Bank policy 
required consultation to take place when preparing the EIA. However, the public 
meetings concerned were held only after the project site had been decided.122 The 
Panel noted that such consultation only provided post hoc justification for the site 
selection, which in essence was not a genuine consultation.123 As for inadequate 
notification and public participation, the Panel held that, since there was a similarity 
between the requirements under Bank policy and the Aarhus Convention, and the 
Panel had also verified the facts that the Aarhus Committee examined, it reached 
the same conclusion as the Aarhus Committee: the project did not ensure adequate 
notification and public participation in consultation meetings during project 
preparation.124
118  ibid para 312.
119  ibid para 323.
120  ibid paras 324–29.
121  ibid paras 330–32.
122  ibid paras 337–41.
123  ibid paras 342–43.
124  ibid paras 350–52.
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This is another example where the Inspection Panel referred to the borrower’s 
treaty obligations relevant to project finance activities. The difference between this 
case and the DR Congo Forest-related Operations case is that here the borrower’s 
Aarhus obligations were raised by the complainants. The Panel in this case found 
the project to be non-compliant with Bank policy in general terms under OP 4.01, 
para 3 in light of the Aarhus obligations. It also examined the compatibility of these 
Aarhus requirements with the public consultation and disclosure requirements 
under Bank policy, as provided in OP 4.01, paragraphs 14 to 15, and reached the 
same conclusion as the Aarhus Committee. This shows the importance of civil 
society, as a complainant, in triggering the Panel’s investigation on the borrower’s 
compliance with its treaty obligations when implementing its Bank-funded 
investment activities. The complainants’ reference to the practice under the Aarhus 
Convention not only had a direct impact on the Panel’s findings in this case, it 
also became an important precedent for considering the requirements under the 
Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Committee’s decisions in assessing complaints 
against projects that are implemented by the Aarhus Convention’s States Parties in 
future cases.
4.2 Natural Habitats125
The Bank’s safeguard policies also regulate other environmental issues arising 
from Bank-financed investment activities. According to Bank policy as revised 
in 2013, the Bank does not support projects involving significant conversion126 or 
degradation127 of critical natural habitats.128 Nor does the Bank support projects 
involving significant conversion of natural habitats, unless there are no feasible 
alternatives for the project and its siting, and comprehensive analysis shows that 
the project’s overall benefits substantially outweigh its environmental costs.129 
125  The term ‘natural habitats’ is defined as ‘land and water areas where (i) the ecosystems’ 
biological communities are formed largely by native plant and animal species, and (ii) human 
activity has not essentially modified the area’s primary ecological functions’. The World Bank, 
Natural Habitat (June 2001) OP 4.04, Annex A, para 1(a) <https://policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.aspx?docid=1568&ver=current> accessed 28 July 
2016.
126  For the meaning of ‘significant conversion’, see ibid, Annex A, para 1(c).
127  For the meaning of ‘degradation’, see ibid, Annex A, para 1(d).
128  ibid para 4; For the meaning of ‘critical natural habitats’, see ibid, Annex A, para 1(b).
129  ibid para 5.
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When an EIA finds that the project would significantly convert or degrade natural 
habitats, mitigation measures, which may involve minimising habitat loss as well 
as founding and maintaining an ecologically similar protected area, should be 
included.130
The Pakistan: National Drainage Program (NDP) Project case involved 
resolving the waterlogging and salinity problems in the Indus Basin’s existing 
irrigation network. The project included extending the Left Bank Outfall Drain 
(LBOD) system, the central feature of which was a spinal drain. This spinal drain 
disposed of saline effluent, generated upstream of the Indus Basin, through the 
Tidal Link to the Arabian Sea.131 However, the project underestimated the risk of 
extreme meteorological events and it lacked appropriate technical measures during 
the design of the LBOD system and the Tidal Link.132 Over time, parts of the 
structures collapsed. Others suffered damages after being hit by tropical cyclones,133 
causing suffering to people and significant changes to the regional ecosystem.134
The complaint was filed by several individuals on their own behalf and on 
behalf of those who lived in the project-affected area. The complainants contended, 
inter alia, that the affected wetlands and interconnected lakes (known as ‘dhands’) 
were an important component of international migration routes for many bird 
species.135 In particular, two of the dhands were in the Ramsar Convention List of 
Wetlands of International Importance, to which the borrowing government was a 
party. They argued that, according to the Ramsar Convention, the government had 
to ensure the wise use and conservation of wetlands. Meanwhile, the Bank should 
not support project activities that would contravene a country’s international 
environmental obligations.136
The Inspection Panel found that the chosen route of the major drainage 
canal—the Tidal Link— ran through the biodiversity-rich and productive dhands. 
However, because of the structures’ failure, the dhands had become part of the 
Arabian Sea’s tidal system. High salinity in the dhands had significantly affected 
130  For the meaning of ‘Appropriate conservation’ and ‘mitigation measures’, see ibid, Annex A, 
para 1(e).
131  The Inspection Panel, Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project (Credit No. 2999–PAK), 
Investigation Report (6 July 2006) paras 78–97 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
PanelCases/34-Investigation Report (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
132  ibid paras 133–53.
133  ibid paras 154–69.
134  ibid paras 170–94.
135  ibid; Request for Inspection (9 September 2004) para 38 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/
apps/ip/PanelCases/34-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
136  ibid para 40.
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the environment.137 The Panel held that the project had focused on evacuating 
effluents and had somewhat neglected the impacts on, or means to rehabilitate, 
the dhands as a habitat and ecosystem. It concluded that this did not comply with 
Bank policy.138
The Inspection Panel then mentioned the objectives of the Ramsar Convention. 
It reiterated the States Parties’ obligation to designate suitable wetlands within 
its territory for inclusion in the Ramsar List and to promote the conservation of 
wetlands in the List.139 It stated that the evidence had shown that the dhands under 
the Ramsar List had suffered negative impacts as a result of rising salinity and 
changed water flow, which constituted a ‘significant conversion or degradation’ in 
terms of Bank policy.140
The Inspection Panel held that the Bank had failed to consider the risks of 
further degrading critical natural habitats adequately, saying that ‘these Ramsar-
listed sites are the type of critical natural habitat that Bank policy promises not 
to significantly convert or degrade’.141 It also ruled that actions were not taken to 
conserve and rehabilitate these degraded natural habitats. The Panel thus concluded 
that the project did not adhere to Bank policy.142
In this case, the complainants stressed the importance of the wetlands on 
which the project had had a negative effect by identifying their ecological value 
and status under the Ramsar Convention, to which the borrower was a State Party. 
However, the complainants did not explicitly argue that these wetlands constituted 
‘critical natural habitats’ because of their Ramsar status.143 This aligns with the Bank 
policy on natural habitats, which also does not define critical natural habitats as 
areas listed under the Ramsar Convention or other MEAs.144
137  ibid, Investigation Report (n 131) paras 341–45.
138  ibid para 346.
139  ibid paras 347–48.
140  ibid paras 349–54.
141  ibid para 357.
142  ibid paras 366–69.
143  Unlike the WHC, the Ramsar Convention does not have a screening procedure for including 
a wetland in the List of International Importance. Instead, the States Parties to the Convention 
can unilaterally designate wetlands to the List. See the Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 February 1971, entered into force 21 
December 1975) 996 UNTS 245 art 2(2) [hereinafter ‘Ramsar Convention’]; See also Bowman, 
Davies and Redgwell (n 102) 408–11.
144  The Bank policy on natural habitats only refers to areas which meet the criteria under the 
IUCN classifications and are considered as critical natural habitats. See OP 4.04, Natural 
Habitat (n 125) Annex A, para 1(b)(i).
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In contrast to the complainants’ submissions, in assigning the wetlands 
concerned as critical natural habitats under Bank policy, the Inspection Panel 
appears to have considered the criteria for the inclusion of wetlands in the Ramsar 
List.145 Its holdings were thus beyond what the complainants argued. Therefore, 
the borrower’s commitments under the Ramsar Convention may increase the 
possibility for a specific area within its territory to be classified as a ‘critical natural 
habitat’ under the Bank policy on natural habitats, thereby reinforcing the Bank’s 
duty to refrain from financing project activities that would cause significant 
conversion or degradation.
In addition, according to the Ramsar Convention, the States Parties have the 
obligation to promote the conservation and wise use of wetlands, whether they 
are listed sites or not.146 It has been suggested that the focus has been on the States 
Parties’ ‘wise use of wetlands’.147 The term ‘wise use’ refers to ‘the maintenance 
of their ecological character, achieved through the implementation of ecosystem 
approaches, within the context of sustainable development’.148 In this case, since the 
project had altered the wetlands’ ecological character, the borrowing government’s 
obligation for wise use of wetlands under the Ramsar Convention, as mentioned by 
the complainants, may have been violated. Since the Inspection Panel also indicated 
that these ‘Ramsar-listed sites are the type of critical natural habitat that Bank 
policy promises not to significantly convert or degrade’,149 the Panel may consider 
the practice concerning ‘wise use’ under the Ramsar Convention in determining 
compliance with Bank policy in future cases. 
4.3 Forests
According to the Bank policy on forests, as revised in 2013, the Bank intends to: (i) 
‘assist borrowers to harness the potential of forests to reduce poverty in a sustainable 
manner’; (ii) ‘integrate forests effectively into sustainable economic development’; 
and (iii) ‘protect the vital local and global environmental services and values of 
forests’.150
145  Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project, Investigation Report (n 131) paras 341–42.
146  Ramsar Convention (n 143) arts 3(1), 4(1).
147  Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 102) 414–16.
148  ibid 417–19 (emphasis added).
149  Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project, Investigation Report (n 131) para 357.
150  OP 4.36, Forests (n 62) para 1.
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The Bank policy formulations on forests are similar to those for natural 
habitats in many respects. First, the Bank does not finance projects that would 
involve significant conversion or degradation of critical forest areas or related 
critical natural habitats.151 Here, ‘critical forest areas’ refer to forest areas that 
qualify as ‘critical natural habitats’ under the Bank policy on natural habitats.152 
Second, the Bank does not support projects if they would significantly convert 
or degrade natural forests or related natural habitats, unless there are no feasible 
alternatives for the project and its siting, and comparative analysis shows that the 
project’s overall benefits substantially outweigh its environmental costs.153 Third, 
the Bank does not support projects that would contravene applicable international 
environmental agreements.154
The Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project case 
best illustrates how the Inspection Panel has dealt with forest issues in a Bank-
financed project in light of international obligations of the borrower. The project 
involved reforming the regulatory framework for forest concession operations in 
Cambodia. Its objectives were to improve forest management through effective 
operational guidelines and to control procedures in forest concessions areas, and 
to establish forest crime monitoring and prevention capacities.155
The complaint was brought by a local-based NGO, ie NGO Forum on 
Cambodia, on behalf of the affected communities living in the concession areas. The 
complainants stated that the project’s flawed design and implementation promoted 
the interests of logging companies with track records of human rights abuses and 
illegal logging. They also asserted that social and environmental impacts were 
inadequately considered, which had harmed forest-dependent communities and 
would continue to do so.156
Specifically, regarding the alleged breach of the Bank policy on forests, the 
complainants contended that the project failed to ‘ensure conservation, sustainable 
use of forests and active participation of local people’.157 Neither did it consider 
151  ibid para 5.
152  ibid, Annex A, para (c).
153  ibid para 5.
154  ibid para 6.
155  Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, Investigation Report (n 
110).
156  ibid; Request for Inspection (28 January 2005) 2 <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
PanelCases/36-Request for Inspection (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016. 
157  Investigation Report (n 110) para 153.
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the social, economic and environmental aspects of the forests being considered 
for concession.158 In particular, forests of high ecological value, especially the Prey 
Long forest, were consequently not identified as such. They argued that the Bank 
financed logging in areas of high ecological value and in doing so caused further 
degradation.159 Moreover, extensive illegal logging by concession companies had 
affected the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities.160
In this regard, the Inspection Panel noted that forests of high ecological 
value should have been identified, especially the Prey Long forest. It found that 
this forest had been included in a listing of tentative natural sites for World 
Heritage consideration for Cambodia because of its importance for biodiversity 
conservation. However, the Prey Long area was covered by three concessions and 
could be subject to industrial logging.161 
The Panel considered that the Prey Long forest should be designated a ‘forest 
of high ecological value’.162 It suggested that even though the Bank did not support 
logging forests of high ecological value, ‘by not raising the Prey Long issue explicitly, 
there [was] an implicit acknowledgement that logging in the Prey Long area may 
be acceptable’.163 By failing to identify the high ecological value of the forest during 
the project’s early stages, the Panel held that the project did not comply with the 
Bank policy on forests.164
In identifying the Prey Long forest as one of the ‘forests of high ecological 
value’ under the Bank policy on forests in this case,165 the Inspection Panel referred 
to the forest’s status under the tentative list for World Heritage consideration for 
Cambodia without the complainants doing so. This was despite the fact that natural 
property on the WHL or on the tentative list was not explicitly stated in Bank policy 
as a factor in determining the nature of a specific forest area.
According to the WHC, the States Parties shall submit to the World Heritage 
Committee an inventory of property they consider to be of cultural and natural 
158  ibid para 154. 
159  ibid para 170.
160  ibid para 226.
161  ibid paras 173–74.
162  ibid xi.
163  ibid paras 176–77.
164  ibid para 180.
165  According to the Bank policy on forests as revised in 1993, ‘In forest areas of high ecological 
value, the Bank finances only preservation and light, non-extractive use of forest resources’. 
See Shihata (n 16) 392. This provision no longer exists in the 2013 version.
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heritage importance for inscription on the WHL.166 Nominations to the WHL 
will not be considered unless the property has been listed on the party’s tentative 
list. The obligation of the States Parties under the WHC applies to all cultural and 
natural heritage, regardless of whether they have been inscribed on the WHL.167 
In assigning the Prey Long forest as a forest of high ecological value and 
holding that three concessions under the project would cover that forest area and 
pose a threat to it, the Inspection Panel evidently considered the status of the Prey 
Long forest under the World Heritage tentative list. While the original stipulation 
noting ‘forests areas of high ecological value’ no longer exists in the Bank policy on 
forests, as the current Bank policy states that ‘[t]he Bank does not finance projects 
that contravene applicable international environmental agreements’;168 natural 
forest areas that are either on the WHL or tentative lists may still be considered in 
determining ‘critical forest areas’.
5 Conclusion
The creation of the Inspection Panel, as an accountability mechanism within the 
World Bank, is a crucial development in the international legal system. It allows 
private individuals affected by the Bank’s financed projects, which have traditionally 
been deemed to benefit borrowing countries, to challenge the legitimacy of the 
Bank’s lending decisions. This shows that the interests between the government and 
its citizens in project finance activities may not be identical.169 It also demonstrates 
the importance of non-economic values, which the World Bank increasingly 
emphasises, in the pursuit of economic growth through project finance activities.
As an internal accountability mechanism within the World Bank, the 
Inspection Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank’s decisions and 
operations on project finance conform to the Bank’s safeguard policies. This is 
important in securing the rights and interests of those who should be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of Bank-financed projects. By finding the Bank’s non-compliance 
with its policies and procedures, the Inspection Panel not only enhances the 
166  WHC (n 96) art 11(1).
167  Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (n 102) 454.
168  OP/BP 4.36, Forests (n 62) para 6.
169  James Cameron and Ruth Mackenzie, ‘Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights 
in International Institutions’ in Michael Anderson and Alan Boyle (eds), Human Rights 
Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon Press 1998) 147–49.
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accountability of the lending institution to the public, but also performs a significant 
role in interpreting the applicable social and environmental norms in the context 
of project finance.
Although the Inspection Panel is not a judicial mechanism, certain 
institutional arrangements ensure its independence from the organisation that 
founded it when conducting investigations. This reflects the Panel’s ombudsman 
feature and helps to strengthen its effectiveness in addressing private complaints 
brought against the Bank.170 Moreover, while it is not the Inspection Panel’s primary 
mandate to examine the borrower’s fulfilment of its treaty obligations pertaining 
to project activities, this does not preclude the Panel from using international law, 
including MEAs, to determine whether Bank policies have been implemented.171 
As previously noted, the World Bank’s operational policies and procedures address 
different environmental issues, including EIAs, natural habitats and forests. In 
practice, these rules have become important bases for the Panel to examine the 
borrowing governments’ fulfilment of their treaty obligations relevant to project 
activities under specific MEAs. 
On some occasions, the Inspection Panel has examined the projects’ 
compliance with Bank rules in light of the borrowers’ MEA obligations on the basis 
of the relevant Bank policies’ explicit references to international environmental 
treaties and agreements.172 On other occasions, the Panel has identified and 
considered the borrowers’ environmental treaty obligations without any particular 
references to such MEAs in Bank policies.173 Save for the Aarhus Convention,174 the 
MEAs referred to in these cases (ie CITES, WHC and the Ramsar Convention) have 
170  See generally, Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Hardening the Legal Softness of the World Bank through 
an Inspection Panel?’ (2013) 58 Scandinavian Studies in Law 101.
171  Alix Gowlland Gualtieri, ‘The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State 
Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel’ (2001) 72 British YB Intl L 213, 245–46.
172  See, eg, DR Congo Forest-Related Operations, Investigation Report (n 91) paras 388–94 
(referring to the CITES and WHC); Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring 
Project, Investigation Report (n 116) paras 323–32, 337–43, 347–52 (referring to the Aarhus 
Convention).
173  See, eg, Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project, Investigation Report (n 131) paras 347–
54, 357 (referring to the Ramsar Convention); Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and 
Control Pilot Project, Investigation Report (n 110) (referring to the WHC).
174  As of 20 May 2016, there are 47 parties to the Aarhus Convention. UNECE (Status of 
Ratification) <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html> accessed 28 July 2016.
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generally been ratified by the majority of states.175 Also, the borrowing governments 
concerned in the abovementioned cases were the States Parties to these MEAs. On 
the one hand, this shows the Panel’s willingness to consider those widely accepted 
MEAs in its investigations, even if such MEAs are not referred to in Bank policies. 
This also means that both the World Bank and the governments have to be aware 
of, and comply with, these environmental treaty obligations (especially those that 
have been ratified by the borrowing governments) in the course of project finance 
activities. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the Panel will examine 
the project’s compliance with Bank policies in light of specific MEAs to which the 
borrowing governments concerned are not state parties.176
Moreover, through these Bank policies, civil society organisations can 
seek to assert their influence on the behaviour of both the World Bank and the 
borrowing governments in conducting project activities. In practice, civil society 
organisations have contributed to this by identifying the borrower’s international 
environmental commitments in their complaints.177 This shows the importance 
of civil society’s arguments in promoting the implementation of MEA obligations 
175  As of 2016, there are 182, 192 and 169 parties to CITES, WHC and the Ramsar Convention 
respectively. CITES (Member countries) <https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php> 
accessed 28 July 2016; UNESCO (States Parties/Ratification status) <http://whc.unesco.org/
en/statesparties/> accessed 28 July 2016; The Ramsar Convention Secretariat (Contracting 
Parties to the Ramsar Convention) <http://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/
library/annotated_contracting_parties_list_e.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
176  The Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have 
provided the possibility for the IFC/MIGA Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) to 
evaluate the project’s compliance with the Performance Standards in light of MEAs to which 
the home states of private sector clients are not state parties. For example, according to IFC/
MIGA Performance Standard 3 (PS3), the transboundary pollutants that the client should 
avoid, minimise and/or control releasing include those identified in the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (adopted 13 November 1979; entered into force 11 June 
1981) 1302 UNTS 217 (LRTAP). As the majority of the state parties to LRTAP are based in 
Europe and North America, but IFC/MIGA-supported projects are implemented in developing 
countries around the world, the reference to LRTAP under PS3 implies the practical effect 
of this Convention extending beyond the state parties to private sector companies of non-
contracting parties. This also allows the CAO to evaluate the project’s compliance with the 
applicable standards in light of an MEA to which neither the IFC/MIGA nor the home state of 
the private sector client is a party.
177  See, eg, Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project, Investigation Report (n 
116) para 312 (referring to the Aarhus Convention); Pakistan: National Drainage Program 
Project, Request for Inspection (n 131) para 40 (referring to the Ramsar Convention).
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in project finance activities. As the Inspection Panel is a rule-based dispute 
settlement mechanism, in order to prompt the Panel actively to take account of 
MEA obligations when conducting investigations, it is of paramount importance 
to ensure that complainants advance their arguments according to pertinent Bank 
policies, which may well involve MEAs in an effective manner. The organisations’ 
sharing of information and experience and assistance for local communities and 
NGOs, especially those in developing countries, can help to build and strengthen 
the capacity of civil society to make complaints.
As Ellen Hey has noted, although the Inspection Panel does not base 
its findings on international law in a strict sense, this does not prevent it from 
considering the project’s compliance with treaty obligations pertinent to project 
finance activities.178 The Panel’s proactive attitude in tackling environmental issues 
in light of the borrowing government’s MEA obligations promotes and contributes 
to the fulfilment of these treaty requirements by governments and the World Bank 
when designing, appraising and implementing project activities. Meanwhile, this 
also allows civil society to influence both the borrowers and the lending institution 
in implementing project finance activities through Bank policies, which, from a 
legal perspective, are soft-law instruments. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Inspection Panel adopted its pilot 
approach in 2014 in order to reach early solutions through dialogue without 
formal investigations.179 This early problem-solving approach was launched for 
the first time in Nigeria: Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project, 
which concerned the compensation issue arising from the demolition of hundreds 
of homes as part of a housing development project.180 Future research should 
investigate if and how the pilot approach will be applied to environmental issues 
and the role of MEAs, which would otherwise be considered if private complaints 
are resolved through formal investigations, in the pilot approach.
Meanwhile, the World Bank is now reviewing and updating its current 
safeguard policies. The second draft of the Environmental and Social Framework 
178  Ellen Hey, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Development of International Law’ in 
Nerina Boschiero, Tullio Scovazzi, Chiara Ragni and Cesare Pitea (eds), International Courts 
and the Development of International Law: Essay in Honour of Tullio Treves (Springer 2013) 731.
179  See text to n 27–46. 
180  The Inspection Panel, Nigeria: Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project, 
Notice of Non-Registration and Panel’s Observations of the First Pilot to Support Early 
Solutions (16 July 2014) <http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/91-Notice of 
Non-Registration (English).pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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was issued on 1 July 2015. The proposed Framework comprises a Version for 
Sustainable Development, the World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for 
Investment Project Financing, and the Environmental and Social Standards (ESS).181 
This Framework is meant to replace several current OPs and BPs, including OP/BP 
4.01 on EIA, OP/BP 4.04 on Natural habitats and OP/BP 4.36 on Forests.182 The 
draft ESS has in many respects emphasised the importance of the borrower to fulfil 
its international environmental obligations.183 However, the relevant rules do not 
further specify any particular MEAs that should be adhered to by the borrower. It 
remains to be seen whether specific MEAs will eventually be incorporated into 
the ESS and how these rules are applied and interpreted by the Inspection Panel 
following the adoption of the Environmental and Social Framework. 
The establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel is a constructive step 
in holding MDBs accountable for their activities. The operation of the Inspection 
Panel may not only provide redress for those affected by project finance decisions 
and operations, but also facilitate the implementation of social and environmental 
rules set out by the World Bank. Based on the above case analysis, this article 
concludes that the Inspection Panel has actively considered environmental issues 
in light of MEAs, along with other concerned operational policies and procedures 
of the World Bank. This was despite the fact that these Bank rules refer to MEAs 
only on a few occasions. The World Bank Inspection Panel represents an important 
181  The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework: Setting Environmental and Social 
Standards for Investment Project Financing, Second Draft for Consultation’ (1 July 2015), 
para 2 <https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-
and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies/en/materials/clean_second_draft_es_framework_
final_draft_for_consultation_july_1_2015.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
182  ibid para 12.
183  See, eg, The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Standard 1. Assessment and Management 
of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts’, para 24 <https://consultations.worldbank.org/
Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies/en/
materials/second_draft_proposed_environmental_and_social_standard_ss1.pdf> accessed 
28 July 2016; The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Standard 3. Resource Efficiency 
and Pollution Prevention and Management’, paras 18, 19, 22 <https://consultations.worldbank.
org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-
policies/en/materials/second_draft_proposed_environmental_and_social_standard_ss3.pdf> 
accessed 28 July 2016; The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Standard 6. Biodiversity 
Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources’, para 24 (b) <https://
consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-update-
world-bank-safeguard-policies/en/materials/second_draft_proposed_environmental_and_
social_standard_ss6.pdf> accessed 28 July 2016.
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example in modern international law in that, as an accountability mechanism, it has 
taken on a positive role of ensuring the projects’ compliance with the environmental 
treaty obligations of the borrowing countries. Other similar mechanisms set up in 
regional MDBs184 should learn from the experience of the Inspection Panel when 
exercising their investigatory mandates.
184  See, eg, the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism in the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Accountability Mechanism in the Asian Development Bank, the 
Project Complaint Mechanism in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
and the Independent Review Mechanism in the African Development Bank.
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Abstract
The metaphor connecting blindness and fair-impartial legal treatment has been embodied 
in the Western world for hundreds of years through the image of a blindfolded woman 
who represents justice. Nonetheless, not much has been written about the complexities and 
obstacles that stand in the way of placing actual blind judges on the bench. Nor has the ‘Icon 
of Justice’ been used to represent the social struggle for disability rights. This article is the 
first to turn a spotlight on the long history of blind people in England and the United States 
serving as members of the judiciary and to explore how this integration dovetails with the 
symbolic importance of blindness in the iconography of law. The article delves into the varied 
connotations of blindness throughout Western culture and legal history, specifically in its 
purported relationship to the objectivity of the judge. Finally, the article contrasts examples of 
the inclusion of blind people in Anglo-American legal systems with an Israeli case, revealing 
existing barriers that still prevent many blind people from entering the legal profession.
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1 Introduction
In late December 2014, Richard Bernstein made history as he was sworn in as 
the first blind person to serve on Michigan’s highest court.1 Bernstein’s election 
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1  Jacob Gershman, ‘Richard Bernstein Brings “Blind Justice” to Michigan’s Highest Court’ The 
Wall Street Journal (New York, 29 December 2014) <http://on.wsj.com/1y1ARbg> accessed 9 
August 2016.
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is emblematic of the integration of blind persons into symbolic judicial positions 
in Anglo-American legal systems. This article is the first to turn a spotlight on 
the long history of blind persons in England2 and the United States (US) serving 
as members of the judiciary and to explore how this integration dovetails with 
the symbolic importance of blindness in the iconography of the legal system. The 
article delves into the varied connotations of blindness throughout Western culture 
and legal history, specifically in its purported relationship to the objectivity of the 
judge. Finally, the article contrasts examples of the inclusion of blind people in 
the Anglo-American legal systems with an Israeli legal case. A close examination 
of these case studies reveals the barriers that remain for individuals with visual 
impairments who want to enter the legal profession and the beliefs about disability 
that reinforce these obstacles.
The possibility of a blind individual serving in a judicial position in Israel first 
presented itself in 2005, when the case of Amidar v Hai came before the Tel Aviv 
District Court.3 An arbitrator in the case went blind while adjudicating it; she was 
then faced with a request, formally submitted to the court by one of the parties, to 
disqualify her based on the argument that her disability would prevent her from 
doing her job. Judge Rina Meshel of the Tel Aviv District Court dismissed the 
request, delivering an impassioned, advanced argument for the ability of a blind 
person to serve in a judicial position, specifically on the Israeli bench. However, 
Judge Meshel’s argument was ignored once the case first reached the Israeli Supreme 
Court.4 Presented with the rare opportunity to change common perceptions of the 
ability of blind persons to hold key roles in Israeli society, the Court failed to rise to 
the occasion. Although the Court ultimately supported the right of the arbitrator 
to stay in her role, once the case reached it for the second time,5 the decision failed 
to address the complex processes of societal stigmatisation experienced by those 
2  Most of the arguments I make in this article can be applied broadly to the British legal system 
as well, but since all the examples I use are from England and because the particularities of 
differences between the British and English systems do not matter to the project, I will refer 
only to the English system.
3  DC (TA) 23342/04 Amidar—National Co for Immigrant Housing Ltd v Hai 2002 (2) 664 (2005) 
(Isr) (DC Amidar).
4  CA 10487/07 Amidar—National Co for Immigrant Housing Ltd v Hai (5 May 2010), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr) (CA Amidar).
5  CA 6931/11 Amidar—National Co for Immigrant Housing Ltd v Hai (10 November 2011), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr) (CA Amidar 2011).
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living with disabilities—processes acknowledged by numerous legal judgments 
and theoretical texts associated with the field of disability studies.
Disability studies is a relatively new field that is gaining momentum in 
academia and beyond.6 This field aims to study disability as a social, cultural, and 
political phenomenon across settings and disciplines.7 Disability studies is based 
on the premise that disability is socially constructed rather than purely a medical-
pathological phenomenon that is intrinsic to the individual. This idea underlined 
the social model of disability that was developed in the early 1970s. This model 
elucidated the complex processes by which people with disabilities are stigmatised 
and consequently excluded and discriminated against by society. Further research 
and the theoretical development of the social model led to the understanding of 
disability as a complex and fluid phenomenon that ‘encompasses a wide range of 
bodily, cognitive and sensory differences and capacities’, yet ‘is produced as much 
by environmental and social factors as it is by bodily functions’.8 
A disability rights critique of the law can be identified as early as the mid-1960s 
in the writings of Jacobus tenBroek, one of the founders of the US disability rights 
movement and the founder and president of the American National Federation of 
the Blind.9 Yet only in 2006 was a new field called disability legal studies, which 
infused the disability studies perspective into legal scholarship and practice, 
officially introduced by Israeli legal scholar Sagit Mor.10 This work contributes to 
the field of disability legal studies by investigating the role that courts, legal actors 
6  Cecilia Capuzzi Simon, ‘Disability Studies: A New Normal’ The New York Times (New York, 
1 November 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/education/edlife/disability-studies-
a-new-normal.html?_r=0> accessed 9 August 2016; In August 2016, The New York Times 
initiated a series of stories on disability, written by disability studies scholars and people 
with disabilities. The first story by renowned disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson, touching on key concepts in the field such as disability, culture and identity, was 
published on 19 August 2016. See Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, ‘Becoming Disabled’ The 
New York Times (New York, 19 August 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/opinion/
sunday/becoming-disabled.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0> accessed 22 August 2016. 
7  Simi Linton, ‘What Is Disability Studies?’ (2005) 120 PMLA 518, 518; Sagit Mor, ‘Between 
Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of Privilege and Neglect 
in Israeli Disability Policy’ (2006) 18 Yale J L & the Human 63, 64; Dan Goodley, Disability 
Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction (SAGE Publications 2010) xi.
8  Rachel Adams, Benjamin Reiss and David Serlin, ‘Disability’ in Rachel Adams, Benjamin Reiss 
and David Serlin (eds), Keywords for Disability Studies (New York UP 2015) 5–6.
9  Jacobus tenBroek, ‘The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts’ (1966) 54 
California L Rev.
10  Mor (n 7) 67–68; Arlene S Kanter, ‘The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an 
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies’ (2011) 42 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 403, 426–28. 
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and legal iconography play in the social construction of blindness inside and 
outside the courthouse. 
This article also addresses the varied concepts and iconographies of ‘blind 
justice’ in Western societies and legal systems and draws connections between 
these metaphorical narratives and the appearance of literal, physical disability in 
the legal system. On the one hand, the image of a blindfolded woman holding a 
sword in one hand and scales in the other, to whom I refer as the ‘Icon of Justice’, 
represents the law’s declared aspiration that judges achieve ‘metaphoric blindness’ 
with regard to those characteristics of the litigants that are irrelevant to the essence 
of the dispute or offence. On the other hand, Western society generally considers 
physical blindness to be a debilitating disability that prevents the blind person 
from performing a wide range of tasks and from serving, de facto, in a wide range 
of professional positions. I term this ambivalent attitude towards blindness in the 
legal sphere as the Blind Justice Paradox. Through an analysis of American, English, 
and Israeli case studies and examples, as well as the theoretical and representational 
basis on which their respective approaches to disability and blindness are founded, 
this article demonstrates the ways in which physical realities intrude upon the 
iconographical basis for societal imaginings of rationality and difference. Far from 
merely serving as a theoretical exercise, this article seeks not only to shed light on 
the contradictions in legal approaches to metaphoric and literal blindness, but also 
to advance the discourse regarding the rights of people with disabilities and to 
help alter stereotypes regarding their abilities and skills. By presenting facts from 
the actual historical records relating to representations of blindness in the legal 
systems of the West, this article forms part of a larger movement to promote the 
integration of blind persons into key roles in society. 
The article is divided into three main sections: In the first section, I analyse 
the term ‘blind justice’ as it is presented through the symbol of the ‘icon of Justice’, 
including a discussion of the sociocultural associations with blindness throughout 
history as they appear in literature and folklore. This reveals the many, often 
contradictory approaches of the legal system toward blindness as imagery and as 
disability. In the second section, I present examples of the successful integration of 
blind judges into the English and American legal systems, and I trace its history 
back to the eighteenth century. I also discuss the social model of disability and, 
through it, the barriers that still exist in incorporating blind persons into the 
legal market and the judiciary. In the third section, I analyse the Tel Aviv District 
Court’s judgment in the matter of Amidar v Hai: a brave approach that constitutes, 
in my opinion, a first step in paving the way for blind Israelis to fill judicial or 
quasi-judicial positions. I then present the Israeli Supreme Court’s judgment in the 
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same matter, and demonstrate how it could have done better to promote a positive 
discourse surrounding the integration of blind persons into the Israeli legal system.
2 Socio-Cultural Aspects of ‘Blind Justice’
2.1 The Ambiguity of the Icon of Justice
Throughout most of Western civilisation’s history, ‘justice’ has been personified 
as a large woman, depicted in the nude or in a traditional Greek toga, bearing a 
series of symbolic objects. The most commonly recognised of these objects are 
the sword, the scales, and the blindfold, which in some depictions covers her eyes 
completely and in others has been pierced with holes that allow her to see through 
it.11 The image of this intriguing woman—a religious, cultural and political icon—
can be found in courts, town squares, law schools, and public buildings throughout 
Western Europe and the US, as well as in works of visual art, books, films, and other 
cultural products.12
Interestingly, this woman is one of many icons, mostly female, who symbolise 
abstract, philosophically important concepts. None of them, however, seem to have 
lingered in public consciousness more than the woman who represents justice.13 
One possible explanation is that, over the course of history, Western sovereigns and 
governments have sought to associate themselves with the virtue of justice, taking 
pains to incorporate it visibly into their core societal institutions and maintain a 
connection with it in the public’s awareness.14 
11  Among the objects surrounding various images of the Icon of Justice are a bundle of wooden 
sticks and an axe (fasces)—which historically symbolised the Roman Republic and the legal 
system—and a curved goat’s horn overflowing with fruits and grains (cornucopia)—a symbol 
of wealth and food in ancient Greece and Rome. See Dennis E Curtis and Judith Resnik, 
‘Images of Justice’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ 1727, 1741–43.
12  ibid; For recent examples of the use of the Icon of Justice in cultural products see Judith Resnik 
and Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and 
Democratic Courtrooms (Yale UP 2011) 1–8. 
13  The image of the Icon of Justice first appeared in the Middle Ages together with six other 
female icons representing basic virtues and qualities: intelligence, restraint, courage, faith, 
hope and generosity: Curtis and Resnik (n 11) 1729–31; Resnik and Curtis (n 12) 10.  
14  It could be argued as well that the iconography of justice was used as visual justification for 
violence and strict measures on the part of sovereigns against their subjects. The other virtues, 
presented through other icons, were not as crucial for maintaining order and authority: Curtis 
and Resnik (n 11) 1734; Resnik and Curtis (n 12) 12.
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The Icon of Justice image has gone through many transformations and has 
been linked to the religious iconography of various cultures (including Egyptian, 
Greek, and Roman mythology, as well as the New Testament); however, the objects 
surrounding the Icon are almost entirely consistent across manifestations.15 The 
aspect of the Icon of Justice that is often characterised as the ‘most mysterious and 
challenging’ is the woman’s blindfold, on which I choose to focus. This blindfold and 
the state of forced blindness that it imposes are, interestingly, absent from the Icon’s 
first incarnations. Thus, for example, coins in circulation during the reign of the 
Roman emperor Tiberius (who ruled from 14 to 37 CE) feature a woman holding 
a sword and scales with eyes uncovered. Similarly, artefacts from the Middle Ages 
depict the Icon with her eyes wide open. The blindfold began appearing on the 
Icon of Justice in the fifteenth century. This has encouraged many contemporary 
scholars to contemplate the nature of this forced blindness and its symbolism.16
In contemporary Western culture and art, blindness is treated ambivalently: 
on the one hand, it is perceived as a disability, as helplessness, or as punishment for 
sin and immorality17; on the other hand, it is considered to accompany the positive 
virtues of divine spirit, divine wisdom, clairvoyance, and fair and untainted 
judgment. This attitude of simultaneous awe and disgust, which I refer to as the 
Blind Justice Paradox, is also directed towards the blindness of the Icon of Justice. 
The first known interpretation of the Icon’s blindness during the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance was based on a European woodblock print from the year 
1494 that appeared in Sebastian Brant’s book Ship of Fools.18 In the print, a fool 
is seen covering the eyes of the Icon of Justice, who is sitting in a chair, holding a 
sword and scales. Scholarly interpretations of this image have viewed the woman’s 
blindness as preventing her from properly using her sword or from seeing what is 
placed on the scales—that is, the blindness is a disability that prevents her from 
carrying out true justice. Blindness as a symbol of idiocy, incapacity, and disability 
15  N S Gill, ‘Lady Justice, Justice Goddess Themis, Dike, Astraia, or Roman Goddess Justitia’ 
(About.com) <http://ancienthistory.about.com/cs/grecoromanmyth1/a/justicegoddess.htm> 
accessed 9 August 2016.
16  Martin Jay, ‘Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the Law’ in Costas Douzinas 
and Lynda Nead (eds), Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law 
(University of Chicago Press 1999) 19; David Howes and Constance Classen, Ways of Sensing: 
Understanding the Senses in Society (Routledge 2013) 95.
17  Georgina Kleege, Sight Unseen (Yale UP 1999) 14–15.  
18  The Ship of Fools is an allegory first published in Basel, Switzerland. For additional information, 
see Duchan Caudill, ‘Ship of Fools’ (About.com) <http://archive.fo/Z9j7B> accessed 9 August 
2016; Resnik and Curtis (n 12) 68. 
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also appears in iconography at the Strasbourg Cathedral in France. There, the 
icon of the blind woman as a symbol of the Jewish synagogue, which resists the 
enlightenment presented by the church and continues living in sin and ignorance, 
is set against the icon of the Christian church, a woman who is wide-eyed and open 
to redemption.19  
The importance attributed in ancient history to the sense of sight is also 
demonstrated in the ‘Eye of the Mind’ metaphor, developed in Greek philosophy 
at the time of Plato to represent the wisdom, intellect, and perception of the world 
that separates man from animal. The metaphor claims that a person perceives 
and understands the world through his or her sense of sight, which is therefore 
superior among the five senses and essential in order to understand the world and 
grow.20 This concept is also expressed in the Hebrew language, in which one word 
(PIKACH-חקיפ) is used to describe both a person who is sighted and one who is 
intelligent: describing someone who can ‘see with his eyes’ thus simultaneously 
evokes the sense of ‘a person with great intellect, whole in his senses and mind’.21 
2.2 Blindness in Folklore and Literature and the Medical-Individual 
Models of Disability
The negative cultural associations with blindness abound, and are not only 
transmitted through visual art.22 In folklore, blindness is often presented as 
punishment for inappropriate behaviour or moral misconduct connected to ‘sexual 
offences’—self-gratification among men or promiscuous behaviour and infidelity 
19  Jay (n 16) 21; Curtis and Resnik (n 11) 1756; Resnik and Curtis (n 12) 65; For an impression 
of the icon statues, see Mary Ann Sullivan, ‘Ecclesia (Church) and Synagoga (Synagogue), 
Column Figures, South Transept Portal, Strasbourg Cathedral’ <www.bluffton.edu/~sullivanm/
strasbourg/strasbourg.html> accessed 9 August 2016.
20  Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton UP 1981) 38–39, 159; For a 
critique from the disability studies discipline of philosophical theories, which sanctify the 
sense of sight, see Anita Silvers, ‘Formal Justice’ in Anita Silvers, David T Wasserman, Marry 
B Mahowald and Lawerence C Becker (eds), Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives 
on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999) 87–89; 
Georgina Kleege, ‘Blindness and Visual Culture: An Eyewitness Account’ in Lennard J Davis 
(ed), The Disability Studies Reader (4th edn, Routledge 2013) 447.
21  Entry: חקיפ (phonetic–Pike’ah) Eitan Avnion (ed), Sapir Dictionary: Hebrew-Hebrew Dictionary 
Concentrated in the Present Method (Prolog Publishing House Ltd 1997) 874.
22  I Bennett Capers, ‘On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness’ (2006) 12 Michigan J Race & L 203, 
210. 
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among women.23 In certain cultures, blindness is considered a contagious disease, 
causing the banishment of blind people from society,24 and in Leviticus, blindness 
is among the conditions that bar a person from entering the Holy Temple.25 
In folktales and Western literature from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, blind people are considered to be destructive and evil.26 Literature of 
the twentieth century continues the trope, drawing on blindness to instil fear and 
horror in readers. Perhaps the most prominent example is José Saramago’s novel 
Blindness from 1995,27 which describes a city plagued by ‘white blindness’ in which 
those infected with loss of sight are institutionalised. Harsh scenes describe the 
terror of their condition: blind people, unable to find bathrooms, are forced to 
urinate in the hallways of the institution;28 a blind man innocently and inadvertently 
comes too close to a fence and is shot by guards; horrific rapes occur within the 
blind community.29 From these examples alone we can see how the novel uses 
blindness as an analogy for depravity and loss of humanity. The fact that the story’s 
protagonist, the doctor’s wife and the only one who does not lose her eyesight, is 
also the one to put a stop to the abuse and deliver justice by murdering the main 
rapist reinforces this conclusion.30
Yaakov Steinberg’s short story The Blind Woman from 191231 tells the tale of 
Hannah, blind from birth and wed to a stranger, in an Eastern European Jewish 
community in the early twentieth century. Throughout the story, the reader must 
attempt to decipher Hannah’s new and mysterious surroundings, her home, and her 
new husband’s occupation. The husband, who wears heavy shoes, uses a large staff, 
23  Annie Wagner-Lampl and George W Oliver, ‘Folklore of Blindness’ (1994) 88 J Visual 
Impairment & Blindness 267, 269; See also Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W Matson, ‘The 
Disabled and the Law of Welfare’ (1966) 54 California L Rev 809, 813.
24  Wagner-Lampl and Oliver (n 23) 270.
25  Leviticus 21: 18.
26  Wagner-Lampl and Oliver (n 23) 271; For an overview of scholarship discussing the negative 
imagery of people with disabilities in literature, see David T Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder, 
Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependence of Discourse (University of Michigan Press 
2001) 17–21.
27  José Saramago, Blindness (1st edn, Harvest Books 1999). 
28  ibid 107–08.
29  ibid 142–43.
30  ibid 152–54; For additional critical reading of Saramago’s novel, see Liat Ben-Moshe, ‘Infusing 
Disability into the Curriculum: The Case of Saramago’s Blindness’ (2006) 26 Disability Studies 
Q <www.dsq-sds.org/article/view/688/865> accessed 9 August 2016.
31  Yaakov Steinberg, The Blind Woman, The Rabbi’s Daughter, Daughter of Israel, Between the 
Silver Bricks (Babel Publishing 2001) (Hebrew).
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and utters few words throughout the narrative, gives the reader an impression of 
being nearly inhuman. In contrast to the characters of Blindness, the blind woman 
in this story represents humanity, while the sighted person, without disability, lacks 
it. Steinberg thus creates a protagonist with a physical impairment and focuses 
the story on her doomed attempt to cope with it, conveying a sense of human 
helplessness against ‘a cruel fate’ prescribed from childhood. 
Blindness as reflected in folklore and literature is mirrored in the medical-
individual models of disability that frame disability as misfortune and those with 
disabilities as ‘less equal’ and incompetent.32 The medical-individual models were 
developed during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time when the 
responsibility of Western governments to provide health services for their citizens 
had not yet been established. Therefore, it fell on physicians to treat and advise 
people with regard to health-related issues. This period of time also saw the rise of 
institutions in an attempt to control the non-working population, comprised mainly 
of people with disabilities.33 Therefore, people with disabilities were excluded and 
segregated from society and its education system and labor market, in order to 
allow them to receive medical care. The exclusion of people with disabilities from 
society perpetuated complex processes of stigmatization and myth surrounding 
them and their capabilities.34 Disability was seen as something that needed to be 
fixed so that the disabled could fit into society, regardless of their needs, wishes, 
or life experiences.35 Historically in the US, disability served as an excuse for 
differential treatment and deprivation of rights not only with regard to disabled 
people, but also as a justification for the unequal treatment of the members of other 
groups, such as women and people of colour.36 This structuring of pathology is 
now referred to as ‘ableism’: the process by which a person’s overall abilities are 
considered to correspond directly to his or her sensory, physical, or mental abilities 
32  Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (Routledge 
1997) 27.
33  Mike Oliver, ‘Social Policy and Disability: Some Theoretical Issues’ (1986) 1 Disability, 
Handicap & Society 5, 14.
34  Deborah A Stone, The Disabled State (Temple UP 1984) 107–17; Colin Barnes, ‘A Brief History 
of Discrimination and Disabled People’ in Davis (n 20) 20, 29.
35  Anthony F LoBianco and Kathy Sheppard-Jones, ‘Perceptions of Disability as Related to 
Medical and Social Factors’ (2007) 37 J of Applied Social Psychology 1, 1–2; Susan Wendell, 
‘Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability’ in Davis (n 20) 336, 349.  
36  See generally Douglas C Bayton, ‘Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American 
History’ in Paul K Longmore and Lauri Umansky (eds), The New Disability History: American 
Perspective (NY UP 2001) 33–57. 
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and measured against a level of productivity determined by non-disabled people.37 
According to this paradigm, only those with medical-rehabilitation training are 
qualified to ‘repair’ people with disabilities, while members of the community 
should not be involved in choosing how best to accommodate their own physical 
or mental needs.38 Disability has thus been historically perceived as inherent to the 
person herself, hence the individual model of disability, which goes hand in hand 
with the medical model and views disability as a trait that an individual should 
try to overcome and undermines the role that myth and stigma play in the social 
construction of disability.39 
The literary works described above greatly emphasise the difference between 
a disabled and a non-disabled person, and use their characters’ impairments as the 
main catalyst for plot developments.40 Through the conscious or subconscious use 
of synecdoche, a literary-figurative device in which a whole is represented by its 
parts, the disability (blindness) essentially replaces the protagonist. Thus, Hannah 
from Steinberg’s story is no longer a woman forced to marry a stranger and move 
her life to his home, but rather, a ‘blind woman’ whose disability forms the essence 
of her self.41 Disability studies scholar David Bolt describes a trend in twentieth 
century literature where many blind literary characters’ names are displaced by 
37  Simi Linton, Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity (NY UP 1998) 9; Gregor Wolbring, 
The Politics of Ableism (2008) 51 Development 252, 252–53.
38  Marta Russell, Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract: A Warning from an 
Uppity Crip (Common Courage Press 1998) 15.
39  Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (Palgrave Macmillan 
1990) 11; Rod Michalko, The Difference that Disability Makes (Temple UP 2002) 6–7 and 51; 
Lorella Terzi, ‘The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique’ (2004) 21 J of Applied 
Philosophy 141, 142–43.  
40  Disability Studies scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that in many Western 
literary pieces, disability served as an ‘opportunistic metaphorical device’ they call ‘narrative 
prosthesis’: ‘We therefore forward reading of disability as a narrative device upon which the 
literary writer of “open ended” narratives depends for his or her disruptive punch. Our phrase 
narrative prosthesis is meant to indicate that disability has been used throughout history as 
a crutch upon which literary narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive 
potentiality, and analytical insight (…) we want to demonstrate that the disabled body 
represents a potent symbolic site of literary investment’. Mitchell and Snyder (n 26) 49.
41  As articulated by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson: ‘A disability functions only as visual difference 
that signals meaning. Consequently, literary texts necessarily make disabled characters into 
freaks, stripped of normalizing contexts and engulfed by a signal stigmatic trait’. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and 
Literature (Columbia UP 1997) 11. 
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labels that refer to blindness, most obviously ‘the blind girl’ and ‘the blind man’.42 
Bolt refers to this process as ‘nominal displacement’,43 while demonstrating it in 
writings of such authors as Kenneth Jernigan,44 Mary Norton,45 and Stephen King,46 
all of whom have had female blind characters who were regarded as infantile, 
objectified, asexual, and weak,47 similar to Steinberg’s Hannah. A notable character 
of a blind male judge in Thomas Wolfe’s 1940 novel You Can’t Go Home Again, 
Judge Rumford Bland, is described as causing fear and panic as a result of his 
presence alone and as having an ‘evil ghost-shadow of a smile’ and a ‘suggestion of 
a devilish humour’ when he speaks.48
The perception of impairment as a barrier or tangible division between 
society and the disabled person links the cultural-literary perception of people 
with disabilities and the medical-individual models.49 I argue that the connection 
between them is compelling because it helps to explain society’s discriminatory 
approach towards people with disabilities—blind people in this case—throughout 
history, within a legal framework and otherwise.
2.3 The Turning Point with Respect to Blindness in Culture and Law
In the mid-1500s, about a century after the creation of the woodblock print 
published in Ship of Fools and the connotations given therein to blindness, the 
trend reversed: positive interpretations of the Icon of Justice’s blindness became 
more prevalent. Asceticism, including an unwillingness to yield to ‘the lust of 
the eyes’, was increasingly promoted by various religious factions. Blind persons 
were considered by these ascetics to possess the superior ability to avoid visual 
42  David Bolt, The Metanarratives of Blindness: A Re-reading of Twentieth-Century Anglophone 
Writing (University of Michigan Press 2013) 36–37.
43  ibid 36. 
44  ibid 37.
45  ibid 39. 
46  ibid 41.
47  ibid 38–39.
48  ibid 44–45.
49  Garland-Thomson (n 41) 79; For a note discussing the low societal expectations of disabled 
people and the manifestation of the idea that ‘[d]isabled people are not just their obvious 
impairments’, see Tom Shakespeare, Why Disabled Achievers Should Be Remembered (BBC 
News Blogs, 9 January 2015) <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-ouch-30700874> accessed 9 
August 2016. 
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temptations and thus, blind judges could potentially hear the parties’ arguments in 
a neutral and objective manner.50 
Later, with the onset of the early modern period and the relinquishing of 
the feudal law of the Middle Ages, secular groups began attributing objectivity to 
blindness, using this metaphor to break from the constraints of religious rule and 
establish the independence of the judicial branch.51 It is no wonder that in Western 
Europe, the image of the Icon of Justice began appearing throughout the public 
sphere, adorning the fronts of the public buildings of the new civil government, 
now disconnected from the church. Legal scholars began to distance themselves 
from theories of natural, divine law and embrace the verbal drafting of codes and 
the development of a formative-factual standard of legal norms. Interestingly, 
during this time of the early modern period, other types of disabilities symbolised 
the desire to avoid unjust judgments. An example is a 1604 fresco from the Geneva 
City Hall, painted by Italian artist, Cesare Giglio, depicting judges who are handless 
and thus cannot receive bribes.52  
The Icon of Justice’s blindness suited, therefore, the legal positivism movement 
of the period.53 Current legal theory continues to mandate that judges keep a 
certain distance from the cases before them and exclude any personal views and 
ideologies from their judgments. Justice should be ‘blind’, ie, objective.54 However, 
advocates of impartiality do admit to the difficulty of the task. The Icon of Justice’s 
blindfold would, in reality, do little to enable impartial judging. 
As part of his Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls developed the ‘veil 
of ignorance’ doctrine. Rawls claimed that in order to create a fair and just process 
that does not lean in favour of a certain social group or conform to existing power 
dynamics, judges must detach themselves from their individual identities, as well as 
all character traits that might be relevant to the cases before them. Thus, obscuring 
herself behind the veil of ignorance, the decision-maker would seek to become an 
‘abstract human entity’, able to judge equally and justly. The concept of the veil of 
ignorance is one of the most influential theoretical ideals of the legal system; its 
actual application, however, has proved to be complicated, just as the ideal of the 
50  Jay (n 16) 24.
51  Curtis and Resnik (n 11) 1746.
52  ibid 1750; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Law After Modernity (Legal Theory Today) (Hart 2013) 216.
53  Jay (n 16) 24.
54  Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s Right 
(Harper Perennial 2005) 157; Scott (n 52) 217. 
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Icon of Justice occupies a position that is somewhat distant from reality.55 Despite 
the difficulties of its implementation, however, the basic concept underlying Rawls’ 
theory—‘tactical ignorance’, or ‘tactical blindness’56—can be found in existing 
practices. Thus, for example, in law schools around the world, exams and papers 
are submitted to professors anonymously to be rated objectively and ‘blindly’.57 
Another scholarly camp rejects the ideal of complete objectivity out of hand, 
considering judgments based on one’s personal perceptions as faits accomplis; they 
cannot be denied, and therefore the injustice should be accepted in certain cases.58 
Judge and scholar Learned Hand commented a number of times on the subject, 
arguing that, even if most judges will never admit it, many of their decisions are 
not objective; a judge cannot behave like a ‘clean slate’ and achieve total emotional 
disengagement.59 
A more moderate approach is offered by former Israeli Supreme Court Chief 
Justice and Yale Law School Professor Aharon Barak. In his book, The Judge in a 
Democracy, he claims that ‘the judge must realize his role in a democracy impartially 
and objectively (…) Absence of bias is essential to the judicial process; hence the 
image of justice as blindfolded’.60 According to Barak, the judge’s objectivity is 
attainable, though it is not an easy task:
The objectivity required of a judge is difficult to attain. Even when we look at 
ourselves from the outside, we do so with our own eyes. Nonetheless, my judicial 
experience tells me that objectivity is possible. A judge does not operate in a vacuum. 
A judge is part of society, and society influences the judge. The judge is influenced by 
the intellectual movements and the legal thinking that prevail. A judge is always part 
of the people (…) He progresses with the history of the people. All of these elements 
contribute to the judge’s objective perspective. Moreover, the judge acts within the 
limits of the court. He lives within a judicial tradition (…) The heavier the weight of 
the system, the greater the objectification of the judicial process.61
However, even Barak acknowledges that ‘some subjectification of the process 
is inevitable (…) The personal aspect of a judge is always present, and his life 
55  Christopher Tarver Robertson, ‘Blind Expertise’ (2010) 85 NYU Law Rev 174, 203; Howes and 
Classen (n 16) 98.
56  Robertson (n 55) 204–05.
57  ibid 205.
58  Rosenbaum (n 54) 157–78.
59  ibid 157–60.
60  Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton UP 2006) 101–02.
61  ibid 104–05.
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experience neither disappears nor can disappear’.62 According to Barak, ‘it is 
enough for a judge to make an honest attempt to objectify his exercise of discretion, 
recognizing that it cannot be done in every circumstance’.63
Apart from the idea of objective and just judicial decision-making, there 
are other virtues, such as extraordinary ‘compensatory powers’ or even a sixth 
sense, associated with blindness and blind people in Western literature.64 In 
ancient Greece, mystical abilities of magical healing were attributed to the blind. 
For instance, the blind prophet Tiresias in Sophocles’s tragic play, Oedipus the 
King, possesses magical powers given to him by the gods as compensation for his 
blindness. Famous Greek poet Homer was also blind, and his poetry was considered 
to be ‘the kind which stems from divine inspiration’.65 
The progressively more positive depictions of the Icon of Justice’s blindness 
reflect an ideological trend in the Anglo-American legal system that has opened 
doors for blind persons to serve in influential positions. Nevertheless, structural-
societal barriers to the full integration of blind persons in key positions in general, 
and in the legal profession in particular, still remain. 
3 The History of Blind Judges in Anglo-American Law
In this section I present a number of examples of the successful integration of blind 
judges into the legal systems of the US and England. The integration of blind judges 
in the American and English systems has a 300-year history, and a number of blind 
judges have presided over the supreme courts in the US and England. 
In the US there are currently two organisations for blind legal professionals 
devoted to making the profession accessible to people with visual impairments. 
The National Association of Blind Lawyers and the American Association of 
Visually Impaired Attorneys are very similar in nature and in their social goals.66 
Despite the efforts of these organisations to compile information about blind legal 
professionals, there is no official estimate regarding the number of blind judges 
presiding over courts in the US. This article is the first step in filling this gap in the 
literature. 
62  ibid 105.
63  ibid. 
64  Bolt (n 42) 69–76. 
65  Wagner-Lampl and Oliver (n 23) 272–74. 
66  Associated with the umbrella organisation, the American Council of the Blind (ACB).
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Disability studies scholars called attention to the phenomenon of ‘false 
admiration’ of people with disabilities by non-disabled members of society and 
mainstream media.67 The idea is that disabled individuals and professionals are 
being praised and put on a pedestal for routine tasks that they perform as part 
of their jobs, just because they live with disabilities.68 The patronising message 
behind the phenomenon of ‘false admiration’ is that people with disabilities are less 
capable or should have things done for them, and therefore should be praised when 
they do it themselves.69 In this section, I make an effort to avoid this patronising 
view and present the experiences and stories of blind judges that include hardships 
and failures alongside success and appreciation (as opposed to false admiration), as 
these are part of every professional career.  
3.1 Stories from England
London of the mid-eighteenth century was a dangerous city. Between the years 1748 
and 1754 the city experienced a wave of violence and crime that continued unabated 
despite the tough stance taken by the legal system and legislators against even petty 
crimes. In those years, Sir John Fielding served as a magistrate at the Westminster 
Court.70 In 1754, Fielding, who had gone blind about a decade beforehand, took 
upon himself the implementation of a programme to eliminate crime in the city. 
The programme had been devised by his half-brother, renowned judge and author 
67  Ben Whitburn, ‘Attending to the Potholes of Disability Scholarship’ in Tim Corcoran, Julie 
White and Ben Whitburn (eds), Disability Studies: Educating for Inclusion (Sense Publishers 
2015) 215, 221; Katie Ellis and Gerard Goggin, Disability and the Media (Palgrave Macmillan 
2015) 62–63; Emily Rapp Black, ‘My Paralympic Blues’ The New York Times (New York, 31 
August 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/opinion/my-paralympic-blues.html> 
accessed September 19, 2016. 
68  Late Australian comedian and advocate Stella Young used the term ‘inspiration porn’ to 
describe the objectification of disability, both in media and in everyday interactions. See Stella 
Young, Inspiration Porn and the Objectification of Disability (2014) <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=SxrS7-I_sMQ> accessed 16 October 2016; Ellis and Gerard Goggin (n 67) 63. 
69  Richard M Keller and Corinne E Galgay, ‘Microaggressive Experiences of People with 
Disabilities’ in Derald Wing Sue (ed), Microaggressions and Marginality: Manifestation, 
Dynamics and Impact (Wiley 2010) 241, 255–56. 
70  J M Beattie, ‘Sir John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court 1754–
1780’ (2007) 25 LHR 61, 61.
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Henry Fielding, who had recently passed away.71 Fielding implemented the plan so 
successfully that within two years he was able to curb the criminal activity of the 
city’s powerful gangs. His success earned him accolades as the ‘most creative judge 
of the eighteenth century’. He was eventually knighted.72 As a tribute to his brother, 
Fielding turned the latter’s house on Bow Street into the headquarters from which 
he headed his operations for twenty-six years, until his death in 1780.73 
One of Fielding’s greatest successes was his establishment of an innovative 
bureaucratic mechanism for investigating crime, which was based on collecting 
information and cataloguing it in archives. Fielding even utilised the main 
promotional medium of those days—the daily press—to publish reports of crimes, 
descriptions of suspects and awards for those assisting the investigation.74 Fielding 
created novel practices pertaining to the management of the criminal process, 
making it accessible to the public, and thus set into motion a mechanism later 
named ‘public justice’.75 The name reflected his commitment to serving the most 
marginalised members of English society. He also arranged workshops and classes 
at designated institutions for abandoned children and youth with a propensity 
towards crime. Fielding is quoted arguing that, although his blindness—which 
was caused by an accident—was perceived by everyone around him as a disaster, 
he himself did not see it that way at all.76 Interestingly, however, Fielding did not 
provide any official support for people with visual impairments. 
Despite his success story, about 200 years after Fielding’s death, in 1946 
an order was issued in England that prohibited blind judges from receiving the 
status of magistrate. The argument underlying the order was that the disability of 
these judges prevented them from forming a proper impression of the defendants 
appearing before them.77 In 2001, the order was revoked by then British Minister 
71  John Dashney, ‘The Blind Beak of Bow Street’ <https://nfb.org/images/nfb/publications/
books/kernel1/kern0808.htm> accessed 9 August 2016. 
72  Beattie (n 70) 63.
73  Dashney (n 71).
74  Beattie (n 70) 69. 
75  ibid 70.
76  Dashney (n 71). This remark, as well as Fielding’s success in creating a revolution in the 
execution of the criminal process, testifies to the deep roots of the social model of disability 
among disabled people, even before it was officially articulated in the 1970s, as will be discussed 
later in the article.
77  Tom Utley, ‘Blindness a Virtue in Justice but Seldom on the Bench’ The Telegraph (London, 
27 June 2001) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/4263377/Blindness-a-virtue-in-Justice-
but-seldom-on-the-Bench.html> accessed 9 August 2016. 
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of Justice Lord Derry Irvine, who appointed nine blind judges after having them 
serve for a trial period.78
In 1990 the first blind judge, Sir John Wall, was appointed to England’s High 
Court of Justice, the highest civil court in England.79 Wall, who went blind when he 
was eight years old, is described as a man blessed with a phenomenal memory. He 
began his career as an attorney in the private sector, after studying throughout his 
life at both institutes for blind people and integrated institutes. Wall explained that 
finding employment after his graduation from Oxford had been a difficult task, and 
that he had therefore decided to focus his efforts on advocating for the employment of 
people with disabilities.80 Unlike John Fielding, Wall worked extensively to promote 
the interests of people with disabilities, and he was even knighted in 2000 for his 
societal contributions and services.81 Wall retired from the English court in 2002 but 
continued his social activity from outside the court until he passed away in 2008.82 
In 1997, legal scholar Amir A. Majid was appointed as a part-time immigration 
judge.83 Majid, who went blind later in life while a student at a university in Pakistan, 
where he was born, is a prominent scholar in international law and also works on 
disability-related issues.
Judge John Lafferty, who has been blind from birth, was appointed to be a 
judge in Snaresbrook Crown Court, England’s largest court, in 2007 and currently 
serves on the bench.84 Like Wall, Lafferty, who practised law as a solicitor for 20 years 
78  Matt Born, ‘Lord Chancellor Lifts Ban on Blind Magistrates’ The Telegraph (London, 26 June 2001) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1310223/Lord-Chancellor-lifts-ban-on-blind- 
magistrates.html> accessed 9 August 2016; ‘Bill Set to Become First Blind Magistrate’ The 
Bolton News (Bolton, 13 July 2001) <http://www.theboltonnews.co.uk/news/6019826.Bill_set_
to_become_first_blind_magistrate/> accessed 9 August 2016.
79  This is one house out of three constituting the Supreme Court in England. 
80  John Wall, ‘The Rights of Blind People’ (2003) 16 Community Eye Health J <http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1705870/> accessed 9 August 2016.  
81  ‘Birthday Honours List–United Kingdom’ The London Gazette (Supplement No 1, London, 
16 June 2000) <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/55879/supplement/1/data.pdf> 
accessed 9 August 2016.
82  ‘Sir John Wall: First Blind High Court Judge of Modern Times’ The Times (London, 11 
December 2008) <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article2083884.ece> 
accessed 29 August 2016. 
83  ‘Blind Lecturer a Judge’ Times Higher Education (London, 21 November 1997) <https://www.
timeshighereducation.com/news/blind-lecturer-a-judge/104451.article> accessed 9 August 
2016.  
84  Jonathan Rayner, ‘Interview: John Lafferty’ The Law Society Gazette (28 September 2015) 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/people/interview-john-lafferty/5051158.fullarticle> accessed 9 
August 2016. 
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after graduating from the University of Leeds, admitted that finding employment 
after graduation had been a difficult task. In Lafferty’s words: 
Many prospective employers are unable to make the leap of imagination to see how 
a blind person can do a job that is regarded as difficult, such as practicing as a lawyer 
(…) If you can just have a dialogue with a prospective employer, your blindness (…) 
will be disregarded and their anxiety eased. That’s what I hope my history will help 
achieve; telling employers that everything is possible. Hard work and determination 
will allow you to overcome all obstacles.85 
3.2 Stories from the United States
One of the earliest appointments in the US was in 1972, when a blind judge was 
chosen to sit on the Fourth Circuit in Duval County, Florida. Judge Louis Corbin 
was appointed to the court at the early age of 35, after eight years as an attorney 
in the private sector. Corbin, who had gone blind at the age of six as a result of an 
accident, spoke many times about the advantages of being a blind judge, able to 
avoid being distracted by appearances or attempts to influence and impress him.86 
Throughout the years in which he sat on the bench, Corbin refused to recuse himself 
from cases and transfer them to other judges due to his disability,87 including cases 
that included evidence in the form of video footage; during these cases, Corbin 
would instruct the lawyers to describe the content of the footage to him in detail. 
In 1984, a torts case about a man killed in a work accident came before Corbin. The 
plaintiff—the wife of the deceased—requested that Corbin recuse himself, arguing 
that, as a blind judge, he could not form an impression from the photos of her late 
husband’s injuries. Corbin refused, subsequently claiming that during his career he 
had successfully tried dozens of cases that included visual evidence.88
85  ibid.
86  ‘Judge Blind, Not Justice’ Cape Girardeau Southeast Missourian (1 September 1974). 
87  ibid. 
88  ‘Blind Judge Refuses to Disqualify Himself ’ Ocala Star-Banner (Jacksonville, 14 August 
1984) <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19840814&id=1CEVAAAAIBA 
J&sjid=bgYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6899,7819745> accessed 9 August 2016; In 1987, Corbin’s career 
came to an abrupt end, after he resigned as part of his punishment for attempted sexual battery 
against a 17-year-old girl. See ‘Blind Judge Reports to Prison’ Associated Press (Jacksonville, 
7 October 1987) <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Blind-Judge-Reports-To-Prison/id-
9892b5de46f8066e5d584b62b53a7b58> accessed 15 December 2016. 
290 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Doron Dorfman
Associate Circuit Judge Nicholas T. Pomaro of Cook County in Illinois was 
appointed to the bench in 1976.89 He served on the bench for thirty-four years 
‘earning a reputation for being an exceptionally fair, diligent, intelligent, and 
sensitive jurist’.90 At one time, while adjudicating a murder trial, a lawyer challenged 
Pomero’s ability to review a videotaped confession given to the police and asked 
Pomero to recuse himself ‘because he would not be able to see the defendant’s 
expression’. Pomero refused and was upheld by the state Supreme Court.91 Pomero 
said that, although he could not see the witness before him, he developed ‘kind of 
a sixth sense’ that allowed him to ‘form these images in my brain, but those images 
are not perceived through sight, but through imagination, sounds, smell, feel and 
the other senses’.92
Judge Tony Cothren, who gradually went blind as a child, was appointed to the 
Tenth Circuit in Jefferson County, Alabama, in 1996. He, like Pomero and Corbin, 
claims that his blindness does not interfere with his work as a judge. Cothren has 
stated that when he hears the voice of a man or a woman, he envisions in his mind an 
abstract shape of the person. He has also argued that he can envision his computer 
even though he cannot commit the vision to memory.93 Cothren’s career has been 
an eventful one. In 1998, he was suspended after being accused of inappropriate 
behaviour and failure to meet deadlines. Claims made against him argued that 
he tended to fall asleep on the bench. Cothren denied these allegations. The affair 
was of great interest to the blind community in the US, some of whom argued that 
these were false accusations arising from discriminatory attitudes toward Cothren 
as a person with a disability, and that Cothren had been suspended simply because 
he was the only blind judge in Alabama. Others, however, questioned the propriety 
of Cothren’s claims that, as a disabled person, he was more dependent on his legal 
assistants, and that these assistants were responsible, through their own negligence, 
89  Jim O’Donnel, ‘Judge on His Own Merits’ Chicago Tribune (Chicago, 8 September 1996) 
<http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996–09–08/features/9609080091_1_senior-judges-
criminal-felony-blind> accessed 9 August 2016.  
90  Hal Dworkin, ‘Testing for Total Inaccessibility in Examination Under the ADA: A Case Study 
of Logic Games’ (2014) U Ill L Rev 1963, 1964–65. 
91  ‘Judge who Is Blind Relies on “What’s Inside” for Truth’ The New York Times (New York, 24 June 1984) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/24/us/judge-who-is-blind-relying-on-what-s-inside- 
for-truth.html> accessed 9 August 2016. 
92  ibid.
93  Rick Bragg, ‘A Sixth Sense and Sensibility’ The New York Times (New York, 22 October 1996) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/22/us/a-sixth-sense-and-sensibility.html> accessed 9 
August 2016.  
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for the irregularities in his chamber.94 Regardless of culpability, it is clear that 
Cothren faced increased public scrutiny for his disability in a time of crisis. 
Judge Peter J. O’Donoghue, who gradually lost his eyesight beginning at the 
age of 12, was appointed to the Civil Court of the City of New York in 1996, and 
in 2002 was promoted to the New York State Supreme Court in Queens County. 
O’Donoghue is considered an excellent judge with careful attention to detail, a 
superb memory, and a strong code of professional ethics.95
Judge Richard B. Teitelman was appointed to sit on the Supreme Court of 
Missouri from 2002 until 2016 (after serving as judge at a lower court since 1998).96 
Teitelman also went blind gradually as a child, an effect of which, he believes, is his 
extraordinary memory. He views his disability as an advantage, bringing a unique 
and interesting perspective to the judge’s table. He is known as an advocate for 
disability rights, and has received a Lifetime Achievement Award for his work.97
As of today, two blind judges have presided over the US Federal Courts. In 
1994 Judge David Tatel was appointed to the US Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. He still holds the position and is regarded as an excellent 
judge: ‘because he can’t see people, he sees through them. He picks up nuances that 
those of us who are sighted cannot’.98 Judge Richard C. Casey was appointed to the 
Federal Court for the Southern District of New York in 1997. 
Unlike other blind judges who went blind at a young age, both Tatel and 
Casey became blind later in life. Tatel went blind after law school and became a 
94  Marc Maurer, ‘The Search for Anonymity’ An Address (9 July 1998) <https://nfb.org/images/
nfb/publications/convent/banque98.htm> accessed 9 August 2016.
95  Charlie LeDuff, ‘This Justice Is Blind, but He’s a Great Listener’ The New York Times (New 
York, 7 September 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/07/nyregion/this-justice-is-
blind-but-he-s-a-great-listener.html> accessed 9 November 2016; See also the information 
page regarding Judge O’Donoghue at the Civil Court of the City of New York website: ‘Hon 
Peter J O’Donoghue’ (NY States Unified Court System) <https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
judicialdirectory/Bio?JUDGE_ID=phuHnjfzplhkA0bEto0z0g%3D%3D> accessed 9 August 
2016. 
96  The information page regarding Judge Teitelman at the Missouri Supreme Court website: 
‘Judge Richard B Teitelman’ (Missouri Courts) <www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=197> 
accessed 9 August 2016. 
97  Jason Kander, Official Manual State of Missouri 2013–2014 (Supreme Court of Missouri 2013) 
234 <http://s1.sos.mo.gov/cmsimages/bluebook/2013–2014/5_Jud.pdf#judbranch> accessed 
9 August 2016.
98  Barbara Slavin, ‘A Judge of Character: Although He’s Blind, David Tatel Skis, Runs and Climbs 
Mountains. By Summer’s End, He May Be a Top Jurist Too’ Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, 
28 July 1994) <http://articles.latimes.com/1994–07–28/news/ls-21024_1_david-tatel/2> 
accessed 9 August 2016. 
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senior partner at an influential Washington law firm.99 Casey only became fully 
blind in his fifties, as a result of an illness that he contracted while working as an 
attorney for a private law firm in Manhattan.100 At a lecture he gave in 1998 at a 
convention for the National Federation of the Blind, he introduced himself as a 
newcomer to the blind world and called for a change in societal attitudes toward 
blind people, as well as people with disabilities in general, and for their integration 
in all fields of life.101
At the time of Casey’s appointment to the Federal Court, many raised 
concerns and doubts regarding his ability to function properly as a judge. In the 
end, these fears were proven to be unfounded and Casey presided for almost a 
decade, deliberating on matters of great interest to the American public, such as 
reproductive rights. Casey passed away in March 2007 at the age of 74.102
3.3 Existing Barriers and the Social Model of Disability
The election of congenitally blind Richard Bernstein to the Michigan Supreme 
Court in December 2014 is significant since all of the American judges with visual 
impairments appointed prior to his election went blind at some point in their lives. 
Being born blind, however, figures centrally for Bernstein himself:  
I genuinely believe as a blind person, I was created this way for a reason (…) It’s not 
easy. It’s incredibly challenging, incredibly difficult. But at the same time, it makes 
your life incredibly fulfilling. If I hadn’t been born blind, I would not have lived my 
life with the same sense of mission and focus and purpose.103
Currently there are still structural barriers that prevent congenitally blind people 
and those who went blind at an early age from entering the legal profession. 
99  ibid.
100  Larry Neumeister, ‘Blind Federal Judge an Inspiration’ Associated Press (New York, 28 October 
2001), <www.jwen.com/rp/articles/blindjudge.html> accessed 9 August 2016.
101  Richard C Casey, A Jurist Who Happens to Be Blind in Federal Courts <www.nfb.org/Images/
nfb/Publications/bm/bm98/bm981202.htm> accessed 9 August 2016. 
102  ‘Richard Conway Casey, 74, Blind Federal Judge, Dies’ The New York Times (New York, 24 
March 2007) <www.nytimes.com/2007/03/24/obituaries/24casey.html?_r=1> accessed 9 
August 2016.
103  Louise Knott Ahern, ‘Michigan’s 1st Blind Justice Aims to Inspire’ Detroit Free Press (Detroit, 
11 January 2015) <http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/01/11/michigans-
1st-blind-justice-richard-bernstein-aims-inspire-others/21611021/> accessed 9 August 2016. 
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Recognition of these structural barriers is consistent with ideas that ground the 
social model of disability about societal disabling factors.  
Since the mid-1970s, a new movement has challenged the medical and 
individualistic accounts of disability that were previously presented.104 The 
underlying paradigm of the disability rights movement is the social model of 
disability. This model emerged in England in the early 1970s with the Union of 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), a group comprised of physically 
disabled veterans who advocated for the deinstitutionalisation of people with 
disabilities, and who clearly articulated the idea that society plays a significant role 
in the disablement of people with disabilities.105 This idea has since gained broader 
recognition.106 The social model argues that people with disabilities are perceived 
as an inferior group due to the social construction of reality and environments, 
and thus challenges the medical-individual models, which imagine impairment 
as the sole reason for discrimination and differential treatment. The assumption 
underlying the social model is that disability is not an inherent phenomenon 
stemming from the individual, but rather, a phenomenon dependent on wider 
social contexts that stems from the ways in which environments and systems are 
constructed as well as the ways in which societal impressions regarding people with 
disabilities are constructed.107 Over the years, the social model was criticized for 
not encompassing the full experience of disability, which often includes pain and 
hardship related to the body and impairments,108 and for undermining the need 
for health care as well as the role of doctors, social workers and other professionals 
in the treatment of disability.109 In response, over the years, the social model was 
further developed by scholars and policy makers and its ideas were implemented 
into law and public policy. A contemporary view of disability that stems from the 
original social model views it as complex and fluid, rather than a dichotomous 
process of presence or absence, which is multidimensional, dynamic, bio-psycho-
104  Joseph P Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement 
(Broadway Books 1995) 49–58.
105  Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs: Revisited (2nd edn, Routledge 2014) 12–17. 
106  Katharina C Hayer, Rights Enabled: The Disability Revolution, from the US, to Germany and 
Japan, to the United Nations (University of Michigan Press 2015) 23.   
107  Oliver (n 39) 11.
108  Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson, ‘The Social Model of Disability: An Outdated 
Ideology?’ (2002) 9 Research in Social Science and Disability 2, 20.  
109  Tom Shakespeare, ‘Still a Health Issue’ (2012) 5 Disability & Health J 129, 129–30.
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social and interactive in nature,110 that is formulated through a complex interaction 
between the impairment and the social environment.111 This view is also reflected 
in the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept and it results from the interaction 
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers 
that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.112
An alternative paradigm, the social model has served as the basis for domestic 
legislation around disability discrimination throughout the Western world. A well-
known example of such legislation that exists in the US, England and Israel is the 
requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodations (or adjustments) 
for qualified employees or job applicants with disabilities, and adjust the work 
environment to meet their needs (rather than expecting the person to adapt to the 
work environment).113
For hundreds of years, across societies and cultures, people with disabilities 
were (and to some extent still are) considered ‘unemployable’.114 In 1963 in England, 
for example, only about 6% of those registered as blind were employed, and about 
63% of those who worked were engaged in sheltered or home employment.115 
Almost 50 years later, in 2012, only 34% of the registered blind population in 
England were employed.116 In the US, according to data originating from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from March 2014, only 37.7% of the blind population are 
110  Irving Kenneth Zola, ‘Disability Statistics, What We Count and What It Tells Us—A Personal 
and Political Analysis’ (1993) 4 J Disability Policy Studies 9, 18. 
111  Saad Z Nagi, ‘Disability Concepts Revisited: Implications for Prevention’ in Andrew M Pope 
and Alvin R Tarlov (eds), Disability in America: Toward a National Agenda for Prevention 
(National Academies Press 1991) 309, 326; Carmelo Masala and Donatella Rita Petretto, ‘From 
Disablement to Enablement: Conceptual Models of Disability in the 20th Century’ (2008) 30 
Disability & Rehabilitation 1233, 1234.
112  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3, preamble (section e). 
113  In the US: Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, sections 12111–12112, 104 Stat 328 (ADA); 
in England: Equality Act 2010, sections 55(6), 60; in Israel, Equal Rights for Persons with 
Disabilities Law 1998, section 8 (Israeli Equal Rights Law). 
114  tenBroek and Matson (n 23) 810; Stone (n 34) 55.  
115  tenBroek and Matson (n 23) 810. 
116  Fred Reid, ‘Blind Rights Activist: “In the UK, 66% of visually impaired are unemployed’’’ 
(EurActive.com) 23 October 2012 <http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-eye-active-ageing/
blind-rights-reporter-paints-var-interview-515575> accessed 9 August 2016.
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‘in the labor force’.117 In a conversation I had in August 2016 with Justice Bernstein, 
the most recently elected blind judge in the US, he attributed part of his success 
to his affluent background. Without the support of his family and their means, he 
believes that he would probably have been among the majority of blind Americans 
who are unemployed. 
Stigma has been found to be a key barrier in gaining employment and social 
inclusion for blind people.118 Bernstein believes a committee would never have 
appointed him to the bench because of latent stigmas and disbelief in his abilities. 
He attributes his appointment to the fact that, in the US, state high court judges 
are elected by the public, and he believes that he had the opportunity to affect 
the voters and convince them of his abilities through the campaign he ran under 
the slogan ‘Blind Justice’. According to Bernstein, the people of Michigan wanted 
to elect a justice with whom they felt a connection, who can connect with their 
hardships and struggles and who cares about their issues. Although Michigan is 
known as a swing state, Bernstein became one of only two endorsed justices who 
was nominated by the Democratic Party, out of seven in the Michigan Supreme 
Court. 
It is not only stigma, however, that gets in the way of blind people who 
aspire to go on the job market, particularly the legal market. Despite the fact 
that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (as well as other disability anti-
discrimination laws around the world) prohibits discrimination in higher education 
and requires accommodations, including assistive technologies, to be applied to 
ensure accessibility,119 the main threshold to American law schools, the Law School 
Admission Test (LSAT), is completely inaccessible.120 This is due to ‘logical games’ 
exercises that require the drawing of diagrams in order to solve them.121 Bernstein 
himself was admitted to Northwestern University Law School after convincing the 
school to accept him based on his academic record, extracurricular activities and 
117  ‘Interpreting Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Data’ (AFB American Foundation for the 
Blind, 2015) <http://www.afb.org/section.aspx?SectionID=15&SubTopicID=177> accessed 9 
August 2016. 
118  Bonnie O’Day, ‘Employment Barriers for People with Visual Impairments’ (1999) 93 J of Visual 
Impairment and Blindness 627, 630; Cecilia Benoit, Mikael Jansson, Martha Jansenberger and 
Rachel Phillips, ‘Disability Stigmatization as a Barrier to Employment Equity for Legally-Blind 
Canadians’ (2013) 28 Disability & Society 970, 976–81.
119  ADA (n 113) sections 12181(7)(J), 12189; Equality Act (n 113) part 2 chapter 6; Israeli Equal 
Rights Law (n 113) part 7 chapter 1.
120  See generally Dworkin (n 90).  
121  ibid 1966–67, 1974–76.
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letters of recommendation alone.122 Nevertheless, this can no longer be the case for 
other blind Americans who wish to go to law school, since prospective law students 
are now required by the Law Students Admission Council (LSAC) to take the test.123 
In June 2016, litigation brought against the American Bar Association, which only 
accredits US law schools that admit students according to the LSAT, was dismissed 
while the Sixth Circuit Court decided that the lawsuit should be filed against LSAC, 
the body that actually administers the exam.124 Such a suit is likely to be filed soon 
by Angelo Binno, who was rejected from a few law schools due to his LSAT results 
and who started the legal battle against the LSAC in 2011.125
As the stories presented here indicate, blind judges have been successfully 
incorporated into judicial systems, despite ambivalent attitudes towards and 
barriers against disability and blindness both societal and legal. As we shall see in 
the next section, the Israeli judicial system has also grappled with discomfort and 
bias when it comes to having blind persons serving in judicial roles.
4 Potential for Integrating Blind Judges into the Israeli Judiciary
The case of Amidar v Hai was argued in the Tel Aviv District Court in 2005 and 
concerned the request of Amidar, an Israeli state-owned housing company, to 
disqualify an arbitrator from her duties on account of her blindness. The case 
involved two parties that had signed an arbitration agreement, according to which 
attorney Heruta Harel would serve as arbitrator in any dispute between them. The 
dispute that emerged between the parties involved an agreement to convert an 
industrial building into a residence for new Eastern European immigrants. The 
plan to convert the building was not approved by the Local Planning and Zoning 
Committee, and Amidar cancelled the project. The arbitrator was finishing her 
review of the materials presented by the parties as well as of the various schemes 
related to the dispute when she lost her vision due to an illness. She therefore 
122  Corey Wheeler, ‘Farewell, Bernstein’ The South End (Detroit, 7 December 2010) <http://
www.thesouthend.wayne.edu/news/article_91e85791–165d-511b-9a68–5a015e04c8c8.html> 
accessed 9 August 2016.  
123  Dworkin (n 90) 1966.
124  Melissa Daniels, ‘6th Circ. Tell Blind Man ABA Is Wrong Target for LSAT Suit’ Law360 (New 
York, 16 June 2016) <http://www.law360.com/articles/807873/6th-circ-tells-blind-man-aba-
is-wrong-target-for-lsat-suit> accessed 9 August 2016.
125  ibid; Dworkin (n 90) 1965–66. 
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requested that the parties allow her to hire a paid assistant at their expense so that 
she could complete the work remaining and deliver a decision.126 In light of these 
circumstances, Amidar petitioned the Tel Aviv District Court with a request to 
dismiss the arbitrator based on section 11(3) of the Arbitration Law allowing for 
the removal of an arbitrator in the event that she is unable to fulfil her duties.127 
According to Amidar, the arbitrator’s blindness constituted a disability preventing 
her from fulfilling her duties for two reasons: first, the arbitrator would no longer 
be able to weigh evidence or review the schemes, plans, and other materials; 
and second, hiring a legal assistant would taint her opinion with an external 
perspective.128 Despite legal aspirations of judges’ ‘metaphorical blindness’, in 
this case the arbitrator’s blindness was seen by Amidar as working against her, 
manifesting what I have here termed the Blind Justice Paradox: she had been struck 
by a disability that rendered her helpless. This case, therefore, demonstrates the 
paradoxical treatment of blindness in the legal realm: first as a physical attribute 
that implies incapability and second as a metaphor for just treatment under the law. 
In her decision, Judge Rina Meshel determined that disqualifying an 
arbitrator from her duties was an extreme measure that would not only tarnish 
the arbitrator’s reputation, but would also damage the quasi-judicial institution of 
arbitration. Therefore, only exceptional circumstances could justify such an action. 
Such exceptional circumstances could be, for example, a severely incapacitating 
disease that could cause ‘real likelihood, under the circumstances, that the arbitrator 
will not produce a true and just arbitration award’.129 The judge reviewed a number 
of Israeli evidentiary legal tests and determined that a blind judge could use them 
appropriately and just as well as any other judge.130
126  DC Amidar (n 3) paras 1–4 (Meshel J).
127  ibid para 6. Similar clauses to this section in other countries are, for example, rule 18 to the 
Commercial American Arbitration Association Rules, which allows for the disqualification of an 
arbitrator due to ‘inability or refusal to perform his or her duties with diligence and in good faith’; 
art 10.1 to the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules which provides that ‘[i]f 
(…) any arbitrator dies, falls seriously ill, refuses, or becomes unable or unfit to act, either 
upon challenge by a party or at the request of the remaining arbitrators, the LCIA Court may 
revoke that arbitrator’s appointment and appoint another arbitrator’; Section 5 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act 2001; For further comparative analysis, see Christopher Koch, ‘Standards and 
Procedures for Disqualifying Arbitrators’ (2003) 20 J Int’l Arb 325. 
128  DC Amidar (n 3) para 6.
129  ibid paras 6–7.
130  ibid paras 8–10.
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Judge Meshel further discussed the potential for blind or visually impaired 
jurists to serve as judges, although no blind judges have ever been appointed in 
Israel to date. She referred to sections 2–3 of the Israeli Equal Rights for Persons 
with Disabilities Law (Equal Rights Law), the Israeli counterpart to the ADA, 
which established the right of a disabled person to ‘equally participate in all areas 
of life (…) while fully maximizing his potential’. In addition, the judge gave an 
example from comparative law, referencing the case of the late US Federal Court 
judge Richard C. Casey.131 She concluded by determining that loss of eyesight could 
not justify relieving an arbitrator of her duties, and completely rejected Amidar’s 
arguments. 
Consistent with alternative views on disability and the social model, Judge 
Meshel’s decision set a high bar, supporting a view of disability as constructed, for 
the most part, through complicated processes of stigmatisation by society at large.132 
In contrast, the arguments of the plaintiff, Amidar, essentialised the difference 
presumably found in the arbitrator due to her disability. They even suggested that 
the arbitrator’s blindness impaired her cognitive ability and discretion, both by 
implying that it would diminish her analytical ability and thus prevent her from 
evaluating the importance of evidence, and by claiming that the arbitrator would 
be more easily influenced by the opinions of her legal assistant. 
These claims mirror more common conflation by Israeli society (among 
others) of sensory with cognitive disabilities. According to this conflation, a person 
with a sensory or a physical disability is often perceived as also having a cognitive 
or mental impairment as well, and incapable of dealing with complicated tasks that 
require analytical resources. The judgment in Amidar v Hai, by contrast, emphasises 
blind individuals’ capabilities over their limitations, promoting the view that a 
blind person is able to fill positions other than those traditionally designated for 
this population. These traditional occupations include operating call centres and 
working in assembly lines in sheltered workshops;133 they are often mundane, and 
do not require imagination or talent.134 According to the judgment, a blind person 
is fully capable of filling an honourable judicial position of high social standing, 
requiring analytical and deductive skills, wisdom, and vast knowledge. I believe 
131  ibid para 15.  
132  ibid. 
133  Shlomo Deshen, Blind People: The Private and Public Life of Sightless Israelis (State University 
of New York Press 1992) 63. 
134  ibid 65; Dean W Tuttle and Naomi R Tuttle, Self-Esteem and Adjusting With Blindness: The 
Process of Responding to Life’s Demands (3rd edn, Charles C Thomas Publisher 2004) 32.
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that this ruling is highly courageous; it is one of the first stepping-stones towards 
allowing people with disabilities to achieve legal recognition of their rights and 
equal integration into society.
Regardless of the importance and sophisticated nature of this decision, 
however, in paragraph 15 of the judgment we find an excerpt reflecting the views 
of the medical-individual models of disability:
And indeed, the legal sphere, and the judiciary in particular, should be at the 
forefront of the fight for the rights of society’s weakest links.135 
This phrase encapsulates an attitude of charity and pity towards people with 
disabilities, and the perception of disability as a tragedy or divine punishment.136 
This mode of thinking stands in contrast to more progressive perceptions aligned 
with the social model which, as mentioned, views disability as a derivative of 
society’s perception, and not a phenomenon immanent to the individual. Although 
there are those who claim that the ‘mercy approach’ produced advancement in 
legislation and recognition of the rights of people with disabilities, many activist 
groups have tried to detach themselves from this approach and from assumptions 
of ‘inherent difference’ and ‘inferiority’ connected to disability.137 
These contradictory approaches are exemplified in the ideological rivalry in 
the 1980s between two Israeli organisations for the blind. While the Centre for the 
Blind advocated for ‘community rehabilitation’ activities, the Association of Blind 
University Graduates (ABUG), a small circle of about one hundred blind members 
who wished to integrate into society as professionals, believed that blind people 
should only demand benefits materially relating to lack of vision, objecting to the 
view of blindness as a tragedy in order to promote the integration of blind people 
into larger society.138 This debate was ignited in the wake of a religious institute 
having published a fundraising flyer in which its blind students were portrayed as 
its wards, and their condition as a ‘cruel fate’. While the Centre for the Blind refused 
to publicly comment on the flyer, the members of ABUG harshly criticised it, as 
well as the Centre’s behaviour.139 Even today, in the post-disability rights legislation 
era, scholars argue that disability is still not widely perceived as a human rights 
135  DC Amidar (n 3) para 15 (emphasis added).
136  Shapiro (n 104) 5.
137  ibid 23–24; One such group is UPIAS, which first articulated the social model in the 1970s: see 
Shakespeare (n 105) 12–17.
138  Deshen (n 133) 155–56.
139  ibid 162–63.
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issue and that mercy and good will underlie the treatment of disability.140 As I 
will point out below, this kind of a ‘mercy-based’ (as opposed to ‘rights-based’) 
approach, which found its way even into Judge Meshel’s advanced decision in the 
short excerpt above, would become central in a later decision on this case. 
The Tel Aviv District Court was faced with the Amidar case a second time 
after the delivery of the arbitration award in the Hai v Amidar judgment.141 This 
time Judge Uri Goren considered Amidar’s application to dismiss the arbitration 
award. Among Amidar’s arguments, which included alleged procedural flaws and 
irregularities in the previous trial, Amidar also repeated its claims regarding the 
blind arbitrator’s inability to form an opinion from the witnesses and documents 
presented to her. This time, Amidar invoked the Hebrew Law, which, it argued, did 
not allow a blind judge to preside. Although primary sources of Hebrew Law such 
as the Mishnah and Shulḥan Aruch prohibit the appointment of a blind judge, even 
while admitting a judge who is blind in only one eye, a few later rabbis and Jewish 
scholars have ruled for allowing blind persons to serve in judicial rules.142 Judge 
Goren therefore denied Amidar’s application to dismiss the arbitration award and 
instructed it to be confirmed, while siding with the legal ruling of Judge Meshel.
This was not, however, the end of the story. Amidar filed for permission to 
appeal Judge Goren’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the case was brought 
before a panel of three justices.143 In an exceptional move, the Supreme Court 
revoked the second part of the arbitration award, reasoning that it contradicted a 
former non-appealable court’s judgment and therefore defied ordre public. Indeed, 
upon accepting the judgments of Judge Goren and Judge Meshel, Justice Yoram 
Danziger dismissed Amidar’s claims regarding the arbitrator’s disability. However, 
he avoided making any fundamental statement regarding the ability of blind 
people to take part in the judiciary as Judge Meshel had done. In paragraph 20 of 
his judgment, Justice Danziger wrote:
140  Mary Johnson, Make Them Go Away: Clint Eastwood, Christopher Reeve and the Case Against 
Disability Rights (Advocado Press 2003) 57, 66; Michael Waterstone, ‘The Cost of Easy Victory’ 
(2016) 57 Wm & Mary L Rev 587, 614. 
141  DC (TA) 191/06 Hai v Amidar Co for Immigrant Housing Ltd (31 October 2007) Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr).
142  Richard Gottheil and Judah David Eisenstein, ‘The Blind in Law and Literature’ in Jewish 
Encyclopedia (1906) <http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3374-blind-the-in-law-
and-literature> accessed 9 August 2016. 
143  CA Amidar (n 4).
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Despite the abovementioned, I wish to note that in the circumstances of the case 
before us, I found no merit in the Applicant’s claims as if the arbitration award 
should have been revoked following the arbitrator’s unfortunate illness, which 
caused her to go blind. As the appeal itself notes, the arbitrator’s unfortunate illness 
and the blindness she contracted as a result thereof were discovered only during 
the second phase of the arbitration proceeding, after the first arbitration award 
was delivered. However, contrary to the Applicant’s claims as if the arbitrator was 
required to review many documents and schemes in order to decide the second 
part of the arbitration proceeding, similarly to the District Court, I also hold that 
in light of the advanced stage of the arbitration proceeding when the arbitrator’s 
disease was discovered, there was no reason for the arbitrator not to continue 
her work and conclude her decision in the matter of damages. The reviewing of 
these documents was done, most probably, already during the initial stage of the 
arbitration proceeding, for which there is no dispute regarding the arbitrator’s ability 
to fulfil her duties.144
As Justice Danziger states, the arbitrator was able to review the schemes and other 
evidence before she went blind, and therefore was fully capable of finishing the 
arbitration proceeding which she had begun; there was also no reason for the 
arbitrator not to use the help of the legal assistant, who simply read the documents 
to her.145 Justice Danziger chose to decide only the matter at hand, and did not allow 
for interpretations about the ability of blind people to fill judicial or quasi-judicial 
roles. The opinion of Justice Ayala Procaccia on the same judgment did little to fill 
in this gap, as she did not refer to the question of the arbitrator’s blindness at all.
In light of this judgment, it is hard not to feel a sense of missed opportunity. 
A case such as this one, with the potential to recognise the capabilities of people 
with disabilities to assume key roles in Israeli society, does not often reach the 
Supreme Court. The justices could have easily rested on Judge Meshel’s decision, 
which expanded on the issue beyond the specifics of the case and opened up a 
broader discussion regarding the relationship between disability and society. 
The Supreme Court justices’ concrete unwillingness to make a fundamental 
and direct statement regarding people with disabilities and the Israeli Equal Rights 
Law is part of a wider trend of evading discussions of disability, overlooking its 
importance as a barrier that stands at the heart of many cases.146 The path towards 
144  ibid para 20 (Danziger J).
145  ibid.
146  Doron Dorfman, ‘The Inaccessible Road to Motherhood—The Tragic Consequence of Not 
Having Reproductive Policies for Israelis with Disabilities’ (2015) 30 Colum J Gender & L 49, 82. 
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achieving formal legal recognition of the rights of blind people and integrating 
them into the judicial sphere was blocked upon reaching the supreme legal 
authority in Israel.147 There is a long way to go before the rights and skills of people 
with disabilities are fully recognised, despite the fact that the Israeli Equal Rights 
Law was enacted almost twenty years ago. 
Nevertheless, one meaningful statement can be extracted from the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the matter of Amidar v Hai. Justice Eliezer Rivlin held a 
dissenting opinion, and stated in paragraph 15 of his judgment:
I agree with my colleague Justice Y. Danziger in the matter of the arbitrator’s disease. 
I also believe that the stage in which the proceeding was at, and in fact at any stage, 
the arbitrator’s disease had no influence on her ability to decide the arbitration. 
Neither of the Applicant’s other claims constitute in my mind cause to intervene in 
the arbitration award.148 
Justice Rivlin opined that, even if the arbitrator had gone blind before reviewing 
the evidence, this would not have been enough of a reason to disqualify her—that a 
blind person could serve as an arbitrator throughout all phases of the proceedings, 
including the evidence-hearing phase, despite her inability to form an impression 
from the witnesses’ appearances. Therefore, it is nevertheless possible to extract an 
attentive statement on the issue at hand. 
One can wonder why the Supreme Court refrained from making a 
fundamental statement that could help to end or at least reduce and undermine 
the marginalisation of people with disabilities from the workforce and from 
key positions in Israeli society. Lack of awareness and recourse to the medical-
individual models as well as mercy-based attitudes towards disability produce 
judicial rulings of this kind, and propagate injustice and discrimination against 
this group. Most likely, until a deeper perceptual change occurs among the entire 
population, and among judges in particular, we will be forced to read between the 
lines of judgments and hold on to small signs of progress.
About eighteen months after the Supreme Court’s judgment, the case reached 
the courts for the fourth time. This time, Amidar petitioned the Tel Aviv District 
147  Formal legal recognition is defined as a significant phase in making a right more accessible. It 
is the establishing moment in which a higher legal authority, such as the Supreme Court or 
the legislator, declares the existence of a right or the scope of the application of the equality 
principle. See Morton J Horwitz, ‘Rights’ (1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties L 
Rev 393, 404.
148  CA Amidar (n 4) para 15 (Rivlin J) (emphasis added).
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Court with the claim that the arbitrator should be relieved from her duties because, 
during the renewed hearings relating to the question of alleged damage caused to 
Amidar, she was being unfair and biased towards them.149 Ironically, these claims go 
against the metaphor of blind justice as impartial and objective, raising once again 
the puzzle of the Blind Justice Paradox.  Even in this request, Amidar repeated its 
claims regarding the arbitrator’s inability to deliberate the case due to her blindness. 
Judge Yehuda Zaft refused to consider the question of ability once more since it had 
already been deliberated in previous judgments.150 Amidar appealed the decision 
to the Supreme Court, before Justice Elyakim Rubinstein.151 In his 2011 decision, 
Justice Rubenstein referred to the question of the arbitrator’s blindness in one 
paragraph at the end of his judgment:152
With regard to the Applicant’s claim which relies on the arbitrator’s visual impairment, 
I do not believe that it is worth commenting on, and best if it were not made at all, 
both in light of their dismissal in previous non-appealable decisions, and due to the 
arbitrator’s dignity, which we are all obligated to maintain and insist thereon. Let us 
imagine a situation in which, God forbid, one of us loses his eyesight, but not his 
mental capacity; would it be right to marginalise him, and push him aside? ‘That 
which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow’ said Hillel the Elder (Bablyonian 
Talmud, tractate Shabbat 31a). Our sages called a person who had lost his eyesight 
Sagi Nahor—great light—also in order to denote the virtues of a person who cannot 
see. Human history, from the Amora Rav Sheshet, to authors and creators of our 
time, is filled with examples of people with remarkable achievements despite their 
visual impairment. Thus, the great Egyptian author Taha Hussein, thus my former 
teacher at the Hebrew University, Prof. Haim Blanc, IDF disabled veteran from 1948 
and a blind man, gifted linguist; and more recently the governor of the State of New 
York; also a judge at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington 
is a blind man.153 I do not discount the technical difficulty of reviewing accounting 
documents etc. in the state of visual impairment, however it is Not in Heaven.154
Justice Rubenstein’s concrete referral to the question of the arbitrator’s blindness 
should be commended, since beforehand, the Supreme Court completely ignored 
149  DC (TA) 48355–06–11 Amidar—National Co for Immigrant Housing Ltd v Hai (7 September 
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr).
150  ibid para 7 (Zaft J).
151  CA Amidar 2011 (n 5).
152  ibid para 27.
153  Referring to Judge David Tatel. 
154  CA Amidar 2011 (n 5). 
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the issue. However, I believe that even this statement misses the great potential it 
could have had in describing the complexity of societal and legal attitudes towards 
blind persons and people with disabilities. In his judgment, Justice Rubenstein, like 
Judge Uri Goren, turns to the Hebrew Law as well as to his personal experiences 
and relationships in order to support his conclusion that ‘a person who has lost 
his eyesight should not be marginalised and pushed aside’. Surprisingly, Justice 
Rubenstein does not mention the Israeli Equal Rights Law at all, despite the fact 
that its underlying basic principle is recognition of ‘the value of each person 
created in the image [of God]’,155 or the issue of the prohibition of employment 
discrimination.156 The lack of legal framing shows, once again, how disability is 
often not thought of as a matter of rights, but rather as a general act of solidarity 
(at best) or an issue of mercy and kindness (at worst). Although Justice Rubenstein 
mentions the human dignity principle, he does not do so in order to invoke the 
prohibition on discrimination against a person for his difference, a principle he 
exemplifies through the rule: ‘[t]hat which is hateful to you, do not do to your 
fellow’. He reaches the desired and correct result in this case, but in a way that 
differs from the one proposed by this article. The problem with the approach taken 
by Justice Rubenstein is that it ignores the legal criteria and tools developed to 
improve the lives of people with disabilities and thus inherently limits the progress 
that can be made in this regard. 
The relatively new field of disability legal studies, to which this article 
contributes, is intended to deal with issues of precisely this kind. Its goal is to expose 
judges, lawyers and jurists to an alternative and progressive approach towards 
disability to be used when they deal with the numerous issues pertaining to the 
relations between people with disabilities and the legal sphere. I believe that Justice 
Rubenstein’s welcomed judgment indicates the need for creating awareness of 
alternative models of disability in legislation, legal rulings and theories pertaining 
to society and the law’s approach towards people with disabilities.157 I am hopeful 
that this article and those that follow will help to expand this awareness of the 
field among the courts, jurists, and the public. This way we will all benefit from a 
collection of precedents that apply the principles of the social model, which may 
significantly advance the rights of people with disabilities in many societies.
155  Section 1 (basic principle) to the Israeli Equal Rights Law (n 113).
156  ibid Section 8.
157  For a comprehensive and enthralling discussion regarding the importance of assimilating 
disability legal studies into the law faculties and the need to raise awareness of this field among 
jurists, see Kanter (n 10) 444–62. 
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5 Conclusion
The image of the blind Icon of Justice has been a fixture in the Western world for 
hundreds of years. Nonetheless, not much has been written about the complexities 
and obstacles that stand in the way of placing actual blind judges on the bench. 
Nor has the Icon been used to represent a social struggle regarding disability rights. 
The unique case of Amidar v Hai represents a missed opportunity to challenge 
the traditional social construction concerning the abilities of blind persons, and 
people with disabilities in general, especially regarding their capability to assume 
key roles in society. The Israeli Supreme Court justices’ way of dealing with the case 
before them, which avoided appealing to the Israeli Equal Rights Law and disability 
studies concepts, seems to be part of a wider trend I have addressed. The real-
life examples of blind judges performing meticulous and complex judicial work 
stand as testimony to their abilities and the possibility of incorporating people with 
disabilities into judicial systems. I hope this article will serve as another brick in 
building the field of disability legal studies, and a reference for legal professionals 
encountering legal issues involving blindness and disability.
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This paper examines how two federal-type polities, Canada and the European Union, have 
addressed the tension between international law’s fundamental value of State sovereignty and 
the constitutional value of federalism as it is professed in domestic settings. The paper argues 
that in both polities, federalism is still, to a large extent, put ‘on hold’ in the area of foreign 
affairs. Despite an increase in international activities by Canadian provinces since the 1960s, 
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controlled by the order of government recognised as a sovereign State. In contrast to Canada, 
however, the dominance of the sovereign State in the area of EU foreign affairs is liable to 
spill over into the EU’s domestic constitution. This observation calls for a recalibration of the 
federal balance in Europe’s foreign affairs constitution. Such a recalibration, it is suggested, 
should start by critically reappraising the use of the technique of mixity.
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1 Introduction
A tension exists between international law’s fundamental value of State sovereignty 
and the value of federalism as it is professed in domestic settings.1 Under domestic 
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constitutional law, government power is considered to be divided between orders 
of government.2 Under international law, by contrast, such divisions of power 
matter little. Thus, for example, in the context of international responsibility, the 
conduct of a State shall be considered an act of that State, ‘whatever position it 
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of 
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State’.3 Similarly, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, exceptions notwithstanding, ‘a 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty’.4
Traditionally, this tension between a constitutional regime of divided power 
and an international legal order by and for unitary, sovereign States was resolved 
through the construction of a dualist ‘wall’ or ‘veil’ between the domestic and the 
international realms, whereby federalism was considered to stop at the water’s edge. 
The United States is perhaps the best known example of this phenomenon, albeit 
not the only one.5 In that country, the federal Congress enjoys an implied power 
to implement treaties into domestic law, even if in a strictly domestic context the 
power to legislate on the subject of the treaty would come to the States.6 Similarly, 
the President and, to a lesser extent, Congress hold broad powers to conduct 
foreign affairs.7 The exercise of these powers can, under certain conditions, pre-
empt the exercise of powers by the States.8 The justification for the existence of such 
2  Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (OUP 1964) 10; and more recently, Daniel Halberstam, 
‘Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary’ in Gregory A Caldeira, Daniel Kelemen 
and Keith E Whittington (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 
142, defining federalism as ‘the coexistence within a compound polity of multiple levels of 
government each with constitutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational 
autonomy and jurisdictional authority’. 
3  ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (12 December 
2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, art 4(1).
4  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (Vienna Convention) art 27.
5  In the German context, see art 32(3) of the Basic Law, requiring prior federal consent to the 
conclusion of an international agreement.
6  See Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920); For a critique on the position of the Supreme Court 
in Missouri, see Justice Scalia’s concurrent opinion in Bond v United States, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). 
7  For the most sweeping expression of the exclusively federal character of the power over foreign 
affairs, see United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304 (1936).
8  See, seminally, Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429 (1968), in which the US Supreme Court 
invalidated a State statute for intruding in the federal realm of foreign affairs in which the 
President upheld an executive policy; For a recent example of the pre-emptive effect of 
the exercise of the President’s foreign affairs powers on State law, see American Insurance 
Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003).
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broad powers is often functional in nature: the specific context of foreign affairs 
requires the federal government to hold broader powers than it does in a strictly 
domestic context.9
As long as international law’s purpose was to allow the different members 
of the international community each to pursue their own conception of the good 
life,10 the restriction of federalism to the domestic realm was not considered 
overly problematic. When the predominant purpose of international law changed, 
however, from that of pursuing the peaceful co-existence of distinct political 
communities to that of pursuing what were considered shared goals and values, 
such as the defence of human rights, or the integration of the global economy,11 
the exclusion of foreign affairs from the application of domestic constitutional 
principles, including the principle of federalism, was put into question. To name 
but one example of such critiques, in a 1991 book, American international lawyer 
Thomas Franck wondered: ‘What is the point of a carefully calibrated system of 
divided and limited power if those who exercise authority can secure an automatic 
exemption from its strictures merely by playing the foreign-affairs trump’?12 
This paper examines how two federal-type polities, Canada and the European 
Union, have taken up Thomas Franck’s challenge as it pertains to the constitutional 
principle of federalism. How have Canadian and European constitutionalism 
responded to the tension between the domestic constitutional principle of 
federalism, on the one hand, and international law, on the other? 
This paper argues that in both polities, the domestic constitutional value 
of federalism is still, to a large extent, put ‘on hold’ in the area of foreign affairs. 
That is, in constitutional terms, the authority to act internationally is still to a 
significant extent held or controlled by the order of government recognised by 
the international community as a sovereign State. This is in spite of an increase in 
international activities by Canadian provinces since the 1960s, and the emergence 
of the European Union as a foreign policy actor of significance—however slow 
9  On this functional justification, see generally Peter Spiro, ‘Foreign Relations Federalism’ 
(1999) 70 U Colorado L Rev 1223, 1227–59; See also Ganesh Sitamaran and Ingrid Wuerth, 
‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’ (2015) 128 Harv L Rev 1897, 1906–18.
10  Sovereignty, in this sense, is based on an analogy with the individual in liberal thought. See, eg, 
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Future of Statehood’ (1991) 32 Harv Intern’l LJ 397, 404. 
11  See Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia UP 1964). 
12  Thomas Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign 
Affairs? (Princeton UP 1992) 5; See also Spiro (n 9).
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and hesitant this emergence may be.13 In contrast to Canada, however, where the 
dualist wall continues to stand strong, the dominance of the sovereign State in the 
area of EU foreign affairs is liable to spill over into the EU’s domestic legal order. 
This observation calls for a recalibration of the federal balance in Europe’s foreign 
affairs constitution. Such a recalibration, it is suggested, should start by critically 
reappraising the use of the technique of mixity.14
The paper is structured as follows. An introductory section shows that both 
Canada and the European Union are federal in nature. The second and third 
sections examine the structure of the foreign affairs constitution of both federal-
type polities. In a fourth section, a brief comparison will be made between both 
polities. The paper ends with an assessment of both federal-type polities’ foreign 
affairs constitution in light of the federalism principle. 
2 Federalism as equal autonomy in Canada and the European Union
Constitutionalism, both in Canada and the European Union, adheres to an 
understanding of federalism as equal autonomy. Kenneth Wheare defined 
federalism as the method of dividing government power so that the general and 
regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent.15 
Relying directly on Wheare, the Canadian Supreme Court stated in its 1998 Quebec 
Secession reference that:
In a federal system of government such as [Canada’s], political power is shared 
by two orders of government: the federal government on the one hand, and the 
provinces on the other. Each is assigned respective spheres of jurisdiction by the 
Constitution Act, 1867.16
13  For a critical appraisal, see Karen E Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World 
(3rd edn, Polity Press 2014) 208–10.
14  On the technique of concluding mixed agreements (ie, agreements to which both the EU and 
the Member States are parties), see Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Mixed 
Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart 2010). 
15  Wheare (n 2) 10. 
16  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385 [56]; On the 
central role of the Quebec Secession reference in Canadian federalism, see Robert S Schertzer, 
‘Judging the Nation: The Supreme Court of Canada, Federalism and Managing Diversity’ (PhD 
thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 2012) ch 4 <http://ethos.bl.uk/
OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.570991> accessed 4 January 2016.
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The Court continued: ‘The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the 
component parts of Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments 
to develop their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction’.17 More 
recently, the Supreme Court of Canada made similar statements in its Securities 
reference, where it held that: 
It is a fundamental principle of federalism that both federal and provincial powers 
must be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively 
eviscerates another. Rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance 
that allows both the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act 
effectively in their respective spheres.18
These statements point to a conception of the constitutional structure of Canada as 
consisting of two orders of government that stand in a relation of equal autonomy. 
This conception has a long standing in Canada. In the 1892 Maritime Bank case, 
Lord Watson, speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
(the Privy Council) held: 
The object of the [Constitution Act 1867] was neither to weld the provinces into 
one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to central authority, but to create 
a federal government in which they should all be represented, entrusted with the 
exclusive administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each 
province retaining its own independence and autonomy.19 
Differences of opinion persist with regards to the origins and nature of the 
constitutional ties that bind the federal and provincial governments in Canada.20 
Beyond contestation, however, is that any interpretation of Canada’s constitution 
17  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385 [58].
18  Reference re Securities Act [2011] 3 SCR 837, 339, (2011) DLR (4th) 577 [7]. 
19  Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v The Receiver General of New Brunswick (Canada) 
[1892] AC 437, 441; See also Hodge v The Queen [1883] 9 AC 117, in which the Privy Council 
confirmed the equal status of the provincial and federal legislatures.
20  Notable members of the Privy Council—in particular Lord Haldane—adhered to a compact 
theory of Canadian federalism. See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the 
Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto UP 2002) 161–62; The Supreme Court rejected this 
theory in Re Resolution to amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753, 803; (1981) 120 DLR 
(3d) 385, 435; See also Wade Wright, ‘Beyond Umpire and Arbiter: Courts as Facilitators of 
Intergovernmental Dialogue in Division of Powers Cases in Canada’ (PhD thesis, Columbia 
University 2014) 328–29 <http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:173873> 
accessed 31 August 2015, distinguishing between a provincial equality perspective, a pan-
Canadian perspective, and a multinational perspective.
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must take place within the confines of a normative theory in which provincial and 
federal governments stand in a relationship of equal autonomy. 
Turning to Europe, in its seminal 1963 Van Gend & Loos judgment, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that:
The [Union] constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.21
In Costa v Enel, the Court dropped the reference to international law, referring 
to EU law instead as a ‘body of law’ and an ‘independent source of law’.22 In 
subsequent decades, the Court of Justice continued on the path of what many 
have described as one of a ‘constitutionalisation’ of the EU legal order and 
institutional structure, allowing the late Eric Stein to characterise early 1980s 
European Economic Community law as ‘a constitutional framework for a federal-
type structure in Europe’.23 At around the same time as the German Constitutional 
Court expressed its claim to ultimate authority in its 1992 Maastricht ruling,24 
academic commentators undertook efforts to pass ‘beyond the sovereign state’ and 
develop a constitutional theory for the European Union in which the Union and 
Member State legal orders were conceived of as co-equal in character.25 Sir Neil 
MacCormick was arguably the first scholar of EU law to articulate this idea. In a 
1993 article, he raised the following question: 
Can we think of a world in which our normative existence and our practical life 
are anchored in, or related to, a variety of institutional systems, each of which has 
validity or operation in relation to some range of concerns, none of which is absolute 
over all the others, and all of which, for most purposes, can operate without serious 
mutual conflict in areas of overlap?26
21  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, para 12.
22  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593–94.
23  Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1, 
1; The Les Verts judgment plays an important symbolic role in this narrative, as it contains the 
first reference to the EU Treaties as a ‘constitutional charter’. See Case 294/83 Parti écologiste 
‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. 
24  BVerfGE 89, 155 (12 October 1993) 2 BvR 2134/92, 2159/92, para 165.
25  Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 MLR 1.
26  ibid 17.
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Constitutional pluralism, as the theory became known, has become the dominant 
theory of European integration within EU legal circles, replacing the paradigm 
of classical constitutionalism described in the above.27 EU constitutionalism 
gives expression to this theory of constitutional pluralism by combining the 
abovementioned claim to autonomy—the ‘new legal order’ claim—with a 
commitment towards protecting the national, including the constitutional, identity 
of the Member States.28
It is suggested that, despite differences in the conceptual structure of both 
compound polities, what unites both Canada and the European Union is an 
adherence to a constitutional principle of federalism understood as the pursuit 
of equal autonomy between both orders of government that together constitute a 
compound polity.29 In Canada, the federalism principle is expressed primarily at 
a hermeneutical level, ie, in the interpretation given to the division of legislative 
competences laid down in Canada’s written constitution. In the EU, by contrast, 
it is expressed at a systemic level, ie, in the process of mutual accommodation 
between the EU and Member State legal orders. Regardless of these differences, 
in both polities, the best possible interpretation of the constitutional structure is 
one in which a respect for the equal autonomy of both levels of government plays 
a prominent role. In the remainder of this paper, this understanding of federalism 
as equal autonomy will act, to paraphrase Canada’s Supreme Court, as the ‘lodestar’ 
by which the analysis of Canada and the EU’s foreign affairs constitution will be 
guided.30
27  For a recent discussion of the different strands in constitutional pluralist thought, see Jan 
Komárek and Matej Avbelj (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 
(Hart 2012); Classical constitutionalism refers to what Mattias Kumm referred to as the 
‘legalist monist’ conception of the structure of the EU polity. See Mattias Kumm, ‘Rethinking 
Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej 
Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 
(Hart 2012) 39–66, 43–47.
28  Maastricht Treaty [1992] OJ C191/1 (TEU) art 4(2); On a role for this provision as a federalism 
safeguard in the EU, see François-Xavier Millet, ‘National Constitutional Identity as a 
Safeguard of Federalism in Europe’ (2012) EUI Working Paper 2012/06.
29  The similarities between the concept of federalism in the Anglo-American tradition and that of 
constitutional pluralism were noted in Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: 
The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP 2009) 13–74.
30  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385 [56]: ‘In 
interpreting our Constitution, the courts have always been concerned with the federalism 
principle, inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements, which has from the 
beginning been the lodestar by which the courts have been guided’.
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3 Federalism and foreign affairs in Canada
How did Canadian constitutionalism address the challenge posed by the tension 
between the domestic principle of federalism and the international legal principle 
of sovereignty? As argued by a federal government lawyer:
The Constitution of Canada is a hybrid plant if ever there was one, deeply rooted 
in the soil of the British tradition of unwritten principles and conventions, but 
with most of its prominent offshoots—a written document, a federal provincial 
distribution of powers, an entrenched Charter, legal amending procedures, judicial 
review—grafted from the American genus and species.31 
Absent any provisions on the subject of foreign affairs in Canada’s written 
constitutional document—the Constitution Act 1867—it was the British 
constitutional tradition of unwritten principles and conventions that Canadian 
constitutionalism turned to in search of materials with which to craft a Canadian 
foreign affairs constitution.32 
Looming large in British constitutional thought on the subject of foreign 
affairs were two notions: that of dualism and that of the royal prerogative. At a 
basic level, dualism means that the international and domestic legal orders are 
considered conceptually distinct.33 As a consequence of this separation, the validity 
of a domestic legal norm cannot be derived from an international legal norm. 
Validity within both legal orders must be derived from each legal order’s rule of 
recognition. In practice, this means that for a treaty to have legal effect within 
domestic law, a form of normative action is required. In the United Kingdom, such 
action traditionally takes the form of a legislative act. Lord Atkin expressed this 
position well in the 1937 Labour Conventions case, where he held that ‘within the 
British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an 
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of 
31  Warren J Newman, ‘Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural Constitution’ 
(Conference on Emerging Issues in Canadian Public Law, Ottawa, May 2015) 20–21.
32  See, however, s 132 of the Constitution Act 1867, empowering the federal Parliament to 
implement Imperial treaty obligations affecting Canada; The extension of the scope of this 
provision to include Canadian treaty obligations was rejected in the Labour Conventions 
case; See Attorney General of Canada v Attorney General of Ontario [1937] AC 326 (Labour 
Conventions).
33  In contrast to monism, according to which domestic and international law form a single legal 
order. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange 2003) 403–04.
314 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Thomas Verellen
the existing domestic law, requires legislative action’.34 The Labour Conventions case 
counts as a precedent both in the United Kingdom and in Canada. It confirmed 
the dualist orientation of Canada’s foreign affairs constitution. As in the United 
Kingdom, a treaty cannot, in and by itself, be binding within Canadian law.
Next to dualism, the royal prerogative is the other central concept of the 
United Kingdom’s foreign affairs constitution. In the United Kingdom, the concept 
operates as the constitutional foundation for the government’s authority over 
foreign affairs.35 The concept has a long pedigree.36 Albert Venn Dicey defined 
the prerogative as the ‘residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’.37 Public authority over foreign 
affairs was generally understood as being part of the royal prerogative.38 The royal 
prerogative encompasses all actions traditionally understood as flowing from a 
polity’s status as a sovereign State. This includes the power to make treaties (ius 
tractati) and the power to send and receive ambassadors and consuls abroad (ius 
legationis).39
The transplantation of concepts of British constitutionalism to Canadian 
soil raised questions regarding these concepts’ compatibility with Canada’s 
federal architecture. Two such questions are worth exploring: (i) Who was to be 
constitutionally empowered to exercise the foreign affairs prerogative: the federal 
Governor General (and thus in practice the federal government) and/or the 
34  Labour Conventions [1937] AC 326, 347; For a more recent affirmation of this principle, see 
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817, (1999) 174 DLR 
(4th) 193 [69], where Justice L’Heureux-Dubé held that ‘[i]nternational treaties and conventions 
are not part of Canadian law unless they have been implemented by statute’.
35  See Ministry of Justice (UK), The Governance of Britain (Cm 7170, 2007) 16, describing the 
power to make treaties as a ‘prerogative executive power’.
36  For an overview of the notion’s historical origins and its historical role in the area of foreign 
affairs, see Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (CUP 2014) 111–258.
37  AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, Macmillan 1915) 
424. 
38  McLachlan (n 36) 117; For a confirmation of this position in the Canadian context, see Canada 
(Prime Minister) v Khadr [2010] 1 SCR 44 [35]: ‘The prerogative power over foreign affairs 
has not been displaced by s 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Act (…) and continues to be exercised by the federal government. The Crown prerogative in 
foreign affairs includes the making of representations to a foreign government’.
39  Blackstone considered the following powers as falling within the scope of the foreign affairs 
prerogative: the power to appoint and to receive ambassadors, to make treaties with foreign 
states, to make war and peace, to exact reprisals for injury to his subjects by foreign states and 
to grant safe conduct for foreigners entering the nation. See McLachlan (n 36) 116, citing Bl 
Comm. 
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provincial lieutenant governors (and thus in practice the provincial governments)? 
(ii) Which legislatures would be constitutionally empowered to implement treaties 
in Canadian law: the federal and/or the provincial legislatures?
3.1 The prerogative and Canada’s federal architecture
As with other concepts and principles originally developed in a British context, 
questions were raised regarding the prerogative’s relation to Canada’s federal 
architecture. Canadian courts were presented with this challenge in the 
abovementioned Labour Conventions case. At issue was the constitutionality of 
federal legislation aimed at implementing a number of conventions adopted in the 
context of the International Labour Organization (ILO). The conventions addressed 
issues of labour law. As such, they touched on provincial legislative authority over 
property and civil rights in the province.40 
The Ontario government launched a constitutional challenge against the 
federal implementing legislation. Before the Supreme Court of Canada and 
ultimately the London-based Privy Council, the Ontario government argued that it, 
too, possessed the constitutional authority to adopt the involved ILO conventions.41 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Chief Justice Duff rejected Ontario’s plea on 
behalf of a 3–2 majority. He responded by stating that: 
As a result of the constitutional development of the last thirty years (and more 
particularly of the last twenty years) Canada has acquired the status of an 
international unit, that is to say, she has been recognized by His Majesty the King, 
by the other nations of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and by the nations 
40  Constitution Act 1867 s 92(13). The federal government accepted before the Privy Council 
that in a strictly domestic context, the federal Parliament would not have had the legislative 
competence to adopt the contested statutes.
41  The Ontario Government argued that ‘[t]here are no grounds whatever for saying that the 
parties to advise His Majesty in matters relating to the jurisdiction of the Provinces have in 
some way come to the Dominion Ministers. The Province has the right to advise the Crown 
in matters where its legislative powers apply. Ontario has the right to enter into an agreement 
with another part of the British Empire or with a foreign State’. Bernier (n 1) 52, citing Labour 
Conventions [1937] AC 326.
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of the world, as possessing a status enabling her to enter into, on her own behalf, 
international arrangements, and to incur obligations under such arrangements.42 
Regarding the nature of that competence, Duff CJ begged the question: ‘That this 
authority is exclusive would seem to follow inevitably from the circumstances 
that the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces do not in any manner represent 
His Majesty in external affairs’.43 The Privy Council did not consider it necessary 
to rule on the question of the impact of the federalism principle on the royal 
prerogative, although its ruling did appear to rely on the premise that only the 
federal government could exercise the royal prerogative to make treaties.44
The issue of the locus and possible division of the power over foreign affairs 
has been, and continues to be, a thorny one in Canada. It became a focal point 
for supporters of Quebec autonomy during that province’s Quiet Revolution45 and 
up until today some commentators defend the position that the foreign affairs 
prerogative can be exercised also by the provincial lieutenant governors (and thus 
by the provincial governments).46 In addition, the government of Quebec itself 
continues to affirm, as former liberal premier Jean Charest held, that ‘[c]e qui est 
de compétence québécoise chez nous est de compétence québécoise partout!’—a 
proposition repeated by Quebec’s current international relations minister as 
recently as the spring of 2015.47 Despite these claims, Canadian courts nonetheless 
42  Reference re legislative jurisdiction of Parliament of Canada to enact the Minimum Wages Act 
[1936] SCR 461, 462; (1936) 3 DLR 673; note that the Privy Council’s Labour Conventions 
reference is the judgment in appeal against the Supreme Court of Canada’s reference mentioned 
here.
43  ibid.
44  In this sense, see Stéphane Beaulac, ‘The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle Province: Quebec’s 
Gerin-Lajoie Statement’ (2012) 35 Dalhousie LJ 237, 250–52.
45  See, eg, the plea for a Quebec treaty-making power in JY Morin, ‘La personnalité internationale 
du Québec’ (1984) 1 Revue Québécoise de Droit International 163; See also the comparative 
analysis made nearly twenty years prior to this, before assuming a prominent role in the 
Quebec provincial government: JY Morin, ‘La conclusion d’accords internationaux par les 
provinces canadiennes à la lumière du droit comparé’ (1965) 3 Can YIL 127. 
46  See generally Hugo Cyr, Canadian Federalism and Treaty Powers: Organic Constitutionalism at 
Work (Peter Lang 2009); Gibran van Ert, ‘The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements with 
Foreign Governments’ (2001) 42 Les Cahiers de Droit 1093.
47  Christian Dufour, ‘La doctrine Gérin-Lajoie pour toujours’ Journal de Montreal (Montreal, 
29 March 2015) <http://service.vigile.quebec/La-doctrine-Gerin-Lajoie-pour> accessed 23 
August 2015.
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continue to consider the foreign affairs prerogative a prerogative of the federal 
government only.48
3.2 Treaty implementation and Canada’s federal architecture
Transplanting both dualism and the royal prerogative to Canadian soil raised 
yet another federalism question. Which Canadian legislature is constitutionally 
empowered to implement treaty obligations incurred by the federal government? In 
Australia, the Commonwealth Constitution explicitly allocates legislative competence 
over external affairs to the Commonwealth Parliament.49 As mentioned, in the 
United States, the Supreme Court held in Missouri v Holland that Congressional 
power to implement treaties is a necessary and proper means of effectuating a treaty.50 
In Canada, by contrast, a similar general treaty-implementing power was rejected. In 
the same Labour Conventions case, Lord Atkin ruled that:
For the purposes of (…) the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion 
and the Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The distribution 
is based on classes of subjects: and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects 
so will the legislative power of performing it be ascertained.51 
Put differently, the treaty origins of a statute do not affect the allocation of legislative 
competences in Canada; this allocation depends on substantive classes of subjects, 
not on the origins (domestic or international) or the type of instrument used.52 The 
48  For a relatively recent confirmation of the position by the Quebec Court of Appeal, see UL 
Canada Inc v Québec (A-G) (2003) 234 DLR (4th) 398 [76] (Nuss JA): ‘As a matter of International 
Law, a country is bound by a treaty from the moment it is ratified. In Canada, the Governor 
General has the Constitutional authority to ratify treaties’; Note that the Supreme Court of 
Canada itself has not revisited the issue since the remarks by Chief Justice Duff uttered in 1936. 
It did, however, on several occasions raise the possibility of overturning the Labour Conventions 
judgment. See, eg, MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd [1977] 2 SCR 134 [168ff] (Laskin CJ). Chief 
Justice Bora Laskin’s opposition to Labour Conventions was well-known; See Bora Laskin, ‘Some 
International Legal Aspects of Federalism: The Experience of Canada’ in David Currie (ed), 
Federalism and the New Nations of Africa (Chicago UP 1964) 396. 
49  Australian Constitution s 51 (xxix).
50  Missouri v Holland (n 6). 
51  Labour Conventions [1937] AC 326, 351.
52  Note that the division of executive powers follows that of legislative powers in Canada. See 
The Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v The King (1916) 1 AC 566, 579: ‘The 
[Constitution Act 1867] has made a distribution between the Dominion and the provinces 
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refusal to make dependent the scope of the federal Parliament’s legislative authority 
on the exercise of the federal government’s treaty-making power sits well with the 
dualist philosophy underpinning Canada’s foreign affairs constitution. The power 
to make international legal commitments remains separate from the power to 
change Canadian law. The dualist wall remains impermeable. 
The refusal to extend the federal Parliament’s legislative powers to keep 
pace with the federal government’s extended executive powers in the area of 
foreign affairs is an important feature of Canada’s foreign affairs constitution, 
setting Canada apart from federations such as Australia and the United States. 
This refusal has certain federalism repercussions. If it is beyond doubt that a 
federally concluded treaty will require provincial legislative implementation, then 
the federal government is well advised to ensure provincial ‘buy in’ at the level 
of the negotiation of that treaty. Such is the case, for instance, with the Canada-
European Union trade agreement. Pressured in this direction by the European 
Union, Canadian provinces will implement the provisions of the treaty that touch 
on provincial heads of competence into domestic Canadian law. As a consequence, 
the federal government accepted a provincial role in the treaty negotiations.53
However, the impact of the Labour Conventions principle on the overall 
federal balance in Canada should not be overstated. The principle does not 
constitutionally entrench a role for the provincial governments in the federal 
treaty-making process.54 On many occasions, the federal Parliament will implement 
treaties, even if some provisions could be understood as touching on provincial 
which extends not only to legislative but to executive authority (…) the distribution under the 
new grant of executive authority in substance follows the distribution under the new grant of 
legislative powers’.
53  Provinces have been making active use of the political leverage that they have been offered. In 
early 2015, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador threatened not to implement the EU–
Canada trade deal if it did not obtain federal funds in compensation for the potential job losses 
in the fisheries sector. See ‘CETA Negotiations with Ottawa Suspended over Fisheries Fund, 
NL Says’ CBC News (19 January 2015) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-
labrador/ceta-negotiations-with-ottawa-suspended-over-fisheries-fund-n-l-says-1.2917699> 
accessed 14 August 2015.
54  The provincial premiers have requested a formalisation of a provincial role in federal treaty 
negotiations. To our knowledge, the federal government has not responded to this request. See 
Government of New Brunswick, ‘Premiers Strengthen Trade’ Communications New Brunswick 
(10 August 2007) <http://www.gnb.ca/cnb/news/iga/2007e1017ig.htm> accessed 14 August 
2015.
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heads of competence.55 This observation does not come as a surprise considering 
the structure of domestic federalism in Canada. The recognition of jurisdictional 
overlap is coupled with a tolerance of Canadian courts towards the operability of 
legislation—federal or provincial—that touches on heads of power allocated to the 
other level of government.56 Such tolerance also exists in the context of foreign 
affairs, where one can expect federal implementing legislation in pith and substance 
in relation to a matter falling within a federal class of subjects to be considered 
intra vires the federal Parliament.
In summary, as holds true for Canada’s domestic constitution, Canada’s 
foreign affairs constitution can be understood as being ‘similar in principle to 
that of the United Kingdom’ albeit adapted to Canada’s federal architecture. On 
the one hand, as in the United Kingdom, external sovereignty in Canada remains 
indivisible. Canada thus assimilates itself to the ideal-type of a unitary, sovereign 
State. On the other hand, the abovementioned dualist wall protects the legislative 
powers Canada’s written constitution has allocated to the federal and provincial 
legislatures. This arrangement can be understood as a compromise between the 
need to ensure a smooth integration in the international legal order and the need 
to protect Canada’s federal architecture. 
55  It was uncertain, for instance, whether the federal Parliament had the constitutional authority 
to implement the entire North American Free Trade Agreement. Provincial governments had 
threatened to launch a constitutional challenge against the federal implementing legislation, 
but in the end refrained from doing so. On this subject, see H Scott Fairley, ‘Foreign Affairs 
and the Canadian Constitution’ (Biennial Conference of the International Law Association, 
Toronto, June 2006) <http://www.ila2006.org/fairley.pdf> accessed 5 January 2016.
56  On the ‘flexible’ nature of Canadian federalism, see Ontario (A-G) v OPSEU [1987] 2 SCR 
2, 27; 41 DLR (4th) 1, 11 (Dickson CJ): ‘The history of Canadian constitutional law has been 
to allow for a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial 
powers. It is true that doctrines like interjurisdictional and Crown immunity and concepts 
like “watertight compartments” qualify the extent of that interplay. But it must be recognized 
that these doctrines and concepts have not been the dominant tide of constitutional doctrines; 
rather they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and substance, the aspect 
doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to concurrency and paramountcy 
issues’; See also Bruce Ryder, ‘The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian 
Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and the First Nations’ (1991) 36 McGill LJ 
308, 324–26.
320 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Thomas Verellen
3.3 Principle and pragmatism in Canadian foreign affairs federalism
How to square, however, the picture of an impermeable dualist ‘wall’ between the 
internal and the external realms with the empirical observation that Canadian 
provinces do develop certain forms of international action—actions which 
include at least in one province the conclusion of agreements with third country 
governments that this province considers to be legally binding?57 
It is suggested that a strict reading of the scope of the foreign affairs 
prerogative precludes Canadian provinces from making agreements that can be 
considered treaties within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties—treaty-making, it was mentioned above, being a central component of 
the foreign affairs prerogative. However, Canadian constitutionalism has opted for 
a pragmatic reading of the scope of the foreign affairs power that accommodates, if 
only partially, provincial claims to hold an independent treaty-making power. This 
pragmatic interpretation of the prerogative was suggested by Eward McWhinney 
in a 1969 contribution. This was shortly after the showdown between the federal 
and Quebec governments over the conclusion of an agreement between France and 
Quebec of which both parties considered to constitute a treaty under international 
law. McWhinney pleaded for:
enlisting the virtues of constitutional self-restraint and moderation and of not 
escalating into a federal-provincial constitutional crisis over foreign affairs and the 
treaty power, before one is sure that, in substance, it really is ‘foreign affairs’ or even 
‘treaties’ that are involved [and not] simply a normal question of provincial legislative 
competence involving, at the same time, some trans-national aspects.58 
57  The government of Quebec regularly concludes agreements with third countries on subjects 
covering the entire scope of its domestic competences. For an overview, see the database on 
the website of the Quebec International Relations ministry at <http://www.mrif.gouv.qc.ca/
en/Ententes-et-Engagements/Ententes-internationales> accessed 29 August 2015; It should be 
noted that Quebec is not alone in undertaking international activities. For an early analysis, 
see Ronald G Atkey, ‘The Role of the Provinces in International Affairs’ (1970) 26 Intern’l 
J 249, 261; For a more recent contribution focussing on the area of international trade, see 
Christopher Kukucha, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy (UBC Press 2008). 
58  Edward McWhinney, ‘Canadian Federalism, and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power: The 
Impact of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution”’ [1969] Can YB Int’l L 3, 10.
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It would appear that the federal government has taken up McWhinney’s advice and 
embraced a pragmatic conception of the scope of the foreign affairs prerogative 
that leaves room for provincial international action without international legal 
consequences. While maintaining an uncompromising position at the level of 
principle,59 the federal government, to our knowledge, has not undertaken any 
legal challenges against provincial practices of making agreements with third 
country governments. 
This arrangement can perhaps best be understood as an example of a 
constitutional abeyance. A constitutional abeyance, Michael Foley explains, 
is ‘a form of tacit and instinctive agreement to condone, and even cultivate, 
constitutional ambiguity as an acceptable strategy for resolving conflict’.60 
Constitutional abeyances are only effective, however, in so far as disagreements 
over substance remain within certain limits. If and when genuine disagreement 
arises, constitutional questions left unanswered will most likely re-emerge. This 
would appear to be the case in Canada as well.61 If a Canadian province would 
desire to make an agreement with a third country government that would run 
counter to federal law or policy, it is to be expected that the federal government 
of Canada will attempt to prevent that province from doing so. The constitutional 
argument that foreign affairs remain federal affairs could, in such a situation, be 
used as another means of exercising leverage. 
In summary, it is suggested that Canadian constitutionalism couples 
principle with pragmatism. The federal government holds an exclusive power to 
bind Canada under international law. It applies this power pragmatically, which 
allows provincial governments to make certain agreements with third countries. 
In case of disagreement between the federal and provincial governments, however, 
the federal government will be able to revert back to a more principled position, 
59  The position of the federal government in this debate has been articulated in Paul Martin, 
Federalism and International Relations (The Queen’s Printer 1968) 15–16, arguing that the 
treaty-making power is part of the federal royal prerogative, and that the power to exercise the 
prerogative has never been delegated to the provincial lieutenant-governors. As confirmed to 
the author in an interview, this white paper remains government policy today.
60  Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, ‘Abeyances’ and Political Temperament in the 
Maintenance of Government (Routledge 2011) xi.
61  See Can Erk and Alain-G Gagnon, ‘Constitutional Ambiguity and Federal Trust: Codification 
of Federalism in Canada, Spain and Belgium’ (2000) 10 Regional & Federal Studies 92, 
suggesting that ambiguity only works as a strategy of pacification if sufficient trust exists 
between orders of government.
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precluding the provincial government from making the contested agreement. In the 
final analysis, therefore, it is argued that Canada’s dualist wall stands strong. As far 
as the power to make commitments under international law is concerned, Canada 
presents itself to the outside world as a unitary, sovereign State. Constitutional 
restrictions on the exercise of the federal foreign affairs prerogative exist,62 but 
these do not include restrictions related to Canada’s federal architecture. 
4 Federalism and foreign affairs in the European Union
How did European constitutionalism address the challenge posed by the tension 
between the domestic principle of federalism and the international legal principle 
of sovereignty? As was the case with Canada’s written constitution, the Treaty of 
Rome had little to say on the subject of foreign affairs. Only two treaty provisions 
empowered the then European Economic Communities to make treaties with 
third countries: the provision on the common commercial policy and that on the 
conclusion of association agreements.63 In the absence of a more elaborate written 
constitutional framework, the EU’s foreign affairs constitution was shrouded 
in mystery.64 How, then, did European constitutionalism address the tension 
between the domestic constitutional value of federalism—as expressed in the 
EU’s constitutional theory of constitutional pluralism—and international law’s 
fundamental value of State sovereignty?
European constitutionalism addressed this challenge in two phases. In a 
first phase, the ‘conceptual-federalist phase’,65 federalism conflicts were avoided 
62  See Khadr [2010] 1 SCR 44 [36].
63  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [1957] Not published [the EEC 
Treaty or Treaty of Rome], respectively, arts 113, 131. 
64  Different schools had different views on the nature of the EU foreign affairs constitution. For 
a comparison, see the report of the 1969 conference held at the University of Liège, where 
Pierre Pescatore and Rolando Quadri defended opposing theories on the international legal 
personality of the Union. See Michel Melchior (ed), Les Relations Extérieures de La Communauté 
Européenne Unifiée. Actes Du Troisième Colloque Sur La Fusion Des Communautés Européennes 
Organisé à Liège Les 25, 26 et 27 Octobre 1967 (Institut d’études juridiques européennes de la 
Faculté de droit de l’Université de Liège 1969) 41–75 and 77–117.
65  Michel Waelbroeck introduced the distinction between competing conceptions of the EU’s 
early foreign affairs constitution as a distinction between a ‘conceptual-federalist’ and a 
‘pragmatic’ approach in M Waelbroeck, ‘The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-Emption—
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and a smooth integration in the international legal order was facilitated through 
a strategy of a progressive ‘exclusivisation’ of Union external competences. In 
this normative vision, external sovereignty over areas covered by the European 
integration process—in particular areas (to be) covered by the so-called ‘common 
policies’—would gradually be ‘transferred’ to the Union level of government.66 At 
least within those areas affected by the integration process, the Union institutions 
would be the holders of an external sovereignty not unlike that of the Union’s treaty 
partners. Federalism was deemed protected sufficiently by the Member States’ 
presence in the Council. 
In a second phase, the ‘pragmatic’ phase, European constitutionalism 
abandoned this strategy of a progressive exclusivisation and instead pursued a 
strategy of a generalisation of shared competence in the foreign affairs area, coupled 
with a normative push towards joint action by the Union and the Member States. 
Member States and the Union institutions are invited to act collectively without the 
division of competences between both levels of government being clearly defined. 
In doing so, the Member States and the Union merge their external sovereignties 
so as to match the external sovereignty of their treaty partners. Unclear, however, 
is how the federalism principle is to fit into this arrangement. The Court of Justice 
appears willing to carve out a space in which federalism can be expressed at the level 
of the decision-making processes. As will be discussed, however, these efforts will 
remain unsatisfactory as long as it remains possible for Member States to become a 
party to an international agreement the EU could arguably conclude independently, 
thereby turning a proposed EU-only agreement into a mixed agreement.
Consent and Re-Delegation’ in Terrance Sandalow and Eric Stein (eds), Courts and Free 
Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe (OUP 1982) 551–52. Waelbroeck was 
right in suggesting that both conceptions operated at the same time. It is suggested, however, 
that the history of the EU’s foreign affairs constitution can be read as one of a gradual move 
from one conception to the other, whereby the ‘pragmatic’ conception gradually overtook 
the ‘conceptual-federalist’ reading as the dominant understanding of the structure of the EU’s 
foreign affairs constitution. 
66  It should be recalled from the outset that even in this ambitious understanding of the scope 
of the Union’s external competences, it was not envisaged that the Union would replace the 
Member States entirely at the international level. As the Court of Justice already held in Case 
26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, sovereignty was only transferred ‘within limited fields’.
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4.1 The conceptual-federalist phase: transferring external sovereignty to 
the Union
The Court of Justice first pronounced itself on the subject of foreign affairs in the 
1971 ERTA judgment.67 In what was incidentally the first inter-institutional dispute 
brought before the Court of Justice,68 the Commission requested that the Court 
annul Council proceedings regarding the negotiation and conclusion by the Member 
States of an international agreement on road transport. In the Commission’s view, 
if adopted, the international agreement would come into conflict with an existing 
Union regulation.69 The Commission requested that the Court rule that ‘where and 
to the extent to which the [Union] actually laid down such regulations, Member 
States lose their authority to legislate at the same level, and can only be called upon 
to take such measures as may be necessary to implement the [Union] provisions’.70 
The Council, followed by Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe, contested 
the Commission’s argument. The Council argued instead that, absent an express 
attribution of powers to the Union, the Union did not hold any form of external 
competence, let alone an exclusive one. In its judgment of 31 March 1971, the 
Court followed the Commission as far as the question of principle was concerned. 
In particular, it ruled that:
Each time the [Union], with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged 
by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these 
may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even 
collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules.71
The ERTA judgment pursued a double objective. On the one hand, from a foreign 
affairs perspective, the ERTA or ‘pre-emption’ doctrine can be understood as an 
67  Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263 (ERTA).
68  ibid para 284, Opinion of AG de Lamothe.
69  ibid para 270. 
70  ibid.
71  ERTA [1971] ECR 263, 274, para 17. As far-reaching as the Court’s argument appears to be, 
it did not benefit the Commission in that particular case. As the origins and a considerable 
amount of the work had been carried out before powers over transport had been transferred 
to the Union, the Court did allow the Member States to become Party to the road transport 
agreement, provided they acted throughout the treaty-making procedure in the interest of the 
Union: paras 84–90. 
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expression of a normative vision of a gradual eclipsing of the Member States from the 
international arena through the adoption of internal Union legislation.72 The Court 
perhaps, and the Commission quite certainly,73 understood the establishment and 
gradual expansion of exclusive Union competence as the preferred constitutional 
answer to the challenge of ‘fitting’ into an international legal order made by and for 
sovereign States. By replacing the Member States at the international level in the 
areas concerned by the integration process, the Union would hold the attributes of 
external sovereignty. Federalism questions would not affect the Union’s ability to 
‘speak with one voice’ internationally. The Union would be on an equal footing with 
its treaty partners.
On the other hand, from a domestic federalism perspective, the ERTA 
judgment aimed to ensure that the Member States would not be able to undo by 
external means that which they had agreed to internally. As the Court held: 
These [external Union] powers exclude the possibility of concurrent powers on the 
part of Member States, since any steps taken outside the framework of the [Union] 
institutions would be incompatible with the unity of the Common Market and the 
uniform application of [Union] law.74
In other words, by rendering exclusive external competence over areas within 
which domestic common rules had already been adopted, the Member States would 
not be in a position to affect, let alone undo, domestic EU norms by concluding 
international agreements with third countries.75 In this sense, the Court of Justice 
aimed to tackle a problem that mirrors the one presented to the Privy Council 
in Labour Conventions: in both cases, one level of government aimed to encroach 
on the competences of the other level of government through the exercise of the 
72  Pierre Pescatore, Le droit de l’intégration: émergence d’un phénomène nouveau dans les relations 
internationales selon l’expérience des Communautés Européennes (Bruylant 2005) 44, arguing 
that in ERTA the Court of Justice confirmed a necessary link between the internal process of 
unification and the right to represent the Community on the international stage.
73  On the role of the European Commission’s legal service in the development of an autonomous 
legal order more generally, see generally Julie Bailleux, ‘Michel Gaudet, a Law Entrepreneur: 
The Role of the Legal Service of the European Executives in the Invention of EC Law and the 
Birth of the Common Market Law Review’ (2013) CML Rev 359.
74  ERTA [1971] ECR 263, para 32.
75  Note that in 1971 it was not at all clear whether the primacy principle could apply to 
international action undertaken by the Member States. See Marise Cremona, ‘The Doctrine of 
Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External Relations of the European 
Community’ (1982) 2 OJLS 393, 397–98. 
326 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Thomas Verellen
treaty-making power.76 The fundamental difference between the two cases was 
that the federalism question in Canada arose at the level of the implementation of 
treaties, while in the EU it arose at the level of their conclusion.77 
Similar observations can be made in relation to those areas now considered 
as falling within the scope of the Union’s so-called a priori exclusive competence.78 
In the Treaty of Rome, the nature of the common commercial policy—to take 
the best-known example of this type of competence—was left undefined.79 The 
Court of Justice derived the exclusive character of the common commercial policy 
competence from what it considered its very nature or ‘essence’ as a policy that did 
not allow for concurrent Member State action. In Opinion 1/75, in particular, the 
Court of Justice held that the common commercial policy:
is conceived (…) in the context of the operation of the Common Market, for the 
defence of the common interests of the [Union], within which the particular interests 
of the Member States must endeavour to adapt to each other (…) Quite clearly, 
however, this conception is incompatible with the freedom to which the Member 
States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent power, so as to ensure that their own 
76  For a similar observation in the EU-US context, see Eric Stein and Louis Henkin, ‘Towards 
a European Polity? The European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the United 
States Constitution’ in M Cappelletti, M Seccombe and J Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law. 
Book 3: Forces and Potential for a European Identity (de Gruyter 1986) 43, pointing out that the 
ruling in ERTA could be seen as the ‘exact reverse’ of that in Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 
(1920). 
77  In contrast to Canadian constitutionalism, which, as described, adheres to the philosophy of 
dualism, European constitutionalism from an early stage adhered to a philosophy of (qualified) 
monism. See already the judgment in Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para 
5: ‘The provisions of the Agreement, from the coming into force thereof, form an integral 
part of [Union] law’; Monism is qualified in the European Union, however, since the Court 
of Justice acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ by subjecting the provisions of an international agreement to 
a direct effect test; For an example, see Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057; On this 
subject, see Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (CUP 
2014) 50–54, comparing the direct effect test to the political question doctrine known in US 
constitutionalism. 
78  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/47 (TFEU) art 3(1).
79  This led to some speculation as to the precise nature of the competence. See Ulrich Everling, 
‘Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy in the European Economic Community’ 
(1967) 4 CML Rev 141, 150.
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interests were separately satisfied in external relations, at the risk of compromising 
the effective defence of the common interests of the [Union].80
Here as well, the Court of Justice might have had in mind a desire to prevent 
federalism conflicts from occurring as well as a normative vision of a gradual 
replacement of the Member States by the Union institutions within the areas 
affected by the integration process. Through exclusivity, a smooth integration 
in the international legal order would be ensured; at the same time, federalism 
conflicts could be prevented.
However, this vision was difficult to accept for many Member States. Already 
in the ERTA case itself, the tension between the Court’s expansive understanding 
of the scope of the Union’s external competences had come into conflict with 
a Member State’s insistence to remain visible at the international level. Thus in 
ERTA itself, the Court introduced the ERTA doctrine at the level of constitutional 
principle, but at the same time sought ways to justify that the Member States, rather 
than the Union, were to conclude the treaty involved.81 
More far-reaching still, in Opinion 1/78, the Court of Justice felt compelled 
to accept a Council submission that the allocation of competence is affected by the 
fact that Member States would, to a significant extent, finance the operations of 
a proposed treaty regime. After confirming its statement of principle in Opinion 
1/75 regarding the nature of the common commercial policy—quoted in the 
above—the Court ruled that if:
the financing is to be by the Member States that will imply the participation of those 
States in the decision-making machinery or, at least, their agreement with regard 
to the arrangements for financing envisaged and consequently their participation 
in the agreement together with the Community. The exclusive competence of the 
Community could not be envisaged in such a case.82 
80  Opinion 1/75 (Understanding on a Local Cost Standard) [1975] ECR 1355, 1363–64; See also 
Case 41/76 Suzanne Criel, née Donckerwolcke v Procureur de la République [1976] ECR 1921, 
paras 24–26.
81  The ERTA case laid the foundation for what is known today as the trustee doctrine. On this 
doctrine, see generally Marise Cremona, ‘Member States as Trustees of the Union Interest: 
Participating in International Agreements on Behalf of the European Union’ in Anthony 
Arnull and others (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan 
Dashwood (Hart 2011).
82  Opinion 1/78 (International Agreement on Natural Rubber) [1979] ECR 2871, para 60.
328 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Thomas Verellen
In other words, while maintaining its position of principle with regards to the 
nature of the common commercial policy, the Court from early on showed itself to 
be pragmatic in defining its scope.
4.2 The pragmatic phase: merging external sovereignties 
In the early 1990s, it had become sufficiently clear that a gradual replacement 
of the Member States by the Union institutions would not occur in the near 
future. Member States were adamant to remain visible at the international stage. 
Presumably at least partially in response to this observation,83 in a number of 
Opinions, the structure of foreign affairs federalism in the European Union went 
through a process of transformation. Prior to that period, EU external action was 
undertaken within a normative framework which aimed to progressively endow 
the European Union with the attributes of external sovereignty, and in which the 
federal relationship between the Union and the Member States would be hidden 
behind a dualist wall.84 In the early 1990s, European constitutionalism moved to 
a normative framework in which the Union and the Member States would merge 
their external sovereignties to form what Robert Schütze has referred to as a 
‘plenipotentiary’ whole.85
This development had two aspects: first, it entailed a move away from a 
paradigm of exclusive external competences and an acceptance of the shared 
nature of both Union and Member State external competences; second, it implied 
an embrace of the technique of concluding mixed agreements.
83  Other factors being the experience of the genesis of the Maastricht Treaty, in which cracks in 
the permissive consensus around the European integration process were revealed, as well as 
the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht ruling, in which similar concerns were given 
judicial expression.
84  See in that regard Ruling 1/78 (IAEA Convention) [1978] ECR 2871, in particular para 35, 
where the Court considered the federal relationship to be a strictly domestic question of no 
interest to the Union’s treaty partners.
85  Schütze (n 77) 202–03; Loïc Azoulai referred to this shift as one from a classical institutionalism, 
focussed on protecting the autonomy of the EU institutional framework towards a form of 
associative institutionalism; See Loïc Azoulai, ‘The Many Visions of Europe: Insights from the 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice in External Relations Law’ in Marise Cremona and 
Anne Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional 
Challenges (Hart 2014) 176–80. 
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The generalisation of shared external competences was brought about 
primarily by means of a narrowing down of the ERTA doctrine.86 In Opinion 
2/91, the Court of Justice made a first step in this direction by recognising an 
ERTA-type exclusive Union competence only in relation to parts of a proposed 
international agreement.87 Other parts would fall under shared Union-Member 
State competence. A similar conclusion was reached in Opinion 1/94, where the 
Court required an area to have been harmonised completely before an ERTA-type 
exclusive Union competence could be recognised.88 In more recent case law, the 
Court took what Advocate General Bot referred to as a flexible approach.89 The 
application of the ERTA principle now depends on a ‘comprehensive and detailed’ 
analysis of the relationship between a proposed international agreement and 
common EU rules, in order to assess whether the agreement ‘may affect common 
rules’, as required by Article 3(2) TFEU.90 Putting aside the intricacies of the ERTA 
doctrine as interpreted by the Court in recent case law, it is clear that the era of an 
expansive reading of the ERTA doctrine has passed.91
This narrowing of the ERTA doctrine coincided with an embrace of the 
technique of mixity. In Opinion 2/91, the Court held that in cases in which a treaty 
cannot be brought entirely within exclusive Union competence, ‘negotiation and 
implementation of the agreement require joint action by the [Union] and the 
Member States’.92 In Opinion 1/94, the Court ambiguously concluded that the 
Member States and the Union were ‘jointly’ competent to conclude the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
86  In addition, it could be argued that the refusal to apply the so-called Opinion 1/76 or 
complementarity doctrine in any case after Opinion 1/76 also forms part of the Court’s move 
towards the pragmatic paradigm; On the complementarity principle or doctrine, see Geert De 
Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP 2008) 52–58.
87  Opinion 2/91 (ILO) [1993] ECR I-1061.
88  Opinion 1/94 (WTO) [1994] ECR I-5267, para 96; On the implications of Opinion 1/94 on 
the structure of foreign affairs federalism in the EU, see generally N Emiliou, ‘The Death of 
Exclusive Competence?’ (1996) 21 EL Rev 294.
89  See Case C-66/13 Green Network SpA v Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas [2014] ECR I-3377, 
Opinion of AG Bot, paras 43–48, where he identified three phases in the Court’s interpretation 
of the ERTA principle: an initial broad interpretation, a later stricter interpretation, and finally 
a more flexible interpretation.
90  See Opinion 1/13 (Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction) [2014] ECR I-2303, 
paras 70, 74.
91  For an analysis of the post-Lisbon ERTA case law, see Thomas Verellen, ‘The ERTA Doctrine in 
the Post-Lisbon Era’ (2015) 21 CJEL 383–410.
92  Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-1061, para 12.
330 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Thomas Verellen
Intellectual Property Rights—a conclusion that perhaps revealed the degree to 
which ‘shared’ competence was conflated with the technique of concluding mixed 
agreements.93 To our knowledge, in subsequent case law, in the area of foreign 
affairs, the choice for mixity has itself never been contested.
By embracing mixity, the Court of Justice accepted that the division of 
competences in the external context be left in abeyance. As was arguably the case 
with the scope of the foreign affairs prerogative in Canada, the practice of mixed 
agreements is another example of what Michael Foley referred to as ‘a constitutional 
abeyance’. As Geert De Baere argued: 
Their lack of clarity as to the precise vertical division of competences makes mixed 
agreements suitable for enabling the Union to act internationally while keeping the 
competence situation sufficiently vague so as not to affect openly the Member States’ 
external competences.94
As ‘mixity’ prevents the federal relationship in the EU from being settled at the level 
of the division of competences, federalism questions have started to appear at the 
level of the Union institutional structure itself. In particular, in three recent inter-
institutional cases, the Court was asked to clarify the terms of the decision-making 
procedures on the basis of which EU external action is to be undertaken.95 In the 
two cases in which the Grand Chamber of the Court has rendered judgment at 
the time of writing, as well as in Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in a third 
case, the autonomy of the Union’s legal and institutional order was given priority 
over that of the Member States. The full effectiveness of the text of the Treaties was 
given priority over arguments derived from the principle of sincere cooperation 
93  Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, para 105.
94  Geert De Baere, ‘EU External Action’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European 
Union Law (OUP 2014) 738.
95  In Case C-28/12 Commission v Council [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:282 (US Air Transport 
Agreement), the Commission challenged the practice of hybrid Union-intergovernmental 
decisions used during the treaty-making process—a practice which, in the Commission’s view, 
undermined the autonomy of the Union institutional structure as it indirectly reintroduced 
decision-making by consensus and thus unanimity in the Council; In C-425/13 Commission 
v Council [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:483, the Commission took aim at what it considered an 
unconstitutional infringement by the Council of its prerogative to represent the Union 
externally; Conversely, in C-73/14 Council v Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:663 (ITLOS), 
the Council launched a constitutional challenge against what it considered an overly expansive 
reading of the same Commission prerogative to represent the Union externally. 
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and the need to protect the ‘unified international representation of the Union and 
the Member States’.96 
This shift of emphasis away from the need to work closely to ensure the 
unified international representation of the Union and towards a greater emphasis 
on the ‘prerogatives’ of the different Union institutions could pave the way for a 
recalibration of the federal balance in the EU’s foreign affairs constitution. Rather 
than putting mixity itself into question, the Court appears to opt for an indirect 
strategy of strengthening the institutional position of the Union institutions within 
the mixed treaty-making procedure. 
Yet, the recalibration put in motion in these cases has pitfalls, if only because 
it leaves untouched the conceptual structure within which the treaty-making 
process in all three cases takes place, ie that of a hybrid process characterised 
both by EU and international legal elements.97 By prioritising the former over 
the latter, the autonomy of the latter is undermined. More precisely, as the Court 
of Justice pushes towards greater autonomy for the Union institutions within a 
mixed framework, the tension between EU law (protecting the autonomy of the 
Union) and international law (protecting the autonomy of the Member States) will 
increase. That is, ensuring the full effectiveness of EU law within a hybrid EU-
international legal arrangement implies a violation of international law’s central 
value of State sovereignty. Arguably, this approach is reminiscent more of a classical 
effet utile-focussed conception of EU constitutionalism than it is of a conception 
of the structure of the European integration project as one in which two orders of 
government stand in a relationship of equal autonomy. 
5 Comparing the European Union and Canada
What differences and similarities exist in the ways European and Canadian 
constitutionalism have addressed Thomas Franck’s challenge? How did European 
96  In US Air Transport Agreement [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:282, para 55, the Court dispelled the 
Council’s argument that the use of hybrid decisions should be seen as an expression of the duty 
of sincere cooperation and thus of the requirement of a unified international representation of 
the Union and the Member States with a brief yet telling swoop that ‘[the principle of sincere 
cooperation] cannot justify the Council setting itself free from compliance with the procedural 
rules and voting arrangements laid down in Article 218 TFEU’. 
97  For a further elaboration of this argument, see Thomas Verellen, ‘On Hybrid Decisions, Mixed 
Agreements and the Limits of the New Legal Order: Commission v Council (‘US Air Transport 
Agreement’)’ (2016) 53(3) CML Rev 741.
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and Canadian constitutionalism address the tension between the domestic 
constitutional principle of federalism and international law’s fundamental value 
of sovereignty? The comparison will take place in two steps. In a first step, the 
allocation of foreign affairs competences will be examined; in a second step, the 
exercise of these competences. 
5.1 The allocation of competences
How have competences over foreign affairs been allocated in the European Union 
and Canada? At the level of competence allocation, in both federal-type polities, 
foreign affairs were initially considered federal affairs. In Canada, the power to 
bind oneself under international law was allocated exclusively to the federal 
government. In the European Union, the doctrines of pre-emption (ERTA) and a 
priori exclusivity were designed to put into motion a gradual transfer of external 
sovereignty over areas covered by the European integration process to the Union 
order of government. As European integration progressed, the European Union 
would gradually replace the Member States within the international arena.
However, in both polities, this initial understanding of the division of 
competences came into conflict with the international ambitions of the other level 
of government—the Canadian provinces and the European Member States. This 
conflict led to a softening of the terms of the allocation of foreign affairs powers to the 
federal order of government. In both polities, opportunities arose for the member 
units of the federation to also undertake international activities. In Canada, this 
softening occurred at the level of the enforcement of existing principles, whereby 
the federal government refrained from enforcing its reading of the constitutional 
settlement before the courts—a strategy that allows the provincial governments 
some leeway to make agreements with third countries. In the European Union, this 
softening occurred at the level of the articulation of the abovementioned doctrines. 
As the ERTA doctrine was narrowed, and as the expansion of the scope of a priori 
competences was put to a halt, European constitutionalism moved to a structure 
of shared competences. Under this arrangement, both the Union and the Member 
States in principle hold vast, albeit shared, treaty-making competences. 
In short, in both federal-type polities, constitutionalism allows for both 
orders of government to undertake international activities. Only in the European 
Union, however, is this ability incorporated in the articulation of the division of 
competences. 
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5.2 Exercise of competences
Turning to the level of the exercise of competences, it is useful to make a distinction 
between direct and indirect restrictions on the exercise of foreign affairs 
competences. In Canada only indirect restrictions exist; in the EU, both direct and 
indirect restrictions exist.
Canada is typically considered a dualist federal system.98 This means that, 
once it is established that a matter falls within the jurisdiction of one order of 
government, that government can exercise its competence over the matter involved 
freely. In Canada, this feature flows from the fusion of federalism and parliamentary 
supremacy: while in Canada, an encompassing supremacy as the one held by the 
UK Parliament is not conceivable, each legislature is nonetheless considered to 
reign supreme within the sphere allocated to it by Canada’s written constitution.99 
However, the philosophy of dualism as expressed in the Labour Conventions case 
does potentially limit the federal government’s freedom to exercise the federal 
foreign affairs prerogative. If it is established that a matter falls within a class of 
subjects allocated to the provincial legislatures, the federal government is well 
advised to ensure provincial ‘buy in’ at the level of the negotiation of treaties, 
for it will not be able to force the provincial legislatures to implement Canada’s 
treaty obligations. Even though this indirect federalism safeguard lost some of its 
effectiveness in an era of flexible federalism in which competences de facto overlap 
significantly, it is suggested nonetheless that this feature of Canadian federalism 
does remain a factor to be taken into account by the federal government.100
In the European Union, restrictions on the exercise of competence are both 
direct and indirect. They are direct, as the duty of sincere cooperation restricts 
the Member States in their ability to exercise shared foreign affairs competences 
98  See, eg, Joanne Poirier, ‘Taking Aim at Cooperative Federalism: The Long-Gun Registry 
Decision by the Supreme Court of Canada’ I-CONnect (15 April 2015) <http://www.
iconnectblog.com/2015/04/taking-aim-at-cooperative-federalism-the-long-gun-registry-
decision-by-the-supreme-court-of-canada/> accessed 26 August 2015.
99  See, most recently, Quebec (A-G) v Canada (A-G) [2015] 1 SCR 693, 383 DLR (4th) 614 [20] 
(Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ), holding that parliamentary sovereignty would be undermined 
if restrictions were put on the exercise of legislative competences in the name of a principle of 
‘cooperative federalism’.
100  In this sense, see, eg, Christopher J Kukucha, ‘From Kyoto to the WTO: Evaluating the 
Constitutional Legitimacy of the Provinces in Canadian Foreign Trade and Environmental 
Policy’ (2005) 38 Canadian J Pol Sci 129, 130–31, suggesting that enduring constitutional 
ambiguities creates motivation for federal-provincial cooperation. 
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independently from the other Member States and from the Union institutions.101 
Member States must consult with the Union institutions before undertaking 
foreign affairs action once some form of concerted Union strategy exists. On 
some occasions—without it being clear when exactly102—Member States are 
constitutionally required to refrain from acting all together. The result of the 
emergence of this duty of sincere cooperation, it is suggested, is that Member 
States are exposed to a significant normative pressure to act within a collective 
Union framework. To paraphrase Christopher Bickerton, to an important extent, 
European foreign affairs constitutionalism transformed Europe’s nation-states into 
Member States.103
Restrictions are also indirect. The widespread availability of mixity, in effect, 
leaves the division of competences in abeyance. Absent clarity on the division of 
competences, the Union order of government is put in a disadvantageous position 
vis-à-vis the Member States. For the Union, absent a clear mandate given to it by 
the Treaties, cannot act internationally; the Member States, by contrast, each hold 
an original, as opposed to a functional, form of international legal personality 
and can thus act without prior authorisation by the Treaties. Shared competences 
combined with unlimited mixity prevent the Union from acting autonomously at 
the international level. As the late Pescatore wrote in a 1999 contribution: ‘Mixity 
combined with a presumption for the competence of Member States is (…) a way 
of whittling down systematically the personality and capacity of the [Union] as a 
representative of the collective interest’.104
In summary, Canadian constitutionalism restricts the ability of the federal 
government as the sole holder of foreign affairs powers in an indirect manner. 
European constitutionalism restricts the ability of both the Member States and the 
Union order of government to act independently at the international level. More 
101  In this sense, see Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR I-3317, paras 74–
75.
102  A criticism expressed in Andres Delgado Casteleiro and Joris Larik, ‘The Duty to Remain 
Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations?’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 524, 538–39.
103  See generally, Christopher J Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member 
States (OUP 2012), arguing that national authority in EU Member States is exercised primarily 
through external—in particular EU—rules and norms; For a further development of this 
strand of thought, as well as a critical assessment, see Christopher J Bickerton, Dermot 
Hodson and Uwe Puetter, The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Actors in 
the Post-Maastricht Era (OUP 2015).
104  Pierre Pescatore, ‘Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: Is There an Escape 
from a Programmed Disaster?’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 387, 388.
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precisely, in Canada, the federal government is the only order of government 
that can act internationally, but, in doing so, it must take into account provincial 
interests. In the European Union, all governments can act autonomously in theory, 
but in practice all governments must act collectively. 
6 Conclusion: equal autonomy, also in foreign affairs? 
In conclusion, it is argued that both in Canada and the European Union federalism 
is, to an important extent, put ‘on hold’ in the area of foreign affairs. The division 
of legislative competences does not affect the treaty-making power in Canada, 
making the federal government the only government actor empowered to make 
commitments under international law. In the European Union, the combination of 
loyalty with mixity moulds the Union and the Member State governments into a 
plenipotentiary whole—a strategy that might facilitate the integration of the Union 
into the international legal order, but only at the price of surrendering its ability to 
act independently from the Member States. 
In the final analysis, however, European constitutionalism would appear to 
be less respectful of the federalism principle than is its Canadian counterpart. In 
Canada, the philosophy of dualism—the dualist ‘wall’ or ‘veil’—protects Canada’s 
domestic federal architecture. Despite its broad foreign affairs powers, the federal 
government cannot overturn the division of legislative powers laid down in 
Canada’s written constitution. The power to legislate remains divided, and the 
federal government cannot change Canadian domestic law through its use of the 
prerogative power.105 In the European Union, by contrast, international agreements 
concluded by the EU are binding within the EU legal order, where they rank below 
primary law, but above secondary law.106 If the conditions for direct effect are met, 
provisions of an international agreement have primacy over Member State law as 
well as over domestic Union legislation.107 
105  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193 
[67] (McLachlin J).
106  TFEU (n 78) art 216(2); Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para 42; Joined Cases C-402/05 P 
and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation [2008] ECR 
I-6351, para 285.
107  On the conditions for provisions of international agreements to have direct effect in the EU 
legal order, see Case C-363/12 Z v A Government Department [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:159, 
para 85.
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The EU’s federal architecture, therefore, would appear to be less protected 
against the joint exercise of foreign affairs powers by the EU and the Member States 
than Canada’s architecture is against the federal government’s use of the foreign 
affairs prerogative. When participating in the negotiation and conclusion of mixed 
agreements, the Member States’ role in the decision-making process is more 
pronounced than it is in a domestic EU context. This feature, coupled with the 
potential direct effect of the resulting treaty, undermines the institutional position 
of the supranational institutions, in particular the Commission and the Parliament. 
This observation only further highlights the pernicious effects of mixity 
on the overall federal balance in the European Union. If one is committed to the 
notion of a European Union that is more than the sum of its parts, this paper 
suggests that the first place to look for remedies for this imbalance is at the elephant 
in the room that prevents federalism as equal autonomy from being expressed in 
the EU’s foreign affairs constitution: the possibility for the Member States to turn 
EU agreements into mixed agreements, without this possibility being subject to 
meaningful federalism safeguards.
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1 Introduction
The Treaty on European Union1 (TEU) seems to provide that the Member States 
have the power to amend the European Union (EU) Treaties as they wish, provided 
that they follow the ‘ordinary revision procedure’ set out in Article 48. Does this 
mean that the Member States could legally introduce a principle of fascism into EU 
law? Would it be possible for the Member States to exclude, say, the Roma from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights? Moreover, could the Member States legitimately 
use the Article 48 procedure to abolish the European Parliament? These are but a 
few awkward, yet not entirely unrealistic, possibilities.
In many national constitutional systems, such illiberal amendments would 
presumably be considered unconstitutional. Written constitutions often include, 
besides procedural requirements, substantive requirements of amendability that 
forbid certain kinds of changes.2 States that do not have explicit constraints on 
formal constitutional change may have some kind of implicit doctrine that deems 
certain constitutional norms and values untouchable. It is, furthermore, conceivable 
that constitutional changes that are legally permissible are nevertheless considered 
substantially illegitimate for the reason that it is impossible as a political matter to 
fulfil the qualified requirements to pass a formal amendment—a phenomenon that 
Albert has labelled ‘constructive unamendability’.3 
The idea of an ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’ may seem 
paradoxical.4 Yet, according to Roznai, ‘the global trend is moving towards accepting 
1  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (TEU).
2  According to the Constitute database, 78 of the national constitutions in the world include 
unamendable provisions. See The Comparative Constitutions Project, ‘Constitute’ <https://
www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=unamend> accessed 24 August 2015; For a 
discussion and categorisation of the many forms of formal unamendability in constitutional 
states, see Richard Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’ (2010) 42 Arizona St LJ 663, 678ff.
3  Richard Albert, ‘Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States’ (2014) 67 
SCLR 181, 182.
4  Jacobsohn calls it a ‘conundrum’. He argues that asking whether a constitution—or a 
constitutional amendment, for that matter—can be unconstitutional is sort of like asking 
whether ‘the Bible can be unbiblical’. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity 
(HUP 2010) 34; Harris notes that ‘[a]t first blush, the question of whether an amendment 
to the Constitution could be unconstitutional seems to be either a riddle, a paradox, or an 
incoherency’. See William F Harris, The Interpretable Constitution (John Hopkins UP 1993) 
169; The possibility of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment strikes Preuss as 
‘inconceivable within the logic of a legal hierarchy’. See Ulrich K Preuss, ‘The Implications 
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the idea of limitations—explicit or implicit—on constitutional amendment power’.5 
Significant numbers of contemporary states, moreover, have implemented the 
practice of judicial review of constitutional amendments.6 However, what about 
the ‘supranational’ EU? Would there be room to argue that substantive limitations 
of amendability—explicit or implicit—also exist as regards the European Treaties? 
Furthermore, if so, would the CJEU have the competence to enforce such limits? 
These questions are the central focus of this article.
The search for substantive constraints on the Member States’ EU Treaty 
revision power is not self-evident. On the face of it, the EU formally does not 
have a constitution, but is governed by a set of Treaties—the TEU, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union7 (TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union8 (Charter)—and under international law, treaties may 
be amended by agreement between the parties.9 This would mean that the Member 
States are not bound by any other procedural or substantive requirements of treaty 
amendability.10 In other words, the revision procedure set forth in Article 48 would 
be optional. The Member States would ultimately remain ‘masters of the treaties’.11
of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience’ (2011) 44 Israel LR 429, 431. The mystery 
disappears if one realises that there is a difference in legal status between a constitution and 
a constitutional amendment (in the context of unconstitutional constitutional amendments): 
the constitution is in force, whereas a constitutional amendment is not; as a proposed change to 
the constitution, it is not yet part of the constitution. Clearly, a proposed change can contradict 
one or more parts (or even the identity or spirit) of the existing constitution.
5  Yaniv Roznai, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Migration and Success of a 
Constitutional Idea’ (2013) 61 AJCL 657, 660.
6  See Kemal Gözler, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Study (Ekin 
Press 2008) 52 ff.
7  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/47 (TFEU).
8  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/02 (Charter).
9  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 39 (VCLT). 
10  Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 
82–83.
11  The Maastricht Case (1993) 89 BVerfGE 155, para 111; The Lissabon Case (2009) 123 BVerfGE 
267, para 231.
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It is often considered, however, that EU primary law—the Treaties and 
general principles of EU law—has been undergoing ‘constitutionalisation’.12 This 
phenomenon is described by Möllers as:
the unorganised intensification of a legal regime, whose increasing quantity of norms 
finally enables the emergence of normative structures—of legal principles—that 
can be generalised and that are also, at least factually, difficult to amend due to their 
generality. In this way, a spontaneous internal hierarchy of norms arises that increases 
and accelerates through the multiplication of adjudicative authorities.13
Indeed, since the 1960s, EU primary law has in fact enjoyed legal supremacy above 
all other kinds of Union law, and, at least as a matter of doctrine, it has also taken 
precedence over the laws of the Member States.14 Like national constitutional law, 
EU primary law attributes power to public authorities, regulates relationships 
between public authorities, and regulates relationships between public authorities 
and individuals. The contemporary Treaties provide for fundamental rights 
and key values of modern constitutionalism, such as democracy and the rule of 
law.15 The CJEU, moreover, has increasingly employed what von Bogdandy has 
termed ‘constitutional semantics’.16 As early as 1986, it referred to the Treaties as 
the ‘constitutional charter’ of the EU,17 and more recently, it introduced the terms 
12  Since 2009, the TEU gives expression to the fact that the constitutionalisation of the EU is not 
per definition a progressive development (notwithstanding art 1 TEU, which speaks of ‘an 
ever closer union’). Art 48 TEU, which provides the ordinary Treaty revision procedure, states 
that proposals for amending the Treaties may serve not only to increase, but also to reduce the 
competences conferred on the Union. Art 50 TEU, moreover, provides that any Member State 
may decide to withdraw from the Union. 
13  Cristoph Möllers, ‘Pouvoir Constituant—Constitution—Constitutionalisation’, in A von 
Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart and CH 
Beck 2010) 169, 195.
14  Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 10) 81.
15  See, in particular, TEU (n 1) art 2; Since 2000, the EU has had in place the Charter, which became 
legally binding in 2009; However, since 1970, the CJEU has declared that it would protect 
human rights as an integral part of EU law. See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v Einfur-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1126 (Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft).
16  Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’ 
(2010) 16 ELJ 95–96.
17  Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
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‘constitutional principle’ and ‘constitutional guarantee’.18 In EU legal scholarship, 
it is now almost conventional to regard EU primary law as constitutional law.19 
Accepting the idea of substantive requirements of Treaty revision may be one of the 
next important steps in the ongoing process of EU constitutionalisation.
We are fully aware of the fact that we are not the first to consider the existence 
of substantive constraints on EU Treaty amendability.20 It should be noted that the 
CJEU never declared a Treaty amendment in violation of the Treaties. However, 
when in the early 1990s, the CJEU opined that it has the task to safeguard respect for 
‘the autonomy of the Community [now EU] legal order’,21 commentators suggested 
that fundamental EU tenets, such as respect for human rights, democracy, and the 
rule of law, may be untouchable.22 The discussion, however, fell silent. In the past 
two decades, the idea of substantive requirements for EU Treaty revision has hardly 
been considered.23 
Meanwhile, the process of constitutionalisation has continued rapidly. 
Therefore, it is now time to rethink this topic. All the more reason to do so is the 
fact that the issue of unconstitutional constitutional amendments is extremely 
topical in the field of national constitutional law.24 It is true that comparing national 
18  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
[2008] ECR I-06351 (Kadi I), paras 5 and 285.
19  See, eg, Möllers (n 13); Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 10); Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati, EU 
Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2nd edn, Hart 2012) 1 ff; A journal called ‘European 
Constitutional Law Review’ has been in publication since 2005.
20  See, eg, Bruno de Witte, ‘Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European 
Community?’ (1994) 25 NYIL 299.
21  Opinion 1/91, European Free Trade Association [1991] ECR I-6079, para 35.
22  cf José Luis da Cruz Vilaça and Nuno Piçarra, ‘Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision 
des traités instituant les Communautés Europénnes?’ (1993) 29 Cahiers de Droit Européen 
37; Roland Bieber, ‘Les limites matérielles et formelles à la révision des traités établissant la 
Communauté Européenne’ (1993) 367 Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne 
343; Deirdre Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ 
(1993) 30 CMLR 17; Joseph H H Weiler and Ulrich Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harv Intl LJ 411.
23  For an exception, see Markus Sichert, Grenzen der Revision des Primärrechts in der Europäischen 
Union (Duncker und Humblot 2005); See also, Wim J M Voermans, ‘Constitutional Reserves 
and Covert Constitutions’ (2009) 3 Indian J Constit L 84, 99. Voermans focusses on the principle 
of conferral and calls it the ‘meta-constitutional reserve’ of the European constitutional order.
24  cf Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, ‘An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective’ 
(2006) 4 ICON 460; Preuss (n 4); Rosalind Dixon, ‘Transnational Constitutionalism and 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments’ (2011) Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory 
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law with EU law poses methodological challenges; as Dehousse has cautioned, the 
EU operates at a different level.25 Still, we believe that a cross-level comparative 
analysis can make an important contribution to the current understanding of the 
EU legal order.26
Below, we will first explore the kinds of arguments that are being used to 
justify a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in national 
systems. We will show that substantive amendment limitations may be based upon 
the constitutional text or upon an implicit understanding of which norms or values 
may not be touched. Secondly, we will ascertain the extent to which such arguments 
can be used to justify a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment in 
EU law. In conclusion, we will argue that it is quite conceivable that certain EU 
Treaty amendments would indeed be deemed to be a violation of the Treaties.
Searching for substantive requirements of amendability may reveal 
deeper constitutional structures that underlie the text of the EU Treaties. It may 
furthermore reveal whether and how constitutional aspirations expressed by 
the TEU preamble, among other sources, have been translated into enforceable 
provisions. Considering the idea of substantive constraints on the Member States’ 
power of Treaty revision may be especially important, moreover, at a time when 
constitutional democratic norms and values are under considerable pressure in 
certain European countries.27
Working Paper 349 <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/349-rd-transnational.pdf> 
accessed 1 February 2015; Gábor Halmai, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: 
Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?’ (2012) 19 Const 182; Roznai (n 5); 
Carlos Bernal, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: 
An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine’ 
(2013) 11 ICON 339; Po Jen Yap, ‘The Conundrum of Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments’ (2015) 4 GlobCon 114; Richard Albert, ‘The Theory and Practice of 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada’ (2016) Queen’s LJ (forthcoming).
25  Renaud Dehousse, ‘Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis’ 
(1994) 42 AJCL 761, 769.
26  ibid 781.
27  cf Gábor Halmai, ‘An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe’ (2014) 
European YB HR 497, 497ff; Armin von Bogdandy and Pal Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional 
Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania 
(Hart 2015); Tomasz Koncewicz, ‘Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, 
Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense’ (Blog of the International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 6 December 2015) <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-
constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-
self-defense/> accessed 30 January 2016.
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2 Substantive requirements of amendability in national 
constitutional systems
In this section, we will examine doctrines of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments in leading national constitutional jurisdictions. We will argue that 
substantive requirements of amendability may be justified with direct reference 
to specific constitutional provisions in the constitutional text itself—explicit 
limitations—and with reference to the constitutional context—implicit limitations. 
We will also consider the possibility of judicial enforcement of these limitations.
2.1 Explicit limits: arguments based on the constitutional text
78 constitutions in the world provide what the Germans call ‘eternity clauses’ 
(Ewigkeitsklauseln): explicit substantive prohibitions that preclude certain 
amendments by making them illegal.28 Eternity clauses may prohibit the textual 
alteration of certain constitutional provisions, but they may also designate certain 
‘core’ norms and values as untouchable. Article 79(3) of the German constitution, 
the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (German Basic Law), provides 
an example of both: 
Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, 
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid 
down in Articles 1 [human dignity] and 20 [basic institutional principles] shall be 
inadmissible.
According to German legal doctrine, constitutional amendments that would appear 
to contravene Article 79(3) could be tested, and in cases where an amendment is 
seen to violate the eternity clause, they could be ruled impermissible.29
Other examples of explicit substantive limits of amendability may be found in 
the US, France and Italy. Article V of the United States Constitution 1787 provides 
that a qualified majority of Congress and the states may amend the document 
provided that ‘no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
28  The definition is derived from Jacobsohn (n 4) 35.
29  See Hartmut Maurer, Staatsrecht I: Grundlagen, Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen (5th edn, 
CH Beck 2007) 745.
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in the Senate’. Both the French and Italian constitutions provide that the republican 
form of government shall not be a matter for constitutional amendment.30
Some constitutions, moreover, also designate what kinds of textual changes 
may not be brought about by way of formal constitutional amendment. Article 112(1) 
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 (Norwegian Constitution), for 
instance, provides that formal amendments may never ‘contradict the principles 
embodied in this Constitution, but solely relate to modifications of particular 
provisions which do not alter the spirit of the Constitution’.31 To be meaningful, of 
course, this provision needs some articulated doctrine that indicates what amounts 
to altering the ‘spirit’ of the Norwegian Constitution.
2.2 Implicit limits: arguments based on the constitutional context
Under constitutional texts that do not contain an eternity clause, arguments for 
the recognition of substantive requirements of amendability may yet be available. 
Substantive constraints on constitutional revision may also be justified on the basis 
of a doctrine or concept of amendment opposing changes that are so fundamental 
that they would amount to a complete replacement of the constitution. An 
alternative justification may be provided by a doctrine of ‘supra-constitutional’ 
norms that occupy such high moral ground that they can never be revised.
As regards substantive limits that are derived from the concept of amendment 
itself, India is a case in point. Indian constitutional amendment theory starts from 
the premise that any part of the constitution may be amended by following the 
procedure laid down in Article 368.32 However, in the famous 1971 Keshavananda33 
case, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution of India provides certain 
‘basic features’ that cannot by altered by way of formal amendment.34 The Court 
asserts the right to annul any amendment that seeks to alter the basic structure or 
the basic framework of the Constitution on the ground of ‘ultra vires’. In other words, 
it has held that the word ‘amend’ in Article 368 encompasses only the possibility of 
30  Art 89(5) of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 1958 (Constitution of France); Art 139 of 
the Constitution of the Italian Republic 1947.
31  See also Eivind Smith, ‘Old and Protected? On the “Supra-Constitutional” Clause in the 
Constitution of Norway’ (2011) 44 Israel LR 369.
32  See Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (20th edn, Lexis Nexis 2012) 167.
33  Kesavananda v State of Kerala [1973] AIR 1461 (SC).
34  ibid para 787.
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bringing about changes that fit into the existing structure of the Constitution. The 
amendment procedure prohibits changes that would be tantamount to drafting a 
new constitution. Since the Indian Supreme Court first introduced this so-called 
‘basic structure doctrine’, the judiciary has recognised at least 25 basic features.35
Also in other jurisdictions, it is considered that a constitutional amendment 
procedure may not be used fundamentally to alter the existing constitutional 
framework. In Raven v Deukmejian (1990),36 the California Supreme Court 
invalidated a constitutional amendment because ‘it substantially alters the 
preexisting constitutional scheme or framework heretofore extensively and 
repeatedly used by courts in interpreting and enforcing state constitutional 
protections’.37 In other words, the court held that the scope of changes that can 
be brought about by way of formal amendment is limited. While the US Supreme 
Court has never really scrutinised the constitutionality of a constitutional 
amendment, some American constitutionalists have argued that the procedure 
laid down in Article V is designed as a means to ‘respond to imperfection’, not as a 
means to bring about fundamental change.38 
Murphy asserts that similar arguments could be used in any system that 
considers itself a constitutional democracy.39 Indeed, the verb ‘to amend’ stems 
from the Latin word emendere, which means ‘to correct’ or ‘to modify’. Any 
amendment that would de facto abolish the existing constitutional order or 
fundamentally change its nature would, therefore, not be an amendment at all, but 
a replacement—and that is, by definition, not the power an amendment procedure 
grants, or so Murphy’s argument goes.
In the same vein, Roznai argues that a fundamental distinction between, what 
he calls, a people’s ‘primary constituent power’—the constitution-making power—
and a people’s ‘secondary constituent power’—the constitution-amending power—
35  Basic features include the ‘essence’ of fundamental rights, the principle of separation of powers, 
federalism, the powers of the Supreme Court, and social justice. For a detailed list, see Basu (n 
32) 168.
36  Raven v Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal 3d 336 [276 Cal Rptr 326, 801 P 2d 1077].
37  ibid 354. 
38  Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (OUP 
2012) 331.
39  Walter F Murphy, Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order 
(John Hopkins UP 2007) 506.
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can be made in every country whose people live under a written constitution.40 
According to Roznai’s theory of ‘foundational structuralism’, the primary constituent 
power cannot be bound by prior constitutional rules; it is unlimited by nature. 
However, the instituted secondary constituent power is, instead, a delegated power 
‘acting as a trustee of the primary constituent power’.41 The secondary constituent 
power, Roznai argues, can therefore not destroy or replace the constitution that 
the primary constituted power has created; it must build upon the foundational 
principles that grant the constitution its identity.42
Arguments for substantive requirements of constitutional amendability may 
also be based upon some kind of understanding of supra-constitutional norms 
or natural law-like norms that supposedly limit the constitutional legislator. As 
Murphy puts it: 
Citizens’ rights and dignity are not fundamental merely because the basic charter 
and the larger constitutional order recognize them as such; rather, the basic charter 
and the constitutional order protect those values because they are fundamental.43
Here, the idea is that certain norms and values are of such a fundamental nature that 
they constitute morally compelling demands. For that reason, the constitutional 
legislator cannot deviate from them.
The idea of supra-constitutionality has been embodied paradigmatically in 
the German constitutional order. Respect for human dignity and human rights 
constitutes the core of the German Basic Law. Since the early days of its existence, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court has reinforced this view. In its famous 
1951 Southwest case,44 for example, it held that:
(…) a constitutional provision itself may be null and void is not conceptually 
impossible (…) There are constitutional principles that are so fundamental (…) that 
they also bind the framer of the constitution, and other constitutional provisions that 
do not rank so high may be null and void because they contravene these principles.45
40  Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits 
of Constitutional Amendment Powers (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science 2014), 81–170 (Ch. 4–6).
41  ibid 237.
42  ibid.
43  Murphy (n 39) 508.
44  The Southwest Case (1951) 1 BVerfGE 14.
45  Translated and reprinted in part in Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus (eds), Comparative 
Constitutional Law (St Martin’s Press 1977) 208. 
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2.3 Judicial review of constitutional amendments
The recognition of substantive requirements of amendability in a particular 
constitutional order does not necessarily imply that this order also subjects 
constitutional amendments to substantive judicial review.46 ‘Understanding that 
constitutional change may produce an unconstitutional result does not in itself 
prescribe a particular remedy’, as Jacobsohn explains.47 Indeed, only a very small 
number of constitutional documents in the world expressly grant the judiciary the 
power to review constitutional amendments substantively.48 Far more commonly, 
is a doctrine or actual practice according to which the judiciary has the right to 
declare a constitutional amendment ‘unconstitutional’ on substantive grounds.49 
The two most prominent examples of the latter judicial power are found in 
Germany and India.
The German Basic Law does not grant the Constitutional Court an express 
right to review the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. However, 
according to German constitutional doctrine, the Constitutional Court has the 
right to declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional and null and void 
when that amendment would not meet the substantive requirements set out in 
Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law.50 In several judgments, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has actually reviewed the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments.51
The Indian case is fascinating, and it arguably indicates that anything is 
possible in constitutional law. After the Indian Supreme Court introduced the 
practice of judicial review of constitutional amendments and the basic structure 
46  Although Roznai believes that, ultimately, the two ideas are inseparable. See Roznai (n 5) 661.
47  Jacobsohn (n 4) 82.
48  Art 93(3) of the Constitution of Chile (1980) provides that it is one of the powers of the 
Constitutional Court to resolve ‘the questions concerning constitutionality which arise during 
the processing of the Bills of law or of constitutional reform and of the treaties submitted to 
the approval of the Congress’; Art 146(a) of the Constitution of Romania provides that the 
Constitutional Court has inter alia the power to review initiatives to revise the constitution. 
That is to say, it has a precautionary power to review constitutional amendments; See The 
Comparative Constitutions Project, ‘Constitute’ <https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Chile_2014?lang=en> and <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Romania_2003?lang=en> accessed 14 June 2016.
49  cf Gözler (n 6); Halmai (n 27).
50  See Maurer (n 29) 745.
51  See The Article 117 Case (1953) 3 BVerfGE 225; See also The Eavesdropping Case (1970) 30 
BVerfGE 1.
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doctrine in the 1971 Keshavananda case,52 the government sought to reverse the 
ramifications of this sweeping ruling.53 In 1976, therefore, the Indian Parliament 
added two clauses to the constitutional amendment procedure (set out by Article 
368) that purported to prohibit the judiciary from reviewing the constitutionality 
of formal constitutional amendments.54 The first clause added (now paragraph 
4 of Article 368) provides, ‘[n]o amendment of this Constitution (including the 
provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article 
(…) shall be called in question in any court on any ground’.55 The second clause 
added (now paragraph 5 of Article 368) provides, ‘[f]or the removal of doubts, it is 
hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power 
of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of 
this Constitution under this article’.56 Four years later, the Supreme Court would 
nullify this attempt to preclude the judicial review of constitutional amendments. 
In the case Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India,57 it ruled that the new paragraphs 4 
and 5 of Article 368 were unlawful. The Court upheld its Keshavananda judgment, 
stating that judicial review is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution and 
cannot be abolished by way of constitutional amendment. To this day, the Court 
has continued to assert its right to review the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments.58
3 Substantive constraints on EU Treaty revision
The brief review above has shown that the idea of substantive constraints on the 
power to amend a national constitution can be justified with reference to explicit 
limitations within the constitutional text itself—commonly in the form of an 
eternity clause—or with reference to implicit limitations. Implicit limitations may 
be based upon a normative understanding of what amounts to ‘amendment’ as 
opposed to ‘fundamental change’, or upon a belief in natural law-like or ‘supra-
constitutional’ norms. In some countries, the constitutionality of constitutional 
52  See above (n 33).
53  Basu (n 32) 167.
54  The [Indian] Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, art 55.
55  ibid.
56  ibid.
57  Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India [1980] AIR 1789 (SC).
58  Basu (n 32) 45.
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amendments can be—and in fact is—reviewed by the judiciary. The power of a 
court to review constitutional amendments is usually not expressly provided by 
the constitutional text, but justified by an implicit doctrine. The case of India 
shows that a court can even assert the power to review the validity of constitutional 
amendments in defiance of an explicit constitutional prohibition against doing so.
We are now ready to explore whether any of these ideas make sense with 
regard to the legal system of the EU. Below, we will explore whether, and to 
what extent, EU law may be open to the idea of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments. We will first try to establish whether the Treaty revision procedure is 
optional or mandatory, as the existence of a mandatory procedure is a prerequisite 
for accepting substantive limitations. Next, we will investigate possible limits to 
Treaty amendments—explicit or implicit—and the mandate of the CJEU to review 
Treaty amendments. Our conclusion will be that it is quite conceivable that, in the 
near future, substantive revision limitations will be also accepted in EU law.
3.1 Prerequisite: the mandatory status of the revision procedure
As we noted at the outset of this article, the search for substantive limits to 
EU Treaty amendment is not self-evident. The EU is established by means of 
international treaties between the Member States. According to Article 39 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty may be amended by ‘agreement’ 
between the parties; furthermore, such an agreement can take many different forms. 
The agreement to amend a treaty does not have to constitute a treaty itself. For 
example, oral agreements are also perfectly possible.59 A subsequent practice in the 
application of a treaty can also have the effect of modifying it, if all parties implicitly 
consent to it.60 This procedural freedom is coupled with substantive freedom. In 
principle, there are no substantive limits to international treaty amendments. The 
only thing that is needed is agreement between the parties.61
Under international law, the parties to a treaty can provide for an amendment 
procedure. This, of course, confers a considerable benefit—that an orderly means by 
59  The legal force of such an agreement is preserved by art 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
60  ibid art 31(3)(a).
61  It is true that international law recognises peremptory norms (ius cogens), but there is no 
agreement regarding precisely which norms are peremptory and how they reach that status. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which declares any treaty that conflicts with a 
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which amendments can be brought about is agreed upon from the start. However, 
there may also be reasons not to include an amendment clause in a treaty. For 
example, such a clause might be politically undesirable in a treaty that establishes a 
border. Perhaps counterintuitively, if the parties decide to include an amendment 
clause, under international law, this clause is not binding on the parties. As Aust 
explains, ‘should the means not be suitable, the parties can simply ignore it and 
amend the treaty in any way they can agree on’.62
Article 48 TEU provides for a revision procedure of the EU Treaties.63 Clearly, 
the significance of this article depends on whether the procedure it sets out 
is exclusive or not. In the latter case, the Member States could easily evade any 
possible substantive constraints on Treaty amendment by relying on their general 
(and substantively unlimited) international treaty-making power to amend the 
Treaties. Arguments to the effect that the Member States can amend the Treaties on 
the basis of general consent outside the revision procedure of Article 48 TEU have 
stressed, in one way or another, the Member States’ sovereignty; in other words, 
their status as subjects of international law. The Member States are the ‘Masters 
of the Treaties’, as the German Federal Constitutional Court calls it.64 In terms of 
constitutional theory, this means that the Member States possess constituent power 
with regard to the EU, and create the Union’s primary law. The EU institutions, 
representing constituted power, are based on, and limited by, primary law. Crucially, 
the Member States themselves remain outside constituted power. This implies that 
the Member States can freely choose whether or not to use the procedure in Article 
48 TEU if they want to change the Treaties.
This line of reasoning, however, ignores the possibility of self-bindingness. 
The purpose of Article 48 TEU is precisely to exclude the possibility of informal 
Treaty changes by agreement among the Member States. If one were to accept 
amendments outside the formal procedure, this would upset the institutional 
balance between the EU institutions. That is, it would imply that the European 
Council could transform itself into a diplomatic conference—and on the basis of 
general consent, without being subject to any formal requirements, could simply 
peremptory norm to be void, does not specify any peremptory norms, nor are they specified 
by any authoritative body. For a discussion, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms 
in International Law (OUP 2008).
62  Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013) 233.
63  Outside the scope of this article is a discussion of the ‘passerelle clause’ and the amendment 
procedure for changing the status of the special territories of the Member States.
64  See above (n 11).
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modify all primary law.65 Indeed, in Defrenne,66 the CJEU ruled this option out: ‘In 
fact, apart from any specific provisions, the Treaty can only be modified by means 
of the amendment procedure carried out in accordance with Article 236 [now 
Article 48 of the TEU]’.67 This ruling implies that, within the EU legal order, with 
regard to the form of amendment, the Member States are no longer the masters of 
the Treaties. They are bound by the revision procedure of Article 48 TEU.68
The question, then, is whether the Article 48 procedures allow for every 
possible change, or whether they forbid certain kinds of revisions.
3.2 Explicit limits: arguments based on the text of the Treaties
The revision procedure in Article 48 TEU, in fact, lays down two procedures: an 
‘ordinary revision procedure’ and a ‘simplified revision procedure’.69 Both procedures 
differ not only in formal requirements, but also with regard to what can be changed 
and how it can be changed. The simplified procedure can be used to amend all or 
parts of the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU, which relates to Union policies 
and internal actions. This comprises, inter alia, the internal market and the four 
freedoms, the area of freedom, security and justice, economic and monetary policy, 
and social policy. Negatively formulated, it excludes the general principles of the EU, 
non-discrimination and citizenship, external action, and institutional and financial 
issues. The simplified revisions procedure, moreover, may not be used to increase 
the competences of the Union. By contrast, the ordinary revision procedure may 
65  cf De Witte (n 20) 314–15.
66  Case 43–75 Gabriella Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] 
ECR 456.
67  ibid para 58. 
68  The Member States have signed a number of treaties closely related to EU law outside of the EU 
legal framework. Such treaties could, in principle, affect EU primary law. See the discussion of 
the European Free Trade Association case and the European and Community Patents Court case 
below. A recent example is the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
A separate treaty, amending art 136 TFEU, gave the ESM a legal basis in EU law. It was argued 
that the ESM was incompatible with the ‘no bailout’ clause of Art 125(1) TFEU, but the CJEU 
was not convinced. See the discussion of the Pringle case below.
69  Some national constitutions include more than one amendment procedure. Sometimes, the 
amendment procedures can only be used to amend specified provisions of the constitution. 
Albert describes this feature as ‘restricted single track’. See Richard Albert, ‘The Structure of 
Constitutional Amendment Rules’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest LR 913, 942–43.
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be used to amend all primary law, and it may also be used to increase (or to reduce) 
the competences of the Union.
Therefore, Article 48 TEU clearly sets out formal requirements for any 
Treaty revision. However, does it also put forward substantive limits of Treaty 
amendability? At first glance, this is not the case: Article 48 seems to provide 
procedural constraints only. However, the questions as to whether a particular 
amendment can or cannot be brought about by using the simplified revision 
procedure may, as a practical matter, turn out to be a substantive one. The recent 
Pringle case illustrates this point.
In Pringle,70 the CJEU was asked to assess the validity of a Treaty revision 
engineered using the simplified revision procedure. The amendment inserted 
a provision for a stability mechanism into Article 136 TFEU. Ten intervening 
states, in addition to the European Council and the Commission, argued that the 
CJEU ‘has no power under Article 267 TFEU to assess the validity of provisions 
of the Treaties’. One reason they cited was that ‘the consequence of reviewing the 
substantive compatibility of an agreed Treaty amendment with existing Treaty 
provisions would (…) be to preclude amendments to the Treaties’.71
The Court, however, was of a different opinion. First, it made the observation 
that the amendment was ‘an act of the institutions’ under Article 267 TFEU, as 
it concerned a decision of the European Council. This means, the Court held, 
that the CJEU has jurisdiction. The Court then went on to verify whether the 
procedural rules of the simplified procedure were followed, and determined 
that this also encompasses an assessment that the amendment does not increase 
the competences of the Union and concerns only Part Three of the TFEU. The 
latter determination contains the finding that the amendment ‘does not entail any 
amendment of provisions of another part of the Treaties on which the European 
Union is founded’.72
According to Advocate General Kokott, such an assessment amounts to a 
substantive review of the amendment.73 The content of the amendment cannot 
be assessed by reference to the provisions of Part Three, precisely because the 
amendment aims to change parts of Part Three. Amendments under the simplified 
70  Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para 30.
71  ibid Opinion of AG Kokott, para 19.
72  ibid para 32.
73  ibid para 23.
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procedure, therefore, have to be examined in the light of the provisions of primary 
law established elsewhere. ‘A formal amendment of Part Three of the TFEU must 
not have as a consequence a substantive amendment of primary law which may 
not be amended by means of the simplified revision procedure’.74 This would imply 
that the European Council is barred from amending the text of Part Three of the 
TFEU in a way that is incompatible with provisions of primary law outside Part 
Three. Otherwise, the European Council could amend all provisions of the Treaties 
by using the simplified procedure.
The Court eschews the distinction between formal and substantive review, 
stating that it simply examines the validity of the amendment in light of the 
conditions laid down in Article 48(6) TEU. It holds that the amendment does 
not overextend Part Three and does not create any new competences for the EU. 
Therefore, in Pringle the CJEU made it clear that there are substantive limits to 
amendments under the simplified revision procedure: they may not entail changes 
of primary law outside Part Three of the TFEU.
However, what about the more interesting and fundamental question: do 
substantive constraints exist with regard to the ordinary revision procedure? 
Article 48 TEU remains textually silent on the issue. It does not provide a kind 
of eternity clause, as for instance the German, the American, and the French 
constitutional documents do.75 It also does not explicitly provide that ‘the spirit’ of 
the Treaties may not be revised, as, for example, the Norwegian Constitution does.76 
Therefore, it seems, at least from a strictly formal (or legalistic) point of view, that 
the procedure may be used to amend all primary law as well as to increase or to 
reduce the competences of the Union. If there are any substantive constraints on 
Treaty amendability, they do not follow immediately from the text of the Treaties.77 
We should therefore consider the possibility of implicit limits.
74  ibid para 28.
75  See the discussion of explicit limits in national constitutions above.
76  ibid.
77  Still, the word ‘revision’ employed by art 48 TEU could be interpreted to imply that the ordinary 
revision procedure of art 48 may only be used to bring about corrections, improvements, or 
updates, not fundamental change. See the definition in OED, ‘Revision’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/164894?rskey=wq1paf&result=1#eid> accessed 
24 August 2015; See also the discussion of implicit limits in national constitutions above.
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3.3 Implicit limits: arguments based on the context of the Treaties
3.3.1 Hints in the case law of the CJEU
The CJEU, in a number of opinions, has clearly hinted at the existence of substantive 
limits under the ordinary revision procedure. In 1991, the Court had to give its 
opinion on the validity of a treaty establishing a European Economic Area.78 The 
treaty provided an alternative judicial system. The Court held: ‘However, Article 
238 of the EEC Treaty does not provide any basis for setting up a system of courts 
which conflicts with Article 164 EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very 
foundations of the Community’.79 The Commission had suggested that in case 
of a conflict, the EEC Treaty could be amended. In the Court’s view this would 
not solve the problem: ‘For the same reasons, an amendment of Article 238 in 
the way indicated by the Commission could not cure the incompatibility with 
Community law of the system of courts to be set up by the agreement’.80 The Court 
here distinguishes between ‘ordinary’ EU primary law and ‘the very foundations of 
the Community’, by which it includes the judicial system. These very foundations 
possess a higher rank than other primary law. The court at least suggests that they 
constitute an absolute substantive limit on Treaty revision, meaning that they could 
never be amended.
The CJEU employed a similar line of reasoning in its opinion on the 
compatibility with EU law of a draft agreement that aims to set up a European patent 
court.81 That court would be outside the institutional and judicial framework of the 
EU, and would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear actions brought by individuals 
in the field of patent law and to interpret and apply EU law in that field. This, 
the CJEU concluded, ‘would deprive courts of Member States of their powers in 
relation to the interpretation and application of European Union law and the Court 
of its powers to reply, by preliminary ruling, to questions referred by those courts’.82 
Consequently, the contemplated system ‘would alter the essential character of the 
powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions of the European Union and 
78  See above (n 21) para 35.
79  ibid para 71.
80  ibid para 72.
81  Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137.
82  ibid para 89. 
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on the Member States and which are indispensable to the preservation of the very 
nature of European Union law’.83
In its opinion on the draft agreement concerning the accession of the EU to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), the CJEU once again stressed its exclusive jurisdiction in 
the field of EU law.84 The Court found that, although the TEU provides for the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR,85 the agreement that is supposed to facilitate this 
accession is not compatible with the TEU because it disrupts EU competences and 
the monopoly of the CJEU in the interpretation of EU law.86
The three aforementioned opinions of the Court concern mainly institutional 
features of the Union, in particular the Union’s judicial system. This system is part 
of the essence of the EU, the Court stated, and hence it cannot be altered—probably 
not even with an explicit Treaty amendment. However, in the case law of the Court, 
there is also the hint at a substantive Treaty amendment limit that is not so much 
institutional in nature, but rather concerns the moral-political identity of the 
Union. In the Kadi I judgment, the Court draws a distinction between two kinds 
of limitations on the operation of the common market. On the one hand, there are 
limitations placed on the common market in exceptional circumstances, which are 
permitted under Articles 297 and 307 TFEU in order to carry out international 
obligations for the purpose of maintaining global peace and security. On the other 
hand, there are limitations that would imply a ‘derogation from the principles 
of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in Article 6(1) TEU [now Article 2 of the TEU] as the foundation of 
the Union’.87 Limitations of the latter kind, the Court suggested, are prohibited.88 
Therefore, the Court has ruled that there is a normative hierarchy between 
the foundation of the Union and the other principles and rules of primary law, 
including the four freedoms. Whereas the latter can be subjected to limitations, 
the former cannot. Translated to the amendment procedure, this would impose 
83  ibid.
84  Opinion 2/13 Accession to the ECHR [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
85  TEU (n 1) art 6(2); See also Protocol 8 to the Treaties, art 1 of which stipulates that the agreement 
relating to the accession ‘shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the 
Union and Union law’.
86 Opinion 2/13 (n 84).
87  Kadi I (n 18) para 303.
88 ibid para 304.
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a categorical prohibition: the foundations of the Union can never be amended, at 
least not in a limiting sense; they can only be corrected and perfected.
Hence, the CJEU seems to deem the EU judicial system and the foundational 
values of the EU so fundamental that they can never be abolished. The considerations 
of the Court, meanwhile, remain very concise. Moreover, the very limited number 
of cases available for analysis cannot provide a definitive answer. For this reason, it 
is appropriate to undertake a more daring exploration of possible substantive limits 
to Treaty revision. To this end, we must explore the deeper structure that arguably 
underlies the text of the Treaties.
3.3.2 The deeper structure of EU law
In its Kadi I judgment, the CJEU suggested that Article 2 TEU provides an 
unchangeable core of EU law. The first sentence of Article 2 states: ‘The Union is 
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities’. These values are also mentioned in the Preamble to the 
TEU, and in the Preamble to the Charter.89 The fact that these values are placed at 
the beginning of the TEU indicates that they are of the utmost importance to the 
EU. If there are any substantive limitations to Treaty amendability, Article 2 TEU 
seems to point at the most obvious ones (besides the Union’s judicial system). The 
question, then, is whether Treaty amendments must be tested against Article 2, 
or—delving even closer to the heart of the matter—whether it is possible directly to 
amend the values of this article by removing one of the values (such as democracy) 
or by inverting one of them (such as by turning equality into inequality).
Contrasted against Article 2 TEU as the unchangeable core of EU law, 
European integration, it could be argued, is an open-ended process. Article 1 TEU 
describes this process as a process of ‘creating an ever closer union’, but it does not 
oblige the Member States to develop the Union in a specific direction. Furthermore, 
89  According to the second sentence of TEU (n 1) art 2: ‘These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men prevail’. The ‘values’ mentioned in this sentence are 
characteristics of European society (or the societies of the Member States); they are not EU 
values. An important argument for this interpretation is that the values of freedom and human 
rights require a distinction between state and society. In light of these values, the state—or, in 
this case, the EU—may not impose its values on society.
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the ordinary Treaty revision procedure explicitly allows for a reduction of 
competences on the side of the EU.90 The lack of political consensus about the 
founding values of the Union—for example, concerning the value of solidarity—
provides another argument for the claim that Article 2 TEU can never be the final 
definition of the core of the Union.91
There are, however, also strong arguments in favour of taking the values of 
Article 2 TEU as the ultimate criteria of legality for any Treaty amendment. These 
values constitute the ‘foundation’ of the Union, so changing them would impact 
the whole edifice of EU law. Importantly, the founding values are positioned before 
the objectives of the Union, which are listed in Article 3 TEU. This indicates that 
these values are not instrumental; instead, they constrain the Union’s objectives, 
and all EU action should comply with them. Further testament to this is the fact 
that political parties in the European Parliament are obliged to respect the Union’s 
founding values. Only political parties that ‘observe’ the values of Article 2 TEU are 
entitled to register at the European Parliament and receive funding.92 Clearly, the 
rationale of this is to bar and eliminate any political forces that would attempt to 
undermine these values.
We can take Article 2 TEU as the normative core of EU law, against which 
all Treaty revisions must be tested—the status of the values of Article 2 TEU is 
another question altogether. While EU law does not define the concept of values, 
von Bogdandy has defined values as ‘normative convictions of a highly abstract 
order that are part of the social identity of the individual’.93 Callies, following Di 
Fabio, defined values as ‘basic attitudes of society or individuals characterized 
by a particular strength and conviction of truth’.94 In both definitions, values are 
understood as subjective preferences of individuals. This would imply that the EU 
is founded on the ethical convictions of the majority of its citizens.
90  In contrast, the fifth indent of art B of the Maastricht Treaty determined: ‘The Union shall set 
itself the following objectives: – to maintain in full the “acquis communautaire”’.
91  CONV 574/1/03 REV1, Reactions to draft arts 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty—Analysis, 
Brussels, 26 February 2003.
92  See Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 on the regulations governing political parties at the European level and the rules 
regarding their funding [2003] OJ L 297/1, arts 2 and 3.
93  Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Constitution and European Identity: Text and Subtext of 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (2005) 3 ICON 295, 308.
94  Christian H Callies, ‘Europe as Transnational Law: The Transnationalization of Values by 
European Law’ (2009) 10 German LJ 1367, 1367.
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This subjective interpretation of values relativises the validity of the 
foundational values. In principle, they may be immutable, but if the citizens of the 
EU come to hold different moral and political convictions, the values of Article 2 
TEU have to change as well. They constitute a substantive limit to Treaty revisions, 
but they can be revised. If society changes, the values of the EU will change as well.
One of the problems with this interpretation is that the values of the EU lose 
their corrective function. According to the doctrine of constitutional democracy, 
human dignity and equality are not merely preferences: they are considered the 
ultimate norms of law. Legislatures and constitution drafters do not create them, 
but are morally obligated to recognise them legally. A positivistic interpretation 
that makes the validity of human rights dependent upon day-to-day societal 
attitudes misses the very point of human rights.
This consequence can be avoided by interpreting the values of Article 2 TEU, 
not as subjective preferences, but as objective ‘supra-constitutional’ moral-political 
truths. Human dignity and human rights do not originate in a contingent choice. 
The Member States have not created or invented them. As treaty-making parties, 
they have merely fulfilled their moral obligation to recognise these values legally. 
The foundational values of the EU define the bedrock of the European project; 
amending them in a detrimental way would amount to betraying everything for 
which the EU stands.
This objective interpretation, which is indebted to a form of moral realism, 
is problematic in itself. Law and societal reality may not correspond completely. 
Indeed, law lives through a certain degree of discrepancy with societal reality 
(otherwise, law would be redundant). However, this discrepancy can only be 
relative; if it is too wide, law loses its actual validity, and becomes meaningless. Here 
we encounter a kind of European Böckenförde dilemma: the free, secularised EU 
lives by values that it cannot guarantee itself.95 If the Member States really do want 
95  The full formulation in the original German: „Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von 
Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann. Das ist das große Wagnis, das er, um der 
Freiheit willen, eingegangen ist. Als freiheitlicher Staat kann er einerseits nur bestehen, wenn 
sich die Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von innen her, aus der moralischen Substanz 
des einzelnen und der Homogenität der Gesellschaft, reguliert. Anderseits kann er diese 
inneren Regulierungskräfte nicht von sich aus, das heißt mit den Mitteln des Rechtszwanges 
und autoritativen Gebots zu garantieren suchen, ohne seine Freiheitlichkeit aufzugeben 
und—auf säkularisierter Ebene—in jenen Totalitätsanspruch zurückzufallen, aus dem er in 
den konfessionellen Bürgerkriegen herausgeführt hat“. Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenförde, Staat, 
Gesellschaft, Freiheit: Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Suhrkamp 1976) 60.
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to chart a different moral-political course, the values of Article 2 TEU will degrade 
into a reality on paper. The EU, as a legal construct, simply misses the capacity to 
enforce its values (leaving aside the preliminary question whether enforcing them 
is a justified responsibility of the EU at all). Of course, this is not likely to happen 
in the near future, but neither can the possibility be excluded.
A third option would be to combine both interpretations: on the one hand, 
the values of Article 2 TEU constitute an unchangeable core of EU law; on the other 
hand, because of their very abstract nature, they allow for changing interpretations. 
The foundation of the EU would become a ‘living foundation’.96 This option may 
seem attractive, but in fact it would mean that the foundational values would lose 
much of their bite. At the very least, they would lose their capacity effectively to 
guide the development of the EU legal order. The foundational values would then 
no longer be able to prevent radical changes. Furthermore, this option would grant 
the CJEU considerable leeway to interpret them in a very indefinite way.
The objective interpretation of the EU’s founding values—according to which 
human dignity and human rights are moral-political truths—seems to be the 
most consistent with the self-understanding of the EU. The Treaties, including the 
Charter, are infused with the idea that the Union stands for values that can never 
be abandoned. Taking this idea seriously, we suggest, would require accepting the 
founding values of the Union as substantive limits to Treaty revision.
3.4 Review by the CJEU
An affirmative answer to the question whether there are substantive limits to Treaty 
amendments does not imply, strictly speaking, that the CJEU has the responsibility 
(and should have the competence) to review amendments in this respect. On the 
one hand, it can be pointed out that the CJEU, under Article 48 TEU, does not even 
have a role in the consultation process (as do the European Parliament and the 
European Commission). On the other hand, it can be pointed out that the CJEU, 
on the basis of Article 19(1) TEU, has a very broad charter—namely ‘to ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’. The 
96  Comparable to the idea that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ that ‘must be interpreted in 
the light of present-day conditions’, an idea that was acknowledged by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) for the first time in 1978. See Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) ECHR 
Series A no 26, para 31.
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Treaties do not contain any restrictions on the jurisdiction of the CJEU concerning 
the review of Treaty amendments. This finding is particularly significant given 
the fact that Article 269 TFEU explicitly lays down such a restriction in other 
circumstances.97 It can be argued, a contrario, that the Court has the competence 
to review both the formal and substantive aspects of Treaty amendments.98 This 
argument is reinforced by the fact that the CJEU has always been a very active 
court.
This does not alter the reality that the number of institutions that can 
meaningfully initiate a legal procedure against an amendment would be very 
limited. As all the Member States will have agreed to the amendment under 
this scenario, only the European Commission would be in a position to start an 
infringement procedure (against all of the Member States). Another option would 
be national courts that refer to the Court for a preliminary ruling about the validity 
of the Treaty amendment.99
On first examination, two issues may seem to make it unlikely that the CJEU 
would substantially review Treaty amendments. First of all, it can be sceptically 
asked where the Court might derive its legitimacy to do so. As the CJEU is not a 
democratically legitimised institution, why should it have the power to invalidate 
amendments that are unanimously accepted by the Member States? One answer 
might be due to the fact that the revision procedures are not democratic either. In 
practice, the procedures to amend the Treaties lack transparency. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that the CJEU has its own, non-democratic legitimacy. The CJEU, 
after all, may serve as the guardian of human dignity and human rights against 
popular democracy and the delusions of the day. Defending the core of European 
values, the Court could even enhance its legitimacy vis-à-vis national courts.
Secondly, one could point to the very abstract nature of the Union’s founding 
values. How could the Court possibly use them to invalidate amendments? Clearly, 
97  According to art 269 TFEU, the Court can review acts adopted pursuant to art 7 TEU (the 
political sanctioning mechanism for the case of the existence of a serious and persistent breach 
by a Member State of EU values) solely at the request of the Member State concerned and 
solely in respect of procedural stipulations. This limitation of the jurisdiction of the Court was 
motivated by the extreme political sensitivity of such acts.
98  Pringle (n 70) Opinion of AG Kokott. 
99  A third option would be that a national (constitutional) court declares an EU Treaty 
amendment incompatible with its national constitution. This scenario—first envisaged in 
the first Solange judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Solange I (1974) 37 
BVerfGE 271)—will not be explored here, as this article focuses on substantive limits to EU 
Treaty amendments ensuing from EU law, not from national (constitutional) law.
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the values need specification in order to make a difference. Giving this power to the 
CJEU, it must be acknowledged, would give the Court enormous leeway. The only 
constraint on the judges is the moral expectation that they will administer justice 
in the spirit of European values. However, at the same time, it must be pointed 
out that the Court has already shown itself to be very well-suited for this job. For 
one value, respect for human rights, it was the Court (not the Member States or 
other EU institutions) that has fleshed out its concrete meaning in an impressive 
collection of case law.
4 Conclusion
We started our article by asking a couple of provocative questions. Could the 
Member States use the Article 48 revision procedure of the TEU to introduce 
a principle of fascism in European law? Could they use the same procedure to 
exclude certain minorities from the Charter of Fundamental Rights? Could the 
Member States legitimately use the Article 48 procedure to abolish the European 
Parliament? Our exploration suggests a tentative no. 
Although the EU Treaties do not contain explicit substantive limits of Treaty 
amendability—and the CJEU has never expressly ruled to this effect—there 
is, nevertheless, room to argue that the idea of a doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments is indeed relevant with regard to the legal system of 
the EU. In its case law, the CJEU has repeatedly emphasised that the judicial system 
of the Union is part of the Union’s essence. Changes to the Treaties that would 
impair this essence seem to be unacceptable to the Court, indicating that there is a 
substantive constraint to Treaty amendability concerning the institutional features 
of the Union. More saliently, we have also encountered possible constraints that 
relate to the moral-political identity of the Union. As we have argued, there are 
good reasons to assume that the founding values of the Union, as enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU, constitute substantive limits of EU Treaty amendability. We have 
also argued that it is not unimaginable that the CJEU will assume the power to 
substantively review amendments to the EU Treaties, in cases where the Member 
States would choose to put forth suspect revisions to these documents.
Would this conclusion make any practical difference in cases where the 
Member States leverage Article 48 fundamentally to change the constitutional 
democratic identity of the EU? In other words, could a doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments—including a judicial power substantively to review 
Treaty revisions—save a Europe in which the ‘spirit of moderation’, to use the 
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famous words of Hand, is gone?100 As Jacobsohn suggests, ‘[e]ndowing courts 
with a judicial review responsibility over constitutional amendments might, when 
prudently considered, be thought of in relation to the relative ease or difficulty 
of altering the document’.101 In India, for example, where the larger part of the 
constitutional document can be amended by just a simple majority in Parliament, 
the judiciary may adopt a relatively strong stance when faced with illiberal 
opposition. Amending the EU Treaties, by contrast, is extremely challenging, as 
it requires unanimous support of the Member States. It would be a formidable 
undertaking for the CJEU to go against that potent tide. Indeed, ultimately, the 
people of Europe therefore presumably comprise the body that should be counted 
on to prevent illiberal amendments from ever being adopted.102 For, in the end, law 
itself cannot prevent a revolution. 
100  Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (Alfred A Knopf 1953) 164 quoted in Jacobsohn (n 4) 82.
101  Jacobsohn (n 4) 82.
102  cf German Basic Law art 20(4): ‘All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking 
to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available’.
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Abstract
Regulation (EU) 462/2013 imposes civil liability upon credit rating agencies for causing loss 
to investors by virtue of intentional or grossly negligent infringement of certain regulatory 
requirements. This article argues that this regulation does nothing more than replicate the 
UK’s existing law on deceit, albeit that it is (inexplicably) more restrictive for claimants. 
Further, it considers the potential harm to taxonomy and—by extension—to the rule of law 
caused by such legal duplication when resorting to very specific harmonisation measures.
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Of the many causes attributed to the credit crisis, few have received more 
attention than the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs). A small number of large 
CRAs dominate an industry whose judgement on the credit-worthiness of debt 
obligations informed the investment decisions of banks and investors the world 
over. In this paper, I consider the latest in a line of EU Regulations dealing with 
CRAs. These regulations include Regulation (EU) 462/2013 of 21 May 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2013] OJ L146/1 
(the Regulation). The Regulation imposes civil liability upon CRAs for causing loss 
to an investor by committing any of a significant number of infringements.1
In Part 1 of the paper, I submit that, while this civil liability replicates the 
existing UK law of deceit almost exactly, it is more restrictive than the law of deceit, 
in that it requires the defendant’s reliance to be reasonable. In Part 2, I consider that 
this divergence from the law of deceit is more than a mere triviality—it has both 
*  Teaching Fellow, Durham Law School (UK); Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn.
1  The Regulation, by art 8d, inserts art 35a into Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of 16 September 
2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L302/1, affording investors or issuers a civil claim for 
damages against CRAs, subject to certain provisions (discussed below).
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practical and legal implications. The practical implications arise from the global 
reach of English law in the debt markets. For example, English law governs more 
sovereign bonds than the law of any other country, and the majority of those bonds 
are listed outside of London and denominated in currencies other than sterling. 
The legal implications are two-fold.2 Firstly, it must be considered what role is 
left for domestic law in the context of rating agency liability. Secondly, there is a 
broader theoretical point to be made in terms of the potential harm to taxonomy 
and, ultimately, to the rule of law that could be brought about by continued resort 
to specific, directly effective civil liabilities without careful consideration of the 
domestic context over which they impose themselves.
It is worth considering, briefly, the background against which this debate 
is set. CRAs are, at best, perceived as having underestimated the risk inherent in 
much of the world’s debt and, at worst, are alleged to have deliberately changed 
rating models to increase the apparent credit worthiness of the booming subprime 
collateralised debt market. That is not, of course, to suggest that such action was 
fraudulent (despite the fact that, in January 2015, Standard & Poors (S&P) settled 
charges of fraudulent misconduct brought by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission), though it was perhaps in response to market pressures.3 As issuers 
began to structure products with significant concentrations in one market (such as 
in subprime residential mortgages), there was considerable pressure on the CRAs 
to adjust their models to produce greater tranches of AAA-rated debt4 within 
investment vehicles.5 For example, in 2004, Moody’s, the second largest CRA,6 
stopped using the binomial expansion ratings model, which favoured diversity in 
a portfolio, but then did not commit ‘nearly enough resources to get the ratings 
2  Issam Hallak, ‘Governing Law of Sovereign Bonds and Legal Enforcement’ in Robert W Kolb 
(ed), Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default (Wiley 2011) 208.
3  US Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Announces Charges Against Standard & 
Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct’ (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 
January 2015) <www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015–10.html> accessed 6 January 2016.
4  AAA-rated debt are gold-standard, highest quality debt. They are the least likely to default of 
any tranches of debt. 
5  See generally John M Griffin and Dragon Y Tang, ‘Did Credit Rating Agencies Make Unbiased 
Assumptions on CDOs?’ (2011) 101(3) AER 125. 
6  In the first half of 2007, Moody’s rated 91.2 per cent of the US asset and mortgage-backed 
securitisation market, second only to S&P. See Asset-Backed Alert ‘Rating-Agency Shares 
of US ABS and MBS in the First Half ’ (30 June 2007) <https://www.abalert.com/rankings.
pl?Q=102> accessed 10 May 2016.
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right’ to reflect changing correlative risk.7 S&P, similarly, were alleged not to have 
allocated resources to improving the analytics because ‘improving the model 
would not add to S&P’s revenues’.8 The progression to more issuer-friendly ratings 
was clearly not uncontroversial. Nevertheless, it did not facilitate claims against 
CRAs in the UK. This is because the lack of proximity between CRAs and investors 
renders a claim in negligent misstatement difficult to establish. This difficulty is 
aggravated in a claim of fraud (or deceit) because such claims require proof of an 
intention to deceive.9
The influence of firms such as Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch was so significant that, 
in effect, they operated as gatekeepers to the debt market.10 By issuing a poor rating, 
they could effectively price smaller issuers out of the market. Even government-
backed liquidity schemes, such as the Bank of England’s 2008 Special Liquidity 
Scheme, required eligible debt to be rated AAA or equivalent by at least two of S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch.11 It was for similar reasons that there were only a few rating 
agencies. Due to the pressure on issuers to compete, there was little incentive to have 
their products rated by relatively small or unknown CRAs, whose ratings carried 
less gravitas than those of larger firms. In sum, the CRAs commanded considerable 
influence over a global market (involving private and state actors), which was not 
always exerted with the care or accuracy that circumstances demanded.12 The 
EU’s—and the United States’—decision to regulate the CRA market more keenly is 
thus unsurprising.
7  US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (112 S Hrg 675) 293.
8  ibid 292.
9  Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 (HL) 374.
10  Matthias Lehmann, ‘Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: An Insipid Sprout from Brussels’ (2014) 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2014, 3 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
law/wps/WPS2014–15_Lehmann.pdf> accessed 12 January 2015; See also, Franz P Hops, 
‘Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handicapping the Credit Rating 
Agencies’ (2009–2010) 79 Miss LJ 531, 535.
11  Bank of England ‘Special Liquidity Scheme: Market Notice’ (21 April 2008) <http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/marketnotice080421.pdf> accessed 14 
February 2015.
12  See, eg, Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] 
FCA 1200, in which S&P was found to have breached a duty of care to investors by awarding 
a AAA rating to a highly volatile instrument (it lost c.90 per cent of its value in fewer than 24 
months).
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1 Duplication of laws
1.1 Article 35a liability
The background set out above does not elucidate why the regulation of CRAs 
necessitated the inclusion of a directly effective civil law action against CRAs. This 
latest Regulation (the Regulation)13—the third of its kind since 2009—affords 
investors a private cause of action14 against a CRA if loss is suffered as a result 
of an agency committing, intentionally or with gross negligence, any one of over 
80 regulatory infringements, where that infringement has an impact on a credit 
rating. These infringements, listed in Annex III of the 2009 Regulation15 include, 
for example, a CRA’s failure to assess ‘whether there are grounds for re-rating or 
withdrawing an existing credit rating’;16 a CRA’s failure to ensure that ‘the provision 
of an ancillary service does not present a conflict of interest with its credit rating 
activity’;17 a CRA’s introduction of ‘compensation or performance evaluation 
contingent on the amount of revenue that the credit rating agency derives from the 
rated entities’;18 and a CRA’s failure to use ‘rating methodologies that are rigorous, 
systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on historical experience, 
including back-testing’.19 Put simply, these regulatory requirements aim to ensure 
the accuracy and fairness of credit rating.
It is not within the remit of this paper to analyse the regulatory requirements. 
The focus, rather, is on the imposition of additional civil liability under Article 35a 
of the Regulation. It is possible to contend both that the Annex III requirements 
are sound and that the liability contingent on infringement is not. The civil liability 
is clearly dependent on some sort of factor capable of breach as provided in Annex 
III. However, those Annex III requirements do not depend on EU statutory liability 
for their relevance. For example, one could imagine the Annex III requirements 
13  See above (n 1).
14  Art 35a was into Regulation (EC) 1060/2009. 
15  Annex III was inserted into the 2009 Regulation by Regulation (EU) 513/2011 of 11 May 2011 
amending Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2011] OJ L145/51, art 1 para 
27.
16  Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 (n 1) Annex III, I No 21.
17  ibid I No 23.
18  ibid I No 41.
19  ibid I No 43.
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forming a guideline for assessing, say, a breach of a standard of care in an action 
for negligent misstatement in the UK. There is also something to be said for 
harmonising credit rating practice across member states. So, to reiterate, Annex III 
is arguably of merit, and one need not disagree with that proposition in order to 
consider that Article 35a was unnecessary or undesirable, or both.
There are certain features of this liability that warrant consideration. Firstly, it 
is not the accuracy of the statement that triggers liability, but rather the intentional 
or grossly negligent commitment of an infringement (albeit that such an 
infringement must have ‘an impact on the credit rating’). Such an observation may 
appear unremarkable, though it will be worth bearing in mind for what follows.
Furthermore, the infringement must, of course, require intention or gross 
negligence—mere negligence will not suffice.20 The Regulation leaves it to the 
individual member States to define the terms ‘intention’ and ‘gross negligence’. 
In the UK, gross negligence is generally understood to mean no more than 
negligence ‘with the addition of a vituperative epithet’.21 However, for the purposes 
of CRA liability, ‘gross negligence’ has been understood to mean recklessness.22 
Recklessness relates not to breach of a standard (as is the case of negligence), but to 
intention. Specifically, that the defendant acts recklessly with respect to:
(i) a circumstance, when he is aware that a risk exists or will exist; or 
(ii) a result, when he is aware of a risk that it will occur,
and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.23
Thus, the focus of the cause of action in recklessness is different from that of 
negligent misstatement (which is concerned with the failure to meet a reasonable 
standard of care). The cause of action against a CRA will require the claimant to 
prove, at a minimum, that the CRA was careless as to the risk of infringement, not 
that they happened not to meet an objective standard of care. 
20  Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 (n 1) art 35a, para 1.
21  Wilson v Brett [1843] 11 M&W 113, 115 (Baron Rolfe).
22  HM Treasury, Explanatory Memorandum to the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) 
Regulations 2013 (Cmd 1637, 2013) 7.5.
23  R v G [2003] UKHL 50, [41] (Lord Bingham), affirming the earlier case of R v Cunningham 
[1957] 2 QB 396.
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1.2 English tort of deceit
English private lawyers will recognise that this formulation resembles the English 
tort of deceit. Deceit consists in the making of a false statement, knowing it to be 
false, or ‘recklessly, careless whether it be true or false’,24 and the claimant then acts 
to his or her detriment in reliance on it. 
Professor Möllers and Ms Niedorf, discussing the new Regulation, contend, 
however, that this is not deceit because deceit requires misrepresentation of fact, 
rather than of opinion.25 Furthermore, they contend that, in any event, the claimant 
will have to show that the defendant lacked reasonable belief in the truth of the 
statement, thus rendering any claim in the tort of deceit very unlikely.26 To this, a 
third possible objection could be added, ie deceit requires an intention that the 
claimant relies on the statement. In the context of ratings requested by the issuer, 
and made publicly available, such a class would either be restrictively narrow (ie, 
those whom the CRA specifically knew would act in reliance on their statement) 
or fancifully wide (ie, those who would rely on the statement, if they were to act).
However, it is respectfully submitted that such a conclusion rests on too 
simplistic a view of English tort law. For the sake of clarity, let us reiterate the 
alleged obstacles to deceit: (i) a statement of opinion cannot constitute deceit; (ii) 
even if the CRA was reckless as to a specific infringement, that is not proof that 
they lacked a reasonable belief in the statement itself; and (iii) it is not at all clear, 
given the context in which CRAs operate, that reasonable bounds can be placed on 
the intention element. 
As to the first, it is submitted that a statement of opinion can, under certain 
circumstances, be regarded as a statement of fact for the purposes of tortious deceit. 
As to the second, the problem with the objection, if it relates to the law as it is 
(ie, post-Annex III requirements), is that it presupposes that recklessness as to the 
ultimate truth of the statement and recklessness with regard to a necessary precursor 
to the statement are somehow discrete. As to the third, intention in English law has 
long included oblique intention, where the outcome is a virtual certainty, even if 
24  Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 (HL), 374.
25  Thomas M J Möllers and Charis Niedorf, ‘Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating 
Agencies—A More Efficient European Law?’ (2014) 11(3) ECFR 333, 355.
26  ibid 356.
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not directly intended,27 and thus concerns relating to the size of the potential class 
of claimants are misplaced. Let us consider each in turn.
1.2.1  Opinion can constitute fact 
Whilst it is true that statements of opinion do not normally constitute a statement 
of fact, numerous cases have held that a statement of opinion can—especially when 
it comes from a professional or competent party—contain within it an implicit 
representation of fact, that fact being that there are reasonable grounds for holding 
the opinion. For example, Lord Evershed MR in Brown v Raphael28 held that:
The representation was not merely confined to the fact that the vendor entertained 
the belief but also, inescapably, there goes with it the further representation that he, 
being competently advised, had reasonable grounds for supporting that belief.29
Similarly, Romer LJ, in his judgment in the same case, opined:
I should have thought that it was fairly obvious that the statement purporting to 
come, as it did come, from the vendor’s solicitors, and expressing a belief vital in 
relation to this legal transaction, inevitably would suggest to the purchaser that the 
opinion was being expressed upon reasonable grounds; for it was a matter which 
everybody concerned, and especially a solicitor, must know would vitally affect the 
value of the reversion which the purchaser was proposing to buy (...).30
Brown LJ in Economides v Commercial Assurance Co plc31 reiterated his statement 
from Brown, albeit to distinguish it, saying that the representation ‘would 
inevitably carry with it the implication that there were reasonable grounds to 
support the belief ’.32 On the basis of these authorities, amongst others,33 one may 
at least conclude that opinions in professional contexts—especially where those 
opinions are vital to the transaction—carry with them an implied representation 
27  R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL).
28  Brown v Raphael [1958] Ch 636 (CA).
29  ibid 644.
30  ibid 649.
31  Economides v Commercial Assurance Co plc [1997] 1 QB 587 (CA).
32  ibid 599a.
33  See, eg, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1996] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 200, 216 (Longmore J).
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that there are reasonable grounds for the belief. It may, perhaps, be going too far 
to suggest that all opinions carry with them such representations, though one can 
comfortably assert that opinions from CRAs—being both professional and vital—
carry with them such implied representations of fact.
1.2.2  Annex III infringement renders opinions unreasonable
In the absence of Annex III (or any specific requirements) it would be difficult 
to establish the grounds for asserting that a CRA lacked a reasonable belief in 
the truth of its statement. While not impossible, any inquiry must first establish 
what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’, even before matters of proof are considered. 
The main benefit of the specified infringements listed in Annex III is that they 
can provide clear guidelines for determining when a rating will be reasonable 
(the conceit being that an infringement renders the rating unsound—otherwise 
what point is the requirement?). There is a sound logic in this position, as is 
clear when one considers the alternative: can the law, on the one hand, hold that 
a rating can be sound only if the agency undertaking the rating has avoided all 
specified infringements, while, on the other, stipulate that the agency can have 
reasonable grounds for believing its statement regardless of whether it avoided the 
infringements? Clearly not: such an assertion would be hopelessly inconsistent.
1.2.3  Intention
It is fairly settled law that, in order to succeed in a claim for deceit, the claimant 
needs to show that the defendant intended that the claimant would act on the 
representation and not, for example, that the statement was made to the claimant in 
particular, or that he would suffer harm as a result.34 This is important. For example, 
there can be no doubt that May LJ, in his judgment in Abu Dhabi Investment Co 
v H Clarkson & Co,35 was incorrect in asserting that deceit required ‘an actual 
intention to deceive the claimant’.36 Firstly, a reasonable reading of the authority 
34  See, eg, Michael Jones, Anthony M Dugdale and Mark Simpson (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 
(19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) paras 18–29–18–31; William V H Rogers (ed), Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 11–11.
35  Abu Dhabi Investment Co v H Clarkson & Co [2008] EWCA Civ 699.
36  ibid [33].
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cited by his Lordship does not support such a conclusion. The authorities are not 
considered in any detail in the judgment, but, inasmuch as they deal with the 
specific issue of intention at all, they confirm the aforementioned position—that 
the defendant must intend the claimant act on the statement.37 Secondly, and far 
more fundamentally, were this the case, then the tort of deceit would undermine 
itself, at least in instances where the defendant was reckless as to the truth of 
the statement. That is, how can one at once intend that the claimant actually be 
deceived while simultaneously not caring about the truth of the statement?38 While 
you may not honestly believe what you are saying, that does not mean you honestly 
believe you are lying. There is a subtle but important difference between intending 
that someone act on a statement you neither know nor care is true, and intending 
for someone to believe an untruth. May LJ appears, perhaps, to have conflated the 
concepts.
With that in mind, it is worth noting two important caveats. Firstly, the 
claimant need not be specifically identifiable with regard to intention; it is sufficient 
that the claimant belongs to a class of persons.39 Secondly, the defendant need not 
have primarily or explicitly intended that the claimant would act on the statement; 
it is sufficient that such was a virtual certainty (as noted in Woollin above).
How, then, should the intention requirement be interpreted with respect to 
CRAs? Put at its most restrictive, one could argue that the defendant ought to be 
virtually certain that everyone within a class of persons would act on the basis of 
the statement. This argument has the merit of being a largely literal interpretation 
of the law. Thus, the CRA would have to know that: (a) a pool of people would act 
on the basis of their statement—not might, would; and (b) this pool of people will 
not necessarily include just those who have already chosen to invest in the relevant 
security but will also include people with whom the CRA has no legal relationship, 
ie, people who are still deciding whether to invest. However, by expanding the class 
to include those who may invest (and, by extension, who may not invest, and those 
37  Eg, in Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 (HL), 
211—a case and page specifically cited by May LJ—it was clearly stated that the false statement 
‘must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff ’ (Viscount 
Maugham); See also, Jones, Dugdale and Simpson (n 27) para 18–01—also cited by May LJ—
in which it is clearly stated that intention in deceit means that the defendant ‘intends that the 
claimant should act in reliance on [the false representation]’.
38  L C H Hoyano, ‘Lies, Recklessness and Deception: Disentangling Dishonesty in Civil Fraud’ 
(1996) 75 Can Bar Rev 474, 487.
39  Abu Dhabi Investment Co (n 35).
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who could not care less either way), it becomes impossible to assert that the CRA 
could be virtually certain that they would act on the basis of the statement. The 
literal interpretation, then, becomes self-defeating.
A second interpretation fits more comfortably with common sense and 
avoids the logical conflict. It should be sufficient that, in making a statement, CRAs 
can be virtually certain that some people within the class will act. The sense in 
this proposition becomes apparent if we remove ourselves from the amorphous 
realm of speech. Consider this: I own a car and, in a moment of questionable 
judgement, decide to loosen significantly all of the wheel-nuts before driving down 
the motorway. That one or more of my wheels will come off is a virtual certainty; 
I intend or am at least reckless as to this outcome. That other drivers will be 
affected by the resulting disaster is also a virtual certainty, as I obliquely intend that 
members within a class (motorway users) will be affected by my action. But can I 
say with any certainty that you—as another driver and thus member of that class 
of motorway drivers—will be affected by it? Of course not. Yet were I to crash into 
you—and ignoring other relevant laws for the sake of the hypothesis—one would 
never wish to deny your claim for damages simply because I had not intended 
that you would be affected. Indeed, it would have been wholly unrealistic for me 
to suppose that all members of the class would be affected; the fact that it is only 
one member of that class who was affected should not diminish my liability to that 
member. And so it is with deceit.
Thus, a CRA can be held to have intended that a claimant would act on the 
rating, on the proviso that the claimant belongs to that class of persons who are 
virtually certain to act on the basis of a rating. It is, for example, difficult to see 
why professional investors ought not to be regarded as such a class. To those more 
used to the realm of negligence, this net seems to be cast very wide; absent the 
limiting factor of proximity, we seem left with something more closely resembling 
reasonable foreseeability. Though, of course, this is not negligence. There would 
seem very little reason for limiting liability in fraud to similar extents.
What has been established, then, is that the current English tort of deceit, 
fortified by Annex III, achieves at least as much as the Article 35a civil law action. 
CRAs are professional, often privy to information inaccessible to others, and thus 
their opinions carry with them an implied representation that there are reasonable 
grounds for holding those opinions, and this places it squarely within the purview 
of the law on deceit. Such an observation may appear trifling—on its own, it 
probably would be—but it is demonstrative of a quick-fix approach to law that is 
troubling, as shall be demonstrated in the following sections.
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2 Taxonomic objections
2.1 Specific conflicts in CRA liability
One of the fundamental problems with duplication of laws actually arises from 
inexact duplication. This is the problem here. Article 35a(1) states that:
An investor may claim damages under this Article where it establishes that it has 
reasonably relied (...) on a credit rating for a decision to invest into, hold onto or 
divest from a financial instrument covered by that credit rating.
Taken on its own terms, the requirement is not without possible justification: 
one suspects that the requirement of reasonable reliance is partly to ensure that 
investors are not at liberty to make risky investments effectively underwritten by 
the CRAs. That being said, the requirement of reasonable reliance does seem out 
of place in an article concerned with intentional or grossly negligent infringement.40 
However, there exists no such requirement in tortious deceit. All that is required in 
this respect is that the claimant relied on the statement, not that the reliance was in 
any way reasonable. The claimant’s own lack of care may be a defence to a claim in 
negligence, but it does not apply to deceit.41 
This leaves the current law in something of a quandary: if Article 35a is to sit 
alongside domestic law, then whatever justification the reasonableness requirement 
may have, it is undone by basic civil fraud. This may not be true in all member 
states, of course; however, if that is the case, then there are obvious implications 
for harmonisation. This would not be a problem if the sole objective of Article 35a 
were to impose a minimum standard of protection, a proposition that is admittedly 
not without some precedent. Arden LJ, in respect of conflicts between the UK’s 
Equal Pay Act 1970 and Article 141 of the European Union Treaty in Wilson v 
Health and Safety Executive,42 noted that Community law does not prevent member 
states from conferring greater rights to equal pay.43 Therefore, so long as domestic 
40  There is a general requirement in private law that the parties be viewed as equal—see, eg, Ernest 
J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012)—which is respected by recognising the contributory 
negligence of the claimant; to ignore one party’s negligence in favour of the other’s is clearly 
unjust. It is not clear that the scales are so equally weighted where one party commits a wrong 
tantamount to fraud and the other party only commits negligence.
41  Central Ry of Venezuela v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99.
42  [2009] EWCA Civ 1074 (CA).
43  ibid [67].
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law affords protection that is at least equivalent to that offered under Community 
law, it will be compatible with Community law. The analogous reasoning works 
inasmuch as both the Treaty and Article 35a liability afford protection by the grant 
of rights, ie the English law on deceit can be compatible with the Regulation if it 
affords greater protection to investors than the Regulation. 
However, the equal pay protection afforded under the Treaty is based on—
and a logical corollary of—a core, foundational principle of the Community that 
prevents comparable situations being treated differently without justification.44 
The Regulation is more removed from this tight logical relationship, and is less 
obviously based on a single principle against which we can judge the compatibility 
of national law. For example, domestic law could be judged to promote equal pay 
more effectively than specific Community laws, and thus still be compatible with 
Article 141. In this context, one cannot make a relevant argument that domestic 
law promotes investor protection more effectively than the Regulation, because the 
Regulation’s explicit objective is regulation of CRAs, and not investor protection—
even if the latter is the overriding rationale. If harmonisation is a principle on 
which the Regulation is based, then such will be of little comfort to those seeking 
to promote better protection through domestic law.
In the alternative, then, we must consider that the Regulation supersedes 
domestic laws of deceit, at least in respect of CRAs, on the basis that tortious deceit 
conflicts with one of the substantive provisions of the Regulation (and who is to 
say that Article 35a(1) concerning reasonable reliance is any less substantive than 
the rest of Article 35a?). Such would, of course, be the traditional interpretation 
of Regulations.45 It seems particularly odd for the rules on fraud to be altered in a 
contingent manner, and yet more odd for CRAs to receive greater protection from 
claims arising from their own fraudulent acts than is afforded to those whose fraud 
may cause less systemic harm, viz. every other legal person under that governing 
law. The Council probably did not consider that this liability amounted to fraud 
in the first place, but such an observation does not change the fact that it does so 
in England and Wales, nor does it help solve the conundrum. Such conflicts are 
bound to occur again in other guises, so long as quick-fix solutions are found in 
44  Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ICR 547, [12].
45  Case 39/72 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1973] ECR 101, [4]: 
‘It cannot be accepted that a Member State should apply in an incomplete or selective manner 
provisions of a Community Regulation (…)’.
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directly effective specific civil actions, imposed upon otherwise long and carefully 
considered law. This is not wanton criticism; it is a fact.
2.2 General theoretical considerations
Bizarre though this situation may be, there is a sense in which we are where we are, 
for now at least. In the final Part of this paper, it is apt briefly to consider some of 
the more theoretical aspects of this problem, if only as a guide for future decision-
making. 
Of the many possible defining characteristics of the rule of law, few can be so 
certain as the requirement that the law must be accessible and intelligible to those 
who would fall within its purview. Accessibility would require that the law does not 
regulate the same wrong—the term ‘wrong’ is used in the sense of a legal category, 
rather than merely meaning the same ‘act’—under different regulatory regimes. We 
accept, of course, that certain actions may violate a number of different principles: 
a breach of contract may violate contractual and tortious principles, just as a 
criminal act may generate both criminal and civil liability. But one may rightly 
question a law that regulates varyingly an act violating just one legal principle. 
Similarly, for the law to be intelligible, it must, inter alia, be possessed of internal 
consistency, of a unity of meaning; if the law is to be a creature of reason, then 
internal contradictions are certainly a sign of misunderstanding or poor reasoning, 
and thus to be avoided. For example, it is a troubling oddity of the English (and 
not just English) common law that fraud ‘vitiates all transactions known to the 
law’46—except, of course, where that fraud relates to inducement to engage in 
sexual activity, where, save in certain exceptional circumstances, consent to sex 
will not be vitiated by fraud.47 This is not to argue that the law is to become slave 
to language, but evidently there is not a clear understanding of some element of—
in this example—either fraud, or consent, or rape law. Fundamentally, the law, if 
46  Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702 (CA) 722 (Parker LJ).
47  See, eg, R v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410; R v Clarence (1888) 2 QBD 23, 43: ‘the proposition that 
fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is not true’ (Stephen J). It is not suggested that such 
should necessarily be the case in rape law, but rather that such a contradiction may denote a 
more fundamental conceptual problem; For a thorough exposition of the subject, see especially 
Jed Rubenfeld, ‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 
122 Yale LJ 1372.
376 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law       (2016) Vol 5 Issue 2
Nicholas Hoggard
it is to be fair, must be consistent; if it is to be consistent, it must eschew flawed 
taxonomy and internal contradiction.
The aforementioned golden thread is important for understanding any 
system of law. Just as we may ask what makes dogs and wolves different enough to 
be of different subspecies, but similar enough to be of the same species, we may ask 
what marks the essential difference between negligence occasioning physical harm 
and negligence occasioning economic loss; or—conversely—what, despite evident 
differences, unifies them when compared with, say, contract law. The example is 
not wanton. Tort law in England has developed in a piecemeal fashion, and, despite 
notable attempts to find irreducible core elements, remains largely diffuse.48 There 
is something to be said for pragmatism over formalism, of course, but there will 
come a point at which pragmatism must yield to the requirement that like cases 
be treated alike. It is clearly not enough simply to assert that ‘tort is the realm of 
legal wrongs’, and thereafter list the many and various wrongs that constitute tort. 
One needs to ask what is meant by wrong that makes tortious wrongs different 
from, say, criminal wrongs or—more pertinently for private law—from the 
‘wrong’ of breach of contract. It is also worth asking what it is that entitles torts 
to belong to the same taxonomic group beyond merely asserting that they do not 
belong in a different taxonomic group (what, for example, unites defamation and 
negligent misstatement?). This is not to say that there are not some answers to these 
questions—and certainly this paper is not the forum to consider them all—but it is 
important that we ask the questions; without clear taxonomic understanding, we 
cannot hope to decide like cases alike.
Perhaps these considerations speak for themselves, but it should be abundantly 
clear that a growing archipelago of small islands of liability from the EU—albeit 
that EU law is in a different but overlapping legal taxonomy—can only serve to 
obfuscate and to sever nascent golden threads. They render illusory any coherence 
in our law, which ‘is liable to be affected whether the basic approach of some area 
of law is changed or whether some ill-fitting and largely unnecessary principles 
are superimposed on to it’.49 It would be one thing if those islands of liability were 
addressing gaps in the national law—and no doubt some do and will—though, as 
has been shown herein, this is not always the case.
48  The most notable of which—at least for its prominence—is that of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 580.
49  Lady Justice Arden, ‘Peaceful or Problematic? The Relationship Between National Supreme 
Courts and Supranational Courts in Europe’ (2010) 29(1) YEL 3, 5.
(2016) Vol 5 Issue 2       Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 377
 Conflicts in Rating Agency Liability
3 Concluding remarks
Though much of the CRA regulatory regime that now exists in the EU is to be 
commended, as it provides guidelines vital to ensuring long-term confidence (if 
not stability) in the potent debt markets, the creation of directly effective liability 
remains both a mystery and a problem. Why the same could not have been achieved 
through a Directive is confounding. The end result is a near duplication of tortious 
deceit in England and Wales—fraud, by any other name—except it did not even 
manage exact duplication (in the matter of reasonable reliance). Accordingly, where 
there would have been mere confusion, there is now genuine conflict, a conflict 
that seems to resolve itself by affording CRAs greater protection against liability 
for fraud than is afforded to any other actor. Whilst the final subsection in this 
paper may have seemed somewhat removed from the rest of the discussion, given 
that Article 35a is already with us, it is in many respects the most important. For as 
long as we classify our private law by causative events—like unjust enrichment, or 
breach of contract, or deceit—we must never allow ourselves to fail to understand 
that causative event, lest we lose sight of what makes those whom we make liable 
actually liable. The quick-fix civil liability in the Regulation takes us one further 
step into the morass of ill-defined and inconsistent private liabilities.
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In October 2015, one week before Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, visited 
the United States, it emerged that the United States may be exploring the possibility 
of reaching a nuclear deal with Pakistan. While it is too early to speculate on the 
exact character and content of such an agreement, it has been reported that the 
United States is seeking guarantees from Pakistan to restrict its nuclear programme 
in a manner that is proportionate to the defence needs of the country.1 In exchange, 
the United States might attempt to convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group2 (NSG) to 
exempt Pakistan from the NSG’s rules enabling nuclear trade with Pakistan, which 
would otherwise be prohibited because of Pakistan’s continued opposition to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3 The tension between such an agreement 
and the United States’ existing obligations under international law, for example, 
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under the NPT, could be analysed in terms of a conflict of norms,4 conflict of laws,5 
or conflict of regimes.6 In her new book, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and 
the Politics of International Law, Surabhi Ranganathan presents a novel approach 
that suggests that the conclusion of a US–Pakistan nuclear deal might represent a 
strategic treaty conflict, although the deal itself is not considered.
According to Ranganathan, a strategic treaty conflict exists when States 
conclude agreements specifically in order to ‘displace, compete with, carve 
exceptions from, or alter, the regime established’ by an existing treaty or treaty 
regime.7 Ranganathan identifies two core features of strategic treaty conflicts. 
First, strategic treaty conflicts often exist between multilateral and bilateral or 
small-group treaties. Second, strategic treaty conflicts often concern treaties with 
non-identical parties. Raganathan’s thesis is that treaty conflicts of this kind are 
much more than a mere deontological incompatibility of legal norms that could be 
resolved by means of traditional norm conflict resolution devices, as contained, for 
example, in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).8 Instead, she 
argues that strategic treaty conflicts are a reflection of the complex relationship and 
inter-dependency of law and politics in the international affairs of states. 
In her book, Ranganathan introduces and develops this argument in two parts 
and seven chapters including a short conclusion. The first part (Chapters I–III) 
considers numerous conceptual and historical issues. The second part (Chapters 
IV–VI) consists of three case studies analysing strategic treaty conflicts in practice. 
In the first chapter, Ranganathan introduces the idea and the problem of strategic 
treaty conflicts. She observes that treaty conflicts occur frequently and perceptively 
acknowledges the various challenges that intentional departures from established 
legal norms pose to the integrity of international law and its relationship with 
politics and international relations.9 Subsequently, Ranganathan situates strategic 
treaty conflicts in the maelstrom between two critical narratives. The first such 
4  See, eg, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates 
to other Rules of International Law (CUP 2003).
5  See, eg, Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different 
Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2012) 22 Duke J Comp & Int’l 
L 349.
6  See, eg, Dirk Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP 2014).
7  Surabhi Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International 
Law (CUP 2014) 7. 
8  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).
9  Ranganathan (n 7) 17.
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narrative is epiphenomenality—which holds that treaty conflicts merely express 
underlying State interests—as advanced inter alia by Goldsmith and Posner.10 The 
second narrative is lawfare—namely, that treaty conflicts reflect the instrumental 
use of law by States—as developed in the writings of David Kennedy.11 Without 
committing fully to either one of the two narratives, Ranganathan sets out to assess 
the strength of both accounts with respect to legal doctrine and the practice of 
international law. 
Chapter II focuses on the genesis of international treaty law’s ‘political 
decision principle’ as reflected in the VCLT’s Article 30(4)(b). The political 
decision principle stipulates that States owing conflicting international obligations 
to different treaty parties pursuant to different treaties are entitled to elect to which 
of the two conflicting norms they wish to comply, subject to compensating any 
detrimentally affected treaty party.12 In the context of treaty conflicts, the VCLT’s 
Article 30(4)(b) is highly relevant because it is only due to the article’s insistence on 
the continued legal validity of conflicting treaty obligations owed to non-identical 
parties that strategic treaty conflicts can arise. In contrast to attempts to construe 
Article 30(4)(b) as a concession to sovereign power, Ranganathan argues that the 
choice of the principle was informed both by the liberal (in the sense that Article 
30 would encourage recourse to international law) and constructivist (in the sense 
that recourse to international law would strengthen respect for international law) 
motives of the VCLT’s authors.13
In Chapter III Ranganathan considers three managerial understandings of, 
and approaches to, treaty conflicts that all envision institutional modifications of 
conflicting treaties. First, Ranganathan considers Lauterpacht’s14 doctrine of the 
approximate application of treaties by courts.15 Second, she evaluates approaches 
relying on compliance management by treaty bodies16 favoured inter alia by 
Chayes and Chayes.17 Finally, Ranganathan evaluates accommodation attempts by 
10  See, eg, Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP 2006).
11  See, eg, David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton UP 2006).
12  See Manfred Zuleeg, ‘Vertragskonkurrenz Im Völkerrecht. Teil I: Verträge Zwischen 
Souveränen Staaten’ (1977) 20 German YB Int’l L 246.
13  Ranganathan (n 7) 94. 
14  Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa (Advisory 
Opinion) [1956] ICJ Rep 35 (Separate Opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht).
15  Ranganathan (n 7) 99.
16  ibid 113.
17  Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (rev edn, HUP 1998).
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means of treaty coordination or regime interaction18 as advanced by Young,19 and 
Wolfrum and Matz.20 Although Ranganathan acknowledges that each of the three 
approaches is informed by distinct objectives, she shows that they share an interest 
in facilitating discourses framed in terms of international law—again, in pursuit of 
a constructivist and liberal understanding of international law.
Chapters IV, V and VI then respectively consider strategic treaty conflicts 
concerning the deep seabed mining regime of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea,21 the tensions surrounding the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court and the subsequent conclusion of numerous Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements by the United States, and concerning the agreement of the India-US 
Civil Nuclear Deal. Each of the case studies offers an extremely rich account of 
both the legal and political genealogy of the respective conflicts. While the level of 
detail in the case studies might not always be easy to digest for those who are not 
experts in the law of the sea, international criminal law or the international nuclear 
regime, Ranganathan generally takes great care to relate the case studies back to the 
conceptual observations introduced in the earlier chapters. 
At times, however, the sheer density of presented facts and ideas makes it 
difficult to keep track of the book’s central thesis. For example, towards the end of 
Chapter I the reader is introduced to the works and thoughts of numerous authors, 
namely Higgins, McDougal and Lasswell, Kratochwil, Koskenniemi, Thompson, 
Onuf, Brunnée Toope and Fuller within the short space of ten pages. Similarly, the 
presentation of the three strands of managerial thought in Chapter III might have 
deserved at least as much space as some of the subsequent case studies. As a result, 
Ranganathan’s otherwise very clearly presented arguments are at risk of getting lost 
in the thicket of authors, cases and ideas. Yet, given the remarkable interdisciplinary 
ambitions of the book, the corresponding necessity to discuss and introduce a large 
variety of materials, and considering that the book already reaches the 500 page 
mark, a certain level of compactness is excusable.
Another criticism relates to Ranganathan’s perhaps too quick dismissal of 
attempts to distinguish between true and false conflicts.22 There is no doubt that 
18  Ranganathan (n 7) 125.
19  Margaret A Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International 
Law (CUP 2011).
20  Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer 2003).
21  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into 
force 16 November, 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.
22  Ranganathan (n 7) 10.
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such attempts may often be no more than ‘red herrings’.23 However, unless the 
notion of treaty conflict is to lose all meaning, it is in principle still very important 
to distinguish between actual and merely apparent conflicts. Ranganathan rightly 
observes that international law’s traditional refusal to accept that contradictory 
relationships between permissive and prescriptive norms can give rise to true 
norm conflicts is unhelpful.24 Distinctions on this basis often fail adequately to 
capture the challenge that particular conflicts pose to specific treaties and they 
unduly subordinate entitlements to obligations.25 But this does not mean that the 
distinction between true and false conflicts is flawed in and of itself. Otherwise it 
might become difficult to draw a line between a State’s outright contestation of an 
established treaty and an actual (legal) strategic treaty conflict. Thus it might be 
more constructive to criticise on what basis true and false conflicts are distinguished 
from each other, rather than calling into question the distinction itself.26 
However, these observations should not in any way distract readers from the 
fact that Ranganathan’s thoughtful book immensely enriches the existing literature 
on both treaty and norm conflicts. Her unique interdisciplinary approach not only 
problematises treaty conflicts, but also, and importantly, considers their wider 
implications for the role of international law in the international affairs of states. 
Going forward, Ranganthan’s concept of a strategic treaty conflict will be of great 
help to those analysing the political and legal implications of past and present, 
actual or potential strategic treaty conflicts, such as the proposed US–Pakistan 
Nuclear deal. Even beyond the treaty context, the strategic-conflict-concept may 
shed considerable light on other established norm-challenging phenomena, such as 
persistent objectors in customary international law or the practice of the (strategic) 
non-recognition of states.
23  ibid 225.
24  ibid 11.
25  ibid 303.
26  Note also that international law scholars increasingly recognise the possibility of true 
contradictory norm conflicts: See, eg, Christopher J Borgen, ‘Treaty Conflicts and Normative 
Fragmentation’ in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 455–56; Erich 
Vranes, ‘The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal Theory’ (2006) 17 
EJIL 395, 415; Pauwelyn (n 4) 176, 199.
